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Foreword

Bill Cooke provides the most thorough examination to date of the potential
benefits and costs of labor-management cooperation and factors that influence
these potential benefits and costs. Recognizing that both labor and manage
ment must derive greater net benefit from cooperation than either party can
derive from strictly confrontational relationships, he critically examines why
some joint efforts succeed and others fail.
It is fundamentally clear from his analysis that labor-management coopera
tion requires high levels of mutual respect and trust. It is along these lines
that Cooke tackles the overriding problem of how to sustain trust, commit
ment, and enthusiasm for cooperation. Most writers on this subject conclude
that it is most difficult, if not impossible, to sustain these programs in the long
term. Unlike most writers, however, Cooke offers a set of specific recom
mendations to avoid this pitfall and sustain the benefits to both labor and
management on a continuing basis. These recommendations, which include
establishing labor©s claim to its stake in business decisions and performance
gains, are worthy of careful consideration.
Cooke provides a critical and balanced view of labor-management coopera
tion. As such, the evidence and opinions provided are important reading for
both union and business leaders. Unions and employers who have either already
embarked on cooperative strategies or who are considering entering into
cooperative relationships should read this book. Although it is doubtful that
this book will be widely read by antiunion executives and managers, I wish
it could be required reading for them. Perhaps they would learn that workplace
efficiency and workplace democracy are not only compatible, they are essen
tial to American competitiveness in a global marketplace.
Douglas Fraser
Former President of the UAW

and University Professor, Wayne State University
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1
Cooperation
Trying To Make It Work In America
As we enter the 1990s, there can be little doubt that global and
domestic nonunion competition have severely challenged traditional
collective bargaining relationships in American industry. The market
forces brought to bear on industry in the late 1970s and throughout the
1980s have led to important strategic choices by employers and unions,
some adversarial and some cooperative. These choices may depict, on
one hand, what some observers have called nothing less than the "trans
formation of American industrial relations" (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986), or what others, on the other hand, view as "nothing new under
the sun" (Dunlop 1986). Whether one views ongoing changes as "noth
ing new" or "a transformation," there are currently unprecedented
widespread efforts at joint union-management activities designed to
improve labor-management relations and company performance. Do
these innovative joint activities, however, hallmark a shift away from
historically adversarial relationships between unions and employers?
Are industry and union leaders truly pioneering new and lasting part
nerships, or are they merely going in circles, buying time and destined
to return to a long tradition of adversarial relationships?
This study examines that fundamental question, although any defini
tive answer at this time would be premature. The purpose of the study is
to explore issues regarding the decision to cooperate, the success of
cooperative efforts, and the problems that undermine these efforts. The
analyses presented are based on a variety of secondary data sources, as
well as data from nationwide surveys of plant managers, their local
union leader counterparts, and executives of companies parent to the
plants sampled.
This first chapter reviews the existing literature and sets the stage for
1
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the analyses that follow. Chapter 2 develops a general theoretical frame
work, which broadly guides the subsequent analyses. Chapter 3 de
scribes companywide labor relations strategies that have recently
emerged and examines why some parties have embarked on cooperative
relations and why just as many have not. In addition, the objectives and
structure of joint programs, as reported by a sample of plant managers
and local union leaders, are described. Chapter 4 examines how effec
tive these joint efforts have been and identifies factors that appear to
enhance or diminish their effectiveness. Chapter 5 addresses the under
lying problems arising in the joint decisionmaking process that under
mine the potential success and longevity of cooperative efforts. Finally,
how the parties can go about resolving, avoiding, or minimizing the
costly effects of these key problems is addressed in chapter 6. In that
final chapter, implications for the union movement are also assessed.
I have chosen to avoid reporting many of the statistical details of my
analyses. My purpose in doing so is to reach out to a wide audience of
local and national union leaders, plant managers and company execu
tives, and various policy makers wrestling with the issues at hand in
practical ways. Although this wider audience needs and seeks informa
tion and analyses that go beyond the wealth of reported case studies,
reports, and testimonials, their interests are not in studying more aca
demic methodological details and nuances of statistical modeling.
Where I report the results of various statistical estimations, I have
nevertheless adhered strictly to the results and hypothesized causeeffect relations. For readers especially interested in statistical details of
the analyses, selected tables reporting the measurement and estimation
of pertinent equations are provided in appendices to chapters 3 and 4.
Nearly all the statistical estimations used in this study, furthermore, have
been published recently or are in press in academic journals and hence
available to the interested reader.

Review and Synthesis of the Literature
The literature on cooperation has grown rapidly in recent years,
addressing both American and foreign experiences. Nearly all this
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literature is founded on single company and union case studies, reports,
and testimonials. Recognizing that a detailed review of the literature is
far beyond the intended scope of this study and that my specific purpose
is to examine American industry experiences, I restrict my review to
first providing a note on the limited early American experiments and,
second, to a general synthesis of the reported potential benefits, costs,
and problems associated with American cooperative activities. The
review is further restricted to cooperative efforts between union repre
sentatives and plant management that (a) are outside traditional contract
negotiations and contract administration; (b) contain formalized mecha
nisms for input from union representatives and/or the employees they
represent into management decisions; and (c) are intended to improve
company performance at the plant, either through direct efforts aimed at
improving productivity, quality, efficiency, etc., and/or through indirect
efforts aimed at improving employee well-being, job satisfaction, and/
or the labor-management relations climate.
Excluded, then, are cooperative problemsolving activities that might
normally occur during the negotiation and the day-to-day administration
of contracts. Although joint programs in health and safety, substance
abuse, apprenticeship training, and many others can be seen as contrib
uting to company performance and employee welfare, they are excluded
from the present analysis. Their specific foci and restricted activities fall
at the periphery of the present investigation and warrant separate analy
ses. Also excluded are joint activities undertaken outside the plant or
company, such as involvement in industry or communitywide joint
activities or instances where the parties seek in concert to obtain trade
protection from foreign competitors.
Except for labor-management committees, most joint activities are
structured to elicit shop-floor participation. These programs, moreover,
are very similar in structure and activity, regardless of program title.
They revolve around team or group activities in which hourly and
salaried employees put their heads together on a fairly regular basis.
Their charge is to identify problems and opportunities for improvements
in the workplace and, in turn, to develop plans for resolving problems or
making improvements. Quality of Work Life (QWL) or Employee
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Involvement (El) programs do not differ substantially from quality
circles, work teams, or employee involvement associated with gainsharing arrangements. The programs all appear to tackle issues surrounding
productivity, product quality, efficiency, etc., and employee concerns
about the work environment, the climate of labor-management rela
tions, and overall job security. Most of these programs also have steering
committees involving union officials, most restrict activities to subjects
not governed by the labor contract, most are voluntary, and most provide
training for team members.
These structural similarities do not imply that there are no differences
among the team-based programs. The differences, however, have less to
do with structure and purpose and more to do with: (a) the intensity of
activity (e.g., the proportion of employees engaged in the activity,
frequency of group meetings, the amount of team member training, and
the extent of other joint programs); (b) the degree of emphasis placed on
selected performance-related factors (quality, productivity, absen
teeism, etc.); (c) the amount of autonomy and decisionmaking authority
granted to teams; (d) the degree of union leader input (both in the design
and facilitation of programs); and (e) whether or not there are financial
incentives, either tied directly (i.e. gainsharing) or indirectly (i.e. profit
sharing and stock ownership) to employee participation.
In spite of an extensive literature addressing cooperation, there are
only a few surveys that begin to document the extent to which cooper
ative activities have been undertaken. My 1986 nationwide survey of
350 relatively large unionized manufacturing plants (described in chap
ter 3) indicates that roughly 50 percent have established formalized joint
programs of the kind described above. A 1983 Conference Board survey
of approximately 400 large companies shows that 56 percent of union
ized business units have established programs wherein "employees meet
in small groups to discuss production and quality" (Kochan, McKersie,
Chalykoff 1986). A 1983-1984 survey of approximately 350 unionized
firms in Wisconsin shows that roughly 60 percent have established
either shop-floor teams or joint committees (Voos 1987). A 1987 nation
wide survey of approximately 150 unionized business units shows that
about 50 percent have established "employee participation initiatives"
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(Delaney, Ichniowski, and Lewin 1988). Although these various surveys
are not fully comparable due to differences in sampling, response rates,
and definitions of cooperative activities, they do encompass the most
extensive efforts to date at documentation of cooperative efforts. Taken
together, these surveys indicate that roughly half of unionized private
sector establishments have embarked on cooperative efforts of the
nature to be examined by this investigation.
The fact that cooperation between unions and employers is occurring
is (in Dunlop©s words) nothing new under the sun. Cooperative efforts to
improve productivity and production standards were undertaken in the
1920s and afterwards, especially in the railroad, textile, and garment
industries (Slichter 1941; Slichter, Healy, and Livernash 1960; Jacoby
1983). Pressured by the War Labor Board during WWII, unions and
employers established thousands of joint productivity committees (de
Schweinitz 1949). Throughout the post-WWII period, there also were a
number of highly publicized but fairly isolated cooperative efforts
undertaken; for example, by the Tennessee Valley Authority and the
Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council, Rushton Coal Mine and the
United Mine Workers, and Harmon International and the United Auto
Workers (Slichter, Healy, and Livernash 1960; Cammann, Lawler,
Ledford, and Seashore 1985). History shows, however, that case after
case of these uncommon cooperative committee and team efforts were
short-lived.
Even though American union-management cooperative efforts de
signed to improve company performance and labor-management rela
tions are nothing new, the fact that these efforts are currently widespread
is unprecedented. Were these efforts to become central and lasting
institutional arrangements of successful collective bargaining rela
tionships, then in the words of Kochan et al., American industrial
relations would be transformed. For cooperative efforts to become
lasting forms of partnership, however, it must ultimately be demon
strated that the gains to cooperation are greater than the costs and that
the net gains at least match those derivable from more traditional or
highly adversarial relationships.
There is a rich descriptive literature that identifies a wide range of
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these potential benefits and costs to management, employees, and union
leaders. The literature also identifies several general or recurring
problems (e.g., insufficient trust and commitment) that appear to in
crease specific costs associated with cooperation. Except for discussing
these general problems, the literature is largely silent, nonetheless, with
respect to identifying salient factors that affect potential benefits and
costs, and, consequently, affect the success of cooperative efforts. One
of the primary purposes of the present study is to begin filling that void.
Potential Benefits and Costs of Cooperation
Potential benefits and costs associated with cooperation must be
examined through the eyes of managers, bargaining unit employees, and
union leaders. In synthesizing the literature, therefore, I attempt to
distinguish potential benefits and costs as they may be realized by these
three parties to cooperative activities. Because most of these potential
benefits and costs are fairly self-explanatory, I avoid any lengthy discus
sion but provide interested readers with citations of reports in which
richer descriptions and analyses can be found. The potential benefits
and costs, as the reader will surely recognize, are sometimes extrinsic or
pecuniary and sometimes intrinsic or nonpecuniary, some depict more
tangible outcomes than others, and some outcomes are potential benefits
to one or more parties but are potential costs to another.
Potential Benefits and Costs to Management
Potential Benefits: The potential benefits to management from plantlevel cooperation reflect various dimensions of the labor costs and
nonlabor cost components of production. Labor costs are potentially
reduced by making the production process more efficient, increasing
output per unit of labor, and reducing the cost of labor per unit of product
produced. Increased product demand can be derived by improving
product quality, giving greater attention to customer satisfaction, and
dealing more effectively with customers. By searching out ways of
eliminating unnecessary overhead expenditures, minimizing waste and
rework, reducing materials costs and materials handling and inventory
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costs, enhancing the utilization of capital equipment, and dealing more
effectively with suppliers, nonlabor costs are potentially reduced. Also
by minimizing unnecessary labor-management conflicts and problems
and by resolving these more quickly and satisfactorily, associated lost
productive time and inefficiencies are minimized. Last, cooperative
efforts can potentially increase worker commitment to and identity with
company goals, which lead to more aggressive efforts by employees and
union leaders at being competitive and at improving workplace
practices.
Drawing on the literature, the following potential benefits have been
identified from a wide range and mix of cooperative efforts.
1. Increased Productivity and Efficiency
See Voos (1987); Schuster (1984, ch.6); Cohen-Rosenthal and
Burton (1987, pp. 32-33); Rosenberg and Rosenstein (1980);
Contino (1986); Boyle (1986); Douty (1975); Pearlstein (1988).
2.Improved Quality of Product and Service
See Camens (1986); Voos (1987); Boyle (1986); Katz, Kochan,
and Gobeille (1983); Katz, Kochan, and Weber (1985); Smith
(1986a).
3.Improved Customer Relations and Service
See Mclntosh (1988).
4.Reduced Waste and Rework
See Boylston (1986); Katz, Kochan, and Gobeille (1983); Camens (1986).
5.Reduced Overhead, Materials Costs, and Material Handling
Costs
See Dulworth (1985); Lazes and Costanza (1984).
6.Enhanced Supplier Service
See Roadley (1988); Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1988).
7.Improved Communications
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See Driscoll (1980); Boyle (1986); Siegel and Weinberg (1982);
U.S. Department of Labor (1982 and 1983); Smith (1988).
8.Improved Relationships Between Supervisors and Employees
See Fuller (1981); Boyle (1986); Burck (1981,a); Kochan, Katz
and Mower (1984, pp. 134-138).
9. Reduced Grievances and Disciplinary Action
See Guest (1979); Watts (1982); U.S. Department of Labor
(1982); Smith (1988b).
10. Stronger Identity and Commitment to Company Goals
See Boyle (1986); Goodman (1980); U.S. Department of Labor
(1982); Walton (1985); Verma and McKersie (1987); Schuster
(1989).
11. Reduced Absenteeism, Tardiness, and TUrnover
See Guest (1979); Goodman (1980); Cammann, Lawler, Ledford, and Seashore (1984, p. 110); Goodman and Lawler (1979);
Siegel and Weinberg (1982).
12.Increased Organizational Flexibility and Adaptability
See Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton (1987, p. 31); U.S. Department
of Labor (1982 and 1983); Lawler and Drexler (1978).
Potential Costs: Organizational shifts from traditional and generally
adversarial collective bargaining relationships and autocratic manage
rial practices (which left little room for employee or union leader
participation in management decisions), demand substantial change in
an organization©s culture, values, and shared ideologies. These organi
zational shifts sometimes require sizable resources for reorientation and
training of managers, supervisors, rank-and-file, and union represen
tatives. The costs of change are not only financial but include nonpecuniary costs to many managers and supervisors in the form of
perceived loss of authority, power, and status. Because of improvements
in productivity and efficiency, furthermore, the perceived threat of job
loss (attributable to shifting authority to employees) among managers
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and supervisors is heightened. In response to these potential costs,
managers and supervisors are less inclined than otherwise to genuinely
embrace cooperation, which necessarily reduces some of the potential
company benefits identified above. There is also testimony that commit
tee and team-based meetings are often marked by wasted or generally
unproductive time, limiting management©s ability to react quickly or
complete production schedules in a timely fashion. In addition, when
important disputes arise, the parties sometimes make unwise compro
mises in the name of bolstering cooperation. In summary, the literature
has addressed the following potential costs of cooperation to
management.
1. Added Costs for Reorientation and Training of Managers, Employ
ees, and Union Representatives
See Tick, McKersie, and Greenblaugh (1982); Lawler and Drexler
(1978); Siegel and Weinberg (1982); U.S. Department of Labor
(1982); Lee (1987).
2. Perceived Loss of Authority and Status
See Lawler and Drexler (1978); Guest (1979); Schlesinger and
Walton (1977); Rosow (1979); Jacoby (1983); Siegel and Weinberg
(1982); Rosow (1986).
3.Displacement or Loss of Employment for Middle-Managers and
Supervisors
See Schlesinger and Walton (1977); Simmons and Mares (1985, ch.
13).
4. Wasted Time Spent in Meetings
See Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1988).

Potential Benefits and Costs to Employees
Potential Benefits: Unless joint activities yield financial rewards (e.g.,
in the form of gainsharing) and greater employment security, the potential
benefits to bargaining unit employees are largely intrinsic, as derived
from more harmonious working relations and higher quality of work-
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lives. The literature highlights how employees derive these potential
benefits by experiencing greater participation or involvement in their
work, having more say in how work gets accomplished, and improving
work conditions and environments. Assuming employees prefer more
harmonious over less harmonious working relations, employees poten
tially benefit from fewer grievance disputes and quicker problem resolu
tion. Last, cooperative relationships often provide employees enhanced
dignity, self-esteem, and pride in their work. In summary, the literature
identifies and addresses the following potential benefits to employees:
1. Increased Intrinsic Rewards from the Participation or Involvement
Process
See Guest (1979); Goodman (1980); Work in America Institute,
Inc. (1982, ch. 3); Parker (1985, ch. 2).
2. Greater Say in How Work Gets Accomplished
See Kochan, Katz and Mower (1984, ch. 4).
3.Improved Working Conditions
See U.S. Department of Labor (1983); Ruttenberg (1988).
4. Enhanced Financial Rewards From Gainsharing and Other Incen
tive Arrangements
See Schuster (1989, 1984, ch. 6); Cummings and Molloy (1977,
ch. 21,22); Dulworth (1985); Pearlstein (1988); Ross and Ross
(1986).
5.Improved Supervisor-Employee Relationships
See Burck (1981,a); Fuller (1981); Boyle (1986); Kochan, Katz,
and Mower (1984, pp. 134-138).
6. Reduced Grievances and Quicker Resolution of Problems
See Burck (198la); Kochan, Katz, and Mower (1984, pp.
134-138); Smith (1988b).
7.Heightened Dignity, Self-Esteem, and Pride in Work
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See U.S. Department of Labor (1983); Work in America Institute,
Inc. (1982, ch. 3); Mclntosh (1988).
Potential Costs: In some cases management may be perceived as
promoting cooperative activities as a guise for having employees simply
work harder as opposed to working smarter, which leads to greater
fatigue and stress. By helping invent ways to increase productivity and
efficiency, some employees fear displacement or loss of employment for
themselves or co-workers. Some employees, furthermore, apparently
fear having to relinquish their secret work practices, which would
eliminate personal advantages in completing tasks more efficiently than
others or in receiving pay incentives. More skilled or senior employees
dislike sharing unwanted tasks, which is frequently required by team
efforts. There is, finally, anecdotal evidence that some employees shun
unwanted peer pressure to be more or less involved in cooperative
activities. In summary, the literature identifies the following potential
costs of cooperation to employees:
1. Working Harder, Not Necessarily Smarter
See Oswald (1986); Simmons and Mares (1985, ch. 14).
2. Displacement or Loss of Employment From Increased Productiv
ity and Efficiency
See Zager (1977); Schuster (1984, ch. 6); Simmons and Mares
(1985, ch. 14); Work in America Institute, Inc. (1982, ch. 3)
Camens (1986); Banks and Metzgar (1989).
3.Unwanted Peer Pressure to be Involved or Not Involved
See Spector (1986).

Potential Benefits and Costs to Unions
In weighing the potential benefits and costs of joint programs, union
leaders estimate the value of joint programs in satisfying the needs and
promoting the interests of (a) their members, (b) the union as an
institution, and (c) themselves as leaders. The potential benefits and
costs to employees described above, therefore, are weighed by union
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leaders. The potential benefits and costs outlined below, on the other
hand, are pertinent to the union as a viable institution and to the leaders
who, it can be assumed, prefer to benefit rather than be hurt politically
by engaging in and supporting joint activities.
Potential Benefits: By satisfying member interests that would not
otherwise be possible to satisfy except through cooperation, union
leaders potentially receive recognition from members. The key here is,
of course, that members reap benefits from cooperation and that they
recognize these benefits were gotten via union leader involvement in
establishing or modifying cooperative activities and could not have been
gotten via traditional collective bargaining. This recognition, however,
is sometimes thwarted by managers failing to share recognition with
union leaders for benefits obtained. Cooperation also potentially pro
vides union leaders with greater knowledge of and input into manage
ment decisionmaking, which, in turn, allows the union leadership to
make better informed decisions affecting the membership and the union
as an institution. Cooperation, that is, potentially gives union leaders
greater access to pertinent company information, earlier notification of
pending organizational changes, and opportunities to persuade manage
ment to modify their decisions.
Cooperation, in addition, potentially leads to improved communica
tion, which (everything else the same) can lead to more harmonious
interpersonal relations and trust between managers and union leaders.
As an outgrowth of reduced grievances and disciplinary action, cooper
ation reduces the conflicts and costs associated with day-to-day contract
administration. Finally, some unions have found that the organizational
structures surrounding joint committee and team-based activities pro
vide avenues for more regular input by members in union activities and
policy making. In summary, the literature identifies the following poten
tial benefits to union leaders:
1. Recognition from Members for Improvements
See Burck (1981,a and 1981,b); Cammann, Lawler, Ledford, and
Seashore (1984, pp. 11, 21-22); Greenberg and Glaser (1980);
Dyer, Lipsky, and Kochan (1977).
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2. Greater Participation and Input in Management Decisions
See Fraser (1986); Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton (1987, p.20);
Simmons and Mares (1985, ch. 14); Work in America Institute,
Inc. (1982, ch. 4).
3. Improved Communications Between Union Leaders and Managers
See Driscoll (1980); Smith (1988b).
4. Reduced Day-to-Day Contract Administration Problems
See Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton (1987, pp. 16-17); Kochan,
Katz, and Mower (1984, pp. 134-146); Watts (1982).
5.Greater Membership Input into Regular Union Activities and
Policies
See Burck (198la); Kochan, Katz, and Mower (1984, pp.
138-146); Bieber (1984, p. 34).
Potential Costs: The adjustment from traditional adversarial roles to
roles that embrace cooperation is just as trying and difficult (if not more
so) for union leaders as it is for managers. One potential cost to union
leaders is being coopted or being perceived as coopted by manage
ment doing management©s bidding, that is, instead of protecting the
interests of the union as an institution or its members more directly. It has
also been reported that employers potentially use cooperative programs
to undermine or bypass the union or its leadership in various ways: by
appealing directly to employees for employer-initiated changes, using
team-based efforts to alter collective bargaining agreements (e.g., with
respect to scheduling, assignments, bidding, and job classifications); by
usurping grievance procedures and union authority in resolving griev
ances; and by weakening the union at the bargaining table (either by
creating or uncovering divisions in bargaining unit preferences over
negotiable issues).
The choice to embrace cooperation and choices about the form and
extent of joint activities are fraught with political conflict over proper
leadership roles. Here, dissension among leaders and the rank-and-file
leads to increased uncertainty of reelection. Evidence also suggests that
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there can be a loss of member loyalty or commitment to the union (and,
hence, loss of union influence) as employees begin to accept and identify
more closely with company goals. In summary, the literature identifies
the following potential costs:
1. Perceived Cooptation by Management
See Goodman (1980, p. 490); Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton (1987,
pp. 17-18); U.S. Department of Labor (1982, 1983); Work in
America Institute, Inc. (1982, ch. 4); Hoyer and Huszczo (1988);
Strauss (1980).
2.Undermining Traditional Roles of Unions and Collective
Bargaining
See IAM Research Report (1984, pp. 16-21); UBC Bulletin (1984,
pp. 41-42).
3.Heightened Political Conflict Over Leadership Role
See Hammer and Stern (1986); Strauss (1980); Levine and Strauss
(1989).
4.Increased Uncertainty of Reelection
See Hoyer and Huszczo (1988).
5. Loss of Member Commitment and Union Influence
See Schlesinger and Walton (1977); Kochan, Katz, and Mower
(1984, pp. 134-146); Guest (1979); Watts (1982).
Fundamental Problems Encountered
When the parties experience too much of the potential cost or too little
of the potential benefits outlined above, problems arise. Indeed, one
could identify a multitude of day-to-day problems and frequent crises
encountered in cooperative activities. Most of these problems, it ap
pears, boil down to several more fundamental problems. First, the
literature and testimony repeatedly suggest that cooperative efforts
between unions and employers are based on fairly uneasy or delicate
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partnerships and that sufficient trust between managers and union lead
ers must be developed over time. When sufficient trust cannot be
developed, joint activities are limited. When trust wanes or is violated,
joint activities likewise wane. (Schuster 1984; Rosow 1986; Kochan,
Katz, and Mower 1984.)
Sufficient commitment by all parties to cooperative efforts is also an
essential ingredient to any long-run success. (See Schuster 1984, pp.
199-200; Cutcher-Gershenfield 1988; Wintergreen 1986; Kochan,
Katz, and Mower 1984.) The stronger the commitment, the more
intensified and diffused these cooperative activities are likely to become.
Furthermore, trust and commitment appear to be inextricably inter
twined. Without sufficient trust, commitment is hard to attain; and
without sufficient commitment, high levels of trust are unobtainable.
In their survey of approximately 140 union representatives, Kochan,
Katz, and Mower (1984) ask the extent to which "loss of union support"
and "loss of plant management support" limit the expansion of the
participation process. They report (see their table 5-3, p. 147) that 43
percent of the respondents do not perceive loss of plant management
support as a problem. About 37 percent perceive it to be somewhat of a
problem and 20 percent perceive it to be "quite a bit" or "a very great
deal" of a problem. With respect to loss of union support, roughly 55
percent of the respondents report that it is not a problem, 37 percent
report it to be somewhat of a problem, and about 20 percent report it to
be a much more serious problem.
A third fundamental problem that arises is disenchantment and de
moralization when anticipated or hoped-for gains are not gotten. When
the kinds of potential benefits described above are not realized, enthusi
asm for joint activities is known to wane (Camens 1986; CutcherGershenfeld 1988; Kochan, Katz, and Mower 1984). Kochan, Katz,
and Mower report that, based on their survey of union representatives,
over 60 percent of union respondents perceive "worker disenchantment"
as somewhat of a problem, and nearly 35 percent perceive disenchant
ment as "quite a bit" or "a very great deal" of a problem. Only 4 percent
respond that disenchantment among workers is not a problem. In a
second related question, Kochan, Katz, and Mower report that 27
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percent of the union respondents find "layoffs or other employment
cutbacks" to be somewhat of a problem, whereas 53 percent find it to be
a more serious problem limiting the expansion of cooperative activities.
Last, some recent literature describes how many problems arise
because of the inherent difficulty of juxtaposing or balancing coopera
tion and more traditional collective bargaining (Bluestone 1987; Wever
1988; Hammer and Stern 1986; Smaby et al. 1988). Alternating be
tween traditional contract negotiations and administration of contractual
rights via grievance, arbitration, and discipline procedures, on one
hand, and cooperative, mutually beneficial problemsolving, on the
other, requires a delicate balancing of two fairly distinct processes.
Although the literature addressing these fundamental problems is
rich, it remains largely testimonial and descriptive. There appear to be
no scientific investigations into causes of these problems or their effects
on cooperative efforts. Nearly all the literature addressing the problems
of distrust, insufficient commitment, and demoralization, furthermore,
has been filtered through the views of union leaders and rank-and-file;
the views of managers are generally missing.

Conclusions
With very few exceptions, the existing literature about American
union-management cooperation is generally descriptive and impres
sionistic. Although it is a rich and valuable literature, as a whole it lacks
comparability across reports. It is piecemeal in its focus and, hence,
lacks a broad theoretical grounding. It rarely provides any form of
empirical testing of basic propositions or related specific hypotheses.
The limited number of empirical investigations, furthermore, have
largely attempted to determine whether or not joint efforts have had an
effect on company performance and labor relations (Schuster 1983 and
1984; Katz, Kochan, and Gobeille 1983; Katz, Kochan, and Weber
1985; Katz, Kochan, and Keefe 1987; Voos 1987 and 1989). Although
these empirical studies provide important evidence about outcomes
(which are reviewed in chapter 4), they tell us very little about which
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factors or what conditions lead to more or less successful cooperative
efforts. Finally, except through highly descriptive assessments, the
literature also tells us little about the key factors that induce or impede
the establishment of cooperative arrangements between unions and
employers. In summary, our understanding of cooperation is highly
fragmented and incomplete.
The purpose of this study is to help begin filling in some of these
holes, first by developing more fully a general theoretical model of
labor-management relations and the role of cooperation in these rela
tions, and second by developing and testing general propositions and
specific hypotheses about factors affecting decisions to cooperate and
the outcomes of cooperative efforts. Cooperation between American
employers and unions historically has been uncommon and short-lived;
in a sharp break with history, it is widespread today. A far richer
understanding of what makes cooperation work or fail is imperative,
since without that understanding history will surely repeat itself, not
necessarily for the right reasons.

A Theoretical Framework
Juxtaposing Conflict and Cooperation
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a fairly general theoretical
framework of labor-management relations. By establishing some highly
simplified assumptions of behavior and general propositions about the
relationship between labor and management, the framework guides the
analyses of decisions to embark upon, maintain, and extend cooperative
activities; the salient factors affecting the outcomes of cooperation; and
the key problems encountered in cooperative relationships. The frame
work also provides guidance in assessing several parameters of success
fully moving from temporal experimentation with cooperative activities
to long-term partnerships between labor and management, the subject
of chapter 6.
There have been recent efforts at developing a general theoretical
framework of labor-management relations by Kochan, Katz, McKersie
(1986), Cooke (1985), and Barbash (1984). In all three models, en
vironmental factors (economic, technical, and sociopolitical) play key
roles in shaping the employment relationship and associated outcomes.
In all three, certain organizational factors (e.g., collective bargaining
structure, size, history, etc.) also shape the employment relationship
and associated employment outcomes. The general environmental and
organizational contexts of these models are basically extensions of
Dunlop©s (1958) systems framework of industrial relations.
Barbash and Cooke develop some fairly explicit assumptions of
behavior of employers, employees, and union leaders. Within the en
vironmental and organizational constraints, the parties go about max
imizing or minimizing toward preferred optimal outcomes in the em
ployment relationship. Barbash, however, is not explicit about how these
behaviors within given constraints lead the parties to engage in cooper19
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ative activities. Although largely consistent with Barbash©s and Cooke©s
models, Kochan, Katz, and McKersie fail to clearly state a full set of
fundamental assumptions of behavior for all parties that would drive the
employment relationship, and in turn explain employment-related out
comes. Although (unlike Barbash) Kochan, Katz, and McKersie ad
dress cooperation, except in a piecemeal fashion it is unclear how their
theoretical framework predicts the decision to cooperate or explains
either the intensity of those efforts or associated outcomes. In this
chapter, I extend my earlier theoretical treatment of industrial relations
theory (Cooke 1985) by focusing more sharply on the logic underlying
cooperation vis-a-vis more traditional adversarial notions of collective
bargaining.

A General Theory
Some Basic Notions
In the discussion that follows, it is held that both management and the
workforce want to get "as-much-as-possible" for itself out of the employ
ment relationship. This does not imply that each party is purely egoistic
or downright greedy (although such behavior is not necessarily ex
cluded). Nor does this imply that either party completely ignores the
interests of the other party; it cannot without at some point jeopardizing
its own welfare, or ultimately destroying the relationship altogether.
Getting as-much-as-possible simply implies that most people prefer
more over less of a desired "pie," and that this basic desire strongly
governs each party©s behavior.
In getting as-much-as-possible, two key dimensions of the employ
ment relationship come into play: (1) the overall size or value of the pie
available to the parties, and (2) the division of the pie between the
parties. American history shows that, until very recently, management
stakeholders were typically viewed as having sole responsibility for
increasing the size or value of the pie via decisions related to operations,
marketing, finance, and human resources. This view of management©s
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exclusive domain has, historically at least, not only been widely shared
by management and its stakeholders, but by the workforce and union
leaders as well. Concurrently, union leaders have been viewed as agents
whose primary role has been to wrest from management as-much-aspossible for the workforces they represent, leaving to management the
full responsibility and task of baking a bigger pie or else giving up some
of the dessert it might otherwise enjoy. Hence, until lately, management
has baked the pie and fought with the union over how it was going to be
divided (in Doug Eraser©s words) "even before it got baked."1
Union-management cooperation, in contrast, reflects a concerted
effort in which the workforce and its representatives share some of the
responsibility and, hence, decisionmaking in baking the pie (ideally a
larger pie, at a lower cost and/or of higher quality). The basic dilemma
underlying cooperation is that it requires cooperation and trust. The
table is laid, knives and forks clearly in sight. Each party knows where
the other is coming from. When it comes to dividing the pie, however
(especially when a 9-inch pie has been reduced to an 8-inch pie), the
parties again pit themselves against one another. The knives are held in
hand, trust diminishes if not vanishes, and there are losers and winners.
In the following subsection, I lay out a more thorough and rigorous
theory than the metaphor of baking and dividing pies. Although the
reader may find the exposition a bit abstract, over-simplified, and/or
cumbersome for his or her tastes, the theoretical framework yields some
fundamentally important propositions about cooperation, which in turn
guide the empirical investigation and overall analysis.

General Assumptions and Propositions
In the abstract, one can, for the moment, imagine that there is a fixed
sum of net gains derivable from a given employment relationship at any
point in time. This sum of net gains is a function of both extrinsic
rewards (e.g., profits and wages) and intrinsic rewards (e.g., recogni
tion and autonomy). For ease in the discussion that follows, the com
bination of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards will be referred to as "utility."
This fixed sum of utility at any point in time is divided between (a)
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management (including all management stakeholders in the employ
ment relationship) and (b) the workforce (including its union represen
tatives). Assuming that both management and the workforce prefer
more over less utility from the employment relationship, it follows that
each party normally seeks to maximize its respective gains (hereafter
called "absolute utility"). This dimension of the employment rela
tionship is characterized by inherent conflicts of interest; what one party
gets has been lost by the other or is foregone. These conflicts of interest
are resolved at any point in time by relative power.
The absolute amount of utility enjoyed by either party, however, is
dependent on the total utility derivable from the employment rela
tionship. It is this variable-sum dimension of the employment rela
tionship that inhibits either party from exercising too much power over
the division of total utility. It is also this variable-sum dimension that
may induce the parties to cooperate in ways that will increase total utility
over time. As discussed below, the variable-sum dimension is a function
of the combined organizational power of management and the work
force, not the relative power of either.
For illustration, the area within the solid-line circle in figure 2.1
depicts the total level of utility at any given point in time (TUi + j,t). The
shaded area within TUi + j.t envelops the absolute amount of utility
derived by management (AUi)t) in a hypothetical employment rela
tionship, while the nonshaded area represents the absolute level of utility
derived by the workforce (AUj )t). The relative share of utility by man
agement equals AlT/PUi + j, and the relative share of utility by workers
equals AUj/TUi + j. The area under the broken-line circle (TUi+j,t + n)
depicts potential total utility in period t+n. The greater the circum
ference of the circle, the greater the total utility.
For the sake of simplicity, an underlying assumption of the present
theory is that both managers and workers seek to maximize the absolute
level of utility derivable from the employment relationship. Toward the
goal of gaining as-much-as possible, the parties© behavior is dependent
upon relative and total power. Relative power determines the distribu
tion of a fixed sum of utility derivable from the employment rela-
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Figure 2.1
Absolute, Relative, and Total Utility

TU

\

\

tionship. Total power, on the other hand, determines the size of the total
utility available to the two parties.

Relative Power
In defining relative power, we begin with Chamberlain©s definition:
[I]f the cost to B of disagreeing on A©s terms is greater than the cost of
agreeing on A©s terms, while the cost to A of disagreeing on B©s terms is
less than the cost of agreeing on B©s terms, then A©s bargaining power is
greater than that of B©s. (Chamberlain 1951, p. 221)
Chamberlain©s definition requires that we estimate the perceived costs
of agreeing and disagreeing in order to determine which party has
greater relative power. Our interest, however, is one of identifying
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factors that increase or decrease the costs of agreeing and disagreeing
for each party. Toward this understanding, the following implicit model
of relative power is stated and briefly explained below:
1
f (I
n
, .. Powen=f
n
-——+, sources of power;
Relative
sources of powerj
\cost of demandsj

bargaining skillsi
bargaining skillsj
Cost of Demands
The first component of the relative power function envelops Cham
berlain©s notion of the "cost of agreeing," which maintains that the
relative power of party i decreases as the cost of demands upon party j
increase. For example (everything else the same), a union demanding a
$0.25 increase in compensation per hour is less likely to obtain that
demand than if it demanded only $0.05. In the first instance, the
employer will resist more because the added labor costs will have more
of an effect on current profits or on product price and, hence, future
profits. In addition, where profitability changes over time or differs
across employers, and/or the ability to pass along costs to consumers
changes over time or across employers, the cost of a $0.25 increase in
hourly compensation varies; consequently, the ability of unions to obtain
such increases changes over time and varies across employers. Addi
tionally, the cost to employers and union representatives appears to vary
according to perceived nonpecuniary costs associated with demands
upon either party. Demands by management to involve workers in
quality circles, for instance, will be perceived by various union repre
sentatives as more or less costly to their constituents© well-being or to the
union as an institution. Similarly, demands by union leaders to have
input into strategic decisions over plant closures will be perceived by
various managers as a more or less costly intrusion on their authority or
status.
In summary, the central point here is that either party has greater
relative power to obtain smaller demands than larger ones (everything
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else constant). Hence, in comparing shifts in relative power between the
parties, either over time or across organizations, by definition alone one
must control for the actual or perceived costs of any demands.
Sources of Power
The second component of the relative function holds that as the
sources of power available to party i to force its demands on party j
increase (relative to the sources of power available to j to reject the
demands of i), the relative power of i increases. With respect to Cham
berlain©s thesis, sources of power depict the ability of either party to
impose costs of disagreeing upon the other party.
The sources of power available to the parties are derived from the
economic, sociopolitical, and technical environments of the employer
and from organizational features of the employer and union. The eco
nomic environment reflects at any given point in time the supply and
demand conditions of the employer©s product and labor markets. An
increase in area unemployment, for instance, may increase the supply of
workers to an employer. In turn, the employer©s relative power at the
bargaining table increases, allowing the employer to "toe the line" on
demands for increased wages and benefits if not obtain give-backs
from the union. The sociopolitical environment affects relative power as
public sentiment, laws, regulatory policies and procedures, and court
decisions favor the bargaining stance of either party. The shift in the
stance of the NLRB from Milwaukee Spring I to Milwaukee Spring II,
for example, increased the relative power of companies to relocate
production (or obtain concessions) during the life of an agreement
(unless explicitly otherwise written in the contract). 2 The technical
environment imposes constraints on either party as the substitutability
of capital for labor, the continuous nature of production, and/or the
strategic positioning of work groups changes or differs across organiza
tions. The increased capabilities and reduced price tags on industrial
robots over the last 15 years, for example, have effectively reduced the
relative power of workforces in many industries.
Finally, certain features of organizations enhance the relative power
of either party and/or certain groups within organizations. Of particular
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importance are the organizational structures, philosophies, and re
sources of employers and unions. Compare, if you will, two companies,
identical with the exception that Company A has all of its ten manufac
turing plants organized by the same national union, and Company B has
only two of its ten plants organized by the same national union. Given
Company B©s ability to shift production from its two unionized plants to
its eight nonunion plants in the event of a strike, the union©s relative
power is greater in Company A than in Company B.
Bargaining Skill
Relative bargaining skill is the third component of the relative power
function. In attempting to maximize the relative share of total utility,
each party attempts to change the perceptions of the other regarding the
sources of power available to each and the costs of demands on the other.
Given the complexity and subjective nature inherent in the assessment of
the sources of power and the pecuniary/nonpecuniary costs of demands,
one can imagine that there is significant opportunity for changing
perceptions (and hence demands). That party which is more skilled or
adept at changing the perceptions of its opponent (of course to the given
party©s benefit) effectively increases the given party©s relative power over
the other.
In the context of union-management relations, these bargaining skills
are especially important during regular contract negotiations, as the
terms and conditions of employment are established or modified. Rela
tive bargaining skills, however, also come into play during the life of
agreements. No written agreement in spite of its length, detail, and
duration can possibly determine all the terms and conditions of em
ployment. Hence the parties must, in effect, continue negotiating over
formal and informal rules governing the employment relationship. In its
most obvious form, disputes over the agreements are resolved through
grievance and discipline procedures, including arbitration. Here, rela
tive negotiation skills play a significant role in determining how total
utility is divided. That party which is more skilled, for instance, at
interpreting or utilizing to their advantage (1) the rights and responsibil
ities arising from the contract and past practices, and (2) the facts
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surrounding disagreements, effectively increases the given party©s rela
tive power (Meyer and Cooke 1988).
In addition to these day-to-day negotiations over the interpretation
and application of contracts, unions may also attempt to influence
management decisions at a more strategic level, such as management
decisions regarding expansion or shrinkage of operations or capital
investments. The birth of GM©s Saturn Corporation jointly devised by
UAW and GM representatives is perhaps the outstanding example along
these lines.3 Again, relative negotiation skills can make a difference.

Total Power
Total utility derivable from the employment relationship is deter
mined by the combination of human and technical capacity of the
employing organization, constrained by the economic and sociopolitical
environments of the organization. In attempting to maximize total
utility, the parties rely on total organizational power, which is the ability
of an organization to extract from its environment the kind and magni
tude of benefits preferred.
The total organization power function can be stated as:
Total

_
. .
, _ (/ Human+Technical Capacity
of Organization
Organizational=f
-—-———\ Economic+Sociopolitical Environmental
Constraints

The capacity of an organization to produce a product or provide a
service at a profit is a function of both human capacity and technical
capacity. Human capacity is the combined capacity of all stakeholders of
the organization, from the top strategic decisionmaking offices down to
the shop floor. Those organizations (1) employing the most talented and
productive individuals across and throughout all the managerial and
employee ranks, and (2) whose managerial processes and practices and
structure maximize the combined productive utilization of all indi
viduals, in turn maximize human capacity.
Technical capacity represents the combination of all the types of
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technologies utilized throughout the organization, how these technolo
gies are integrated, and how well these technologies and their integra
tion are utilized in production or in the provision of services by all
members of the organization. Across organizations and over time, the
availability of less costly and/or more productive technologies and
innovations differ, as well as the ability of the organization to integrate
and utilize the technologies in the most productive and efficient manner.
In addition to the human and technical capacity of an organization,
total organizational power is determined by the constraints (or lack
thereof) imposed by the economic and sociopolitical environments.
With respect to constraints of the economic environment, by way of
example, the reader hardly needs to be reminded of the changing
economics of global competition. Off-shore competition continues to
penetrate both the domestic and foreign markets of many American
businesses. As demand for American-made products falls, profits
shrink, employees are laid off, concessions may be negotiated, assets
stripped, and facilities closed. In short, total utility for many companies
diminishes. In response to the impact of heightened global competition,
organizational capacity adjusts: organizations restructure through mer
ger, acquisition, or joint ventures; centralize or decentralize operations;
they replace top executives; they make bold capital investments in new
and old facilities both here and off-shore; they transfer production off
shore; or they restate corporate visions with new concentration, for
example, on product quality improvement, employee involvement in
management decisionmaking, or cooperation with unions.
Sociopolitical environments also differ across organizations and over
time, sometimes imposing greater and sometimes imposing lesser con
straints on organizational capacity. Several examples come quickly to
mind. Recent deregulation of the trucking and airline industries has
certainly affected the total organizational power of companies within
these industries, resulting in widespread reorganization. Recent protec
tive U.S. trade practices in the steel, textile, and auto industries offset
diminishing total organizational power for some companies. The
federal government©s break-up of AT&T altered the organizational ca-
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pacity of AT&T and effectively increased the total organizational power
of its competitors within the telecommunications industry.
Relative Power v. Total Organizational Power
Based on perceptions of relative power and total power, workers and
managers seeking to maximize the absolute level of utility must weigh
the expected net gains from (a) relying solely on relative power or (b)
also working jointly to increase total organizational power. Under the
assumption of maximizing behavior, we must hold that each party seeks
to utilize that combination of relative and total power it perceives as best
serving its own interests. Hence, each party weighs the perceived costs
and benefits of various combinations of relative and total power ac
tivities that could maximize its absolute utility. Both parties, however,
must come or be forced to the same conclusion on the appropriate mix.
Historically, with few exceptions until lately, this conclusion has been
that management has sole responsibility for managing total organiza
tional power (and, hence, total utility), and that both parties utilize their
relative power to maximize their relative utility (and, hence, absolute
utility).
In attempting to understand the recent widespread move toward plantlevel cooperative activities (intentionally undertaken to increase total
organizational power), we need to ask: what are the key factors that have
changed the perceptions of one or the other party or both parties such
that the perceived net benefit from cooperation has changed signifi
cantly? Later, factors that increase the perceived benefits or reduce the
perceived costs of cooperation are identified. For the moment, let us
stay at a more general theoretical level.
In deciding that some degree of cooperation will lead to increased
utility for each party, the parties are attempting to (a) increase organiza
tional capacity and/or (b) reduce the constraints of the economic or
sociopolitical environments directly. Herein, I focus on efforts aimed at
increasing organizational capacity at the corporate and plant levels. An
example of cooperative efforts to reduce environmental constraints is
the ongoing lobbying efforts of both manufacturers and unions in the
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textile and steel industries to have Congress embrace protective trade
legislation.
With respect to increasing total organizational power, the following
kinds of behavior are observed: (a) one party relinquishes some absolute
utility (and, hence, relative utility) with the expectation that this will
increase total utility in subsequent periods (for which that party regains
its relinquished absolute utility but not ipso facto its relative utility), or
(b) both parties voluntarily alter the set of work rules for which each
party believes that relinquished absolute utility will subsequently be
regained.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 should help illustrate these concepts. In figure
2.2, the solid-line circle (TUt) depicts total utility in period t. Presume
for the moment that the potential total utility in subsequent periods is
reflected by the broken-line circle (TUt + n). To obtain the greater
potential total utility in t+n, however, changes in the existing utility
must come about. One option is for the parties to exchange control of
selected work rules, without simultaneously altering relative utility
(e.g., workers might exchange restrictive work rules for a gainsharing
plan). Diagrammatically, the line of demarcation of relative utility, RU,
rotates to RU©. Such trade-offs increase total utility from TUt to TUt + n,
reflecting the assumed maximizing behavior, since absolute utility in
creases for both parties. A second option illustrated in figure 2.2 is the
shift from RU to RU". The reduction in relative utility (and, hence,
absolute utility) by party j depicts a calculated move by j in period t as a
means of obtaining AUj,t + n . Party j would behave as such only if what is
added in absolute utility for j in period t+n is perceived to be greater
than what is to be relinquished in period t. Although relative utility in
this instance becomes smaller in period t+n, party j has behaved in such
a way that absolute utility is maximized over time.
Now consider figure 2.3, where expectations (e.g., about interna
tional competition) are such that total utility will be reduced in period
t+1 (depicted by the - - circle). When expectations about obtaining
greater total utility in subsequent periods (e.g., returning to TUt) are
insufficient to compel the parties to behave cooperatively during period t
+1, the parties will rely on relative power to wrest away more absolute
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Figure 2.2
Expected Increases in Total Utility in Period t+n

TU,

Figure 2.3
Expected Reductions in Total Utility in t+1
and Expected Increases in Total Utility in t+n
t+n
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utility from one another. This has become known as "concession" or
"give-back" negotiations. As illustrated, the shift in the relative power
position of the parties from RU to RU© has allowed party i to lose less (if
any) of its absolute utility between periods, while party j has lost some
absolute utility between periods. Of course if the changes in the eco
nomic and/or sociopolitical environments that caused the reduction in
total utility do not effectively alter the relative power positions of the
parties, then no shift in relative utility will be generated. Consequently,
both parties experience proportionately equal reductions in absolute
utility.
A fundamental dilemma becomes apparent as the parties simul
taneously weigh relative and total power options and requisite behavior.
Given that, historically, employers and unions have largely attended to
resolving conflicts of interest via the exercise of relative power, it would
appear to be a safe presumption to hold that the appeal of resolving
conflicts of interest supersedes the appeal of working jointly on mutual
interests. A key challenge to unions and employers, therefore, is to find
ways to juxtapose or balance the resolution of conflicts of interest with
the pursuit of mutual interests. That balance, however, goes well beyond
the efforts of the parties at the bargaining table to jointly solve problems.
These "integrative bargaining" practices have long been a part of the
collective bargaining experience (see Walton and McKersie 1965, chap
ter 5). That balance, furthermore, goes beyond joint committees estab
lished to mutually resolve problems like health and safety, training, and
employee assistance. These limited joint problemsolving efforts may be
viewed as an extended form of integrative bargaining and are likely
precursors to the kind of joint programs to be examined herein.

Sharing Gains From Cooperation
Among those parties choosing to cooperate, it can be assumed that
each party wants its fair share of any increase in total utility derivable
from cooperative activities. The parties ultimately must decide upon an
appropriate fair share for each, presumably based on each party©s
contribution to added total utility via cooperation. In deciding on a fair
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share, the parties must first determine the amount of total utility that has
been derived from cooperative efforts-an amount that must be dis
tinguishable from any gains in total utility not derived from cooperative
efforts (e.g., gains derived from decisions about technology invest
ments, acquisitions, product development, marketing, etc. for which
the union may not have participated in making).
By way of example, assume that in period t+n, total utility increased
by X amount, where X=NC+C, and where NC equals the gain from
noncooperative activities and C equals the gain from cooperative ac
tivities. As diagrammed in figure 2.4, the unshaded area marked NC
depicts increases in total utility that would have been obtained without
cooperation. This gain is, in turn, distributed via relative power, a
mechanism which is acceptable (albeit, perhaps begrudgingly) to both
parties. The shaded area marked C in figure 2.4 depicts increases in total
utility only obtainable through cooperation. Here the parties can be
assumed to seek their fair share; shares not based on notions of relative
power but on notions of contribution to C.
One can readily imagine that sharing any gains from cooperation is
wrought with difficult assessments about (a) how much of any increases
in total utility are attributable to noncooperative and cooperative efforts,
and (b) what proportion of any increases in total utility attributable to
cooperative efforts are due to each party©s contribution.
These difficult assessments inevitably lead to problems, problems
which diminish if not destroy cooperative relations (as discussed in
detail in chapter 6), when the parties are unable to resolve them in
mutually satisfactory ways. For the sake of illustration, assume that the
union©s contribution to added total utility via cooperative efforts is 75
percent or at least perceived to be by the union. Assume, however, that
management©s relative power would be sufficient to extract 50 percent of
that added total utility. If management were to impose its relative power
will on the union, the union would forego 25 percent of added total
utility it perceives itself to have contributed. The union, therefore, may
obtain more absolute utility through cooperation than without, but
management gains even more in relative terms. This relative difference
raises an obvious dilemma. The process of cooperation requires ele-

34

A Theoretical Framework

Figure 2.4
Sharing Cooperative and Noncooperative
Gains to Total Utility in t+n

t+n

\

ments of sufficient trust and fairness, which are not required in adver
sarial relations. To divide the added utility derived from cooperation via
relative power diminishes, therefore, the necessary trust and fairness
underlying cooperation. In turn, the intensity of cooperative efforts is
diminished (if not destroyed), which, as discussed in chapter 4, reduces
the magnitude of gains from cooperative activities. Upon reducing the
added total utility from cooperation, management (in our example)
consequently also loses added utility. In summary, each party must
weigh (a) any losses in absolute utility caused by using relative power to
divide cooperative gains against (b) the absolute utility derived from
cooperative gains, which are divided fairly according to what each party
contributes to the added total utility from cooperation.

Feedback From Experience
Because the decisions and behavior of the parties are shaped or
constrained by subjective interpretations of the costs of demands, the
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sources of power, and the net benefits of any mix of cooperation and hard
bargaining, feedback from experience (both internal and external to the
organization) plays a critical role in determining (and, hence, under
standing) the behavior of the parties. This feedback mechanism or
learning curve effect on perceptions and, in turn, presumably on behav
ior, applies to all the underlying dimensions of the relative power and
total power functions.
Since employers and unions traditionally have had very limited expe
rience in cooperation, the feedback mechanism is obviously quite
important to the maintenance, as well as expansion of joint labormanagement activities. In particular, depending upon the magnitude of
any problems encountered and/or changes in the expected outcomes of
joint endeavors, the parties can be expected to adjust the intensity,
extensiveness, or content of joint activities in an effort to effectively
increase organizational capacity and, hence, total organizational power.
The perceptions of outcomes and the relative costs of problems
encountered are also likely to change with the longevity of joint pro
grams, given the possibility of diminishing returns of these efforts over
time or abrupt changes in expected outcomes (e.g., as may arise from a
disheartening round of concession bargaining). These changes in per
ception over time can result in subsequent termination of programs. In
the chapters that follow, I explore these perceptions of outcomes and.
moreover, attempt to track how perceptions change over the life of
programs.

Potential Benefits and Costs of Cooperation
Vis-a-Vis Relative Power Options
Both management and its stakeholders and the workforce and its
selected union representatives must sort through the options underlying
both the relative and total power functions. In sorting through these
options the parties, in effect, weigh the perceived potential costs and
benefits (both pecuniary and nonpecuniary) of a wide range of possible
actions, ranging from no cooperation to extensive cooperation. Assum
ing that the parties act rationally in selecting among available options,
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the parties will behave in ways at least perceived to be most beneficial to
them (i.e., that which maximizes absolute utility). This maximizing or
optimizing behavior, however, is based on subjective expectations about
various costs and benefits, is constrained by incomplete information and
limited experience, and is sometimes influenced by inaccurate or mis
leading information. Furthermore, and very important, organizational
decisionmaking is quite complex, as it involves a large cast of indi
viduals with varying interests and varying degrees of authority and
influence. This decisionmaking process differs, of course, across em
ployers and across unions.
Bearing these caveats in mind, the decision to cooperate must satisfy
two general conditions:
(1) Each party (management, the workforce, and union leadership)
must perceive that the benefits from proposed joint programs outweigh
the costs.
(2) Each party must perceive that the net benefit from cooperation is
greater than the net benefit derived from exclusive utilization of relative
power.
The basic thesis herein is that the likelihood that parties establish and
are able to manage successful joint programs varies directly with the
following perceptions for each party:
a. higher perceived benefits from cooperation;
b. lower perceived costs of cooperation;
c. higher perceived costs of relative power options; and
d. lower perceived benefits of relative power options.
In modeling the factors that influence the joint decision of the parties
to establish and manage successful cooperative programs, therefore, we
must turn to identifying factors and circumstances that are associated
with either increasing or decreasing these perceived benefits and costs.
In chapter 1, potential benefits and costs and fundamental problems
associated with cooperative activities were identified. There is no need
to revisit that synthesis in this chapter, but several observations about the
difficulty of weighing potential benefits and costs is warranted. Subse
quently, perceived benefits and costs associated with exercising relative
power options (e.g., concession bargaining, subcontracting, etc.) are
discussed.
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Assessing Potential Benefits and Costs of Cooperation

Several general observations about the above costs and benefits are
warranted. First, costs and benefits can be either extrinsic or intrinsic in
nature. Although each party is expected to weigh both extrinsic and
intrinsic variables, it should be underscored that the parties are typically
weighing apples and oranges. Management, for instance, may be able to
weigh (a) the perceived reduction in production costs attributable to
increased productivity, improved product quality, and reduction in
scrappage against (b) the incurred education and training cost for
workers and supervisors (in, say, statistical process control techniques,
problemsolving, and teamwork methods). But how does management
then compare those extrinsic costs and benefits to the intrinsic costs and
benefits associated with, say, perceived loss of status for middle manag
ers and supervisors, or improved communications between and among
white-collar and blue-collar workers? The key point to be made here is
that the literature addresses both extrinsic and intrinsic costs and bene
fits of cooperation, but it is silent with regard to how the parties go about
weighing potential intrinsic costs and benefits. In part, this is a measure
ment problem. How does one measure, for example, the benefits of
improved communication? In addition, this is a valuation problem. How
does one place a cost-benefit value on improved communication, which
can then be compared to other intrinsic costs and benefits and, more
over, to extrinsic costs and benefits?
A second observation is about the distinction between what may be
called, for present purposes, primary and secondary outcome variables.
Secondary outcome variables may have value in and of themselves, but
they also lead to more tangible primary outcomes. An example may best
illustrate this distinction. Improved communication or harmony be
tween managers and employees (secondary outcomes) may be valued
outcomes in and of themselves, but they may also lead to other outcomes
such as fewer grievances, enhanced job security, or increased productiv
ity (primary outcomes). The literature on joint programs is again silent
on how the perceived costs and benefits of primary outcomes are
weighed or stack up against secondary outcomes. In most cases, one can
imagine that primary outcomes get closer to the "bottom-line" thinking

38

A Theoretical Framework

of the parties and, hence, play a more important role in the decision to
embark upon and/or maintain joint programs. We have much to uncover,
however, with respect to what outcomes are primary or secondary in
nature; how this distinction may differ between management, workers,
and union leaders; and how much weight is given to each type of
outcome as the parties go about deciding the fate of cooperation.
The third observation is that some potential outcome variables reflect
costs or benefits specific to a given party (e.g., increased employee
commitment to the union primarily benefits the union leadership). Other
outcome variables reflect costs or benefits to more than one party (e.g.,
a reduced grievance load saves both management and the union lead
ership lost time and resources in resolving grievances). Going one step
further, what may be viewed as a benefit to one party can alternatively be
perceived as a cost to another party. For instance, more rank-and-file
autonomy may be viewed as a benefit by a work unit but not by its
supervisor.
Finally, the potential magnitude of any cost or benefit is bound to
differ across organizations as circumstances differ. Take, for illustra
tion, an organization with a very low grievance rate. It has less to gain
from reducing grievances through joint program activities than an
organization with a very high grievance rate.
In summary, the salient variables identified in the existing literature
that appear to be weighed by the parties (a) include both extrinsic and
intrinsic costs and benefits, which makes meaningful comparisons very
difficult; (b) represent what may be called primary and secondary
outcomes, which may differ across parties and, again, make com
parisons very difficult; and (c) may reflect costs and benefits specific to
one party or shared by other parties, or may reflect costs to one party but
benefits to another. Finally, the reader should bear in mind that the
potential magnitude of any cost or benefit is bound to differ across
employers, workforces, and union leadership.
Assessing Potential Benefits and Costs of Exercising Relative
Power Options
Toward maximizing their own absolute utility without cooperation,
employers attempt to bolster their relative power, and, when possible,
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increase total utility. Within our theoretical framework, these efforts are
concentrated in altering organizational features (via the relative power
function) and altering the human and technical capacity of the firm (via
the total organizational power function). From the vantage point of
unions, pursuit of increases or maintenance of their own absolute utility
(without cooperation), rests solely with reshaping organizational fea
tures (via the relative power function).
From a more practical plane of analysis, we need to examine the
salient relative power options. Both the popular and more academic
literature identify several key management options: concession bargain
ing, subcontracting, curtailing operations and closing plants, substitut
ing computer-based automation for labor, and deunionizing. Except for
improving organizing activities, union options reflect, for the most part,
defensive strategies to the above management options.
Other than in the broadest of terms, the literature has little to say
about the estimated costs and benefits of the various relative power
options. Assuming, however, that top management is driven to max
imize profits for the company as a whole and that middle and lower
management in production have been directed to maximize efficiency,
quality, and productivity and minimize labor costs, it follows that
management decisions are viewed by managers as providing the greatest
net benefit to the company. It is evident that, except for concession
bargaining, no option selected is based strictly on reducing labor costs,
albeit the reduction of labor costs may be an important if not a primary
factor in selecting options.
In examining the perceived costs and benefits of relative power
options, several dimensions of the subject are worth underscoring.
First, most key options appear to be more aggressively pursued under
increasingly competitive, if not adverse, economic circumstances. In
theoretical terms, total organizational utility has diminished or is ex
pected to diminish, short of some organizational adjustments. Second,
although management may be able to estimate the direct net benefit from
a selected option (e.g., the projected net savings in materials handling,
inventory, labor costs, etc., from subcontracting), the indirect potential
costs of lower employee morale, union-management hostility, and
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heightened insecurity are not readily ascertainable. One might even
surmise that in an already existing adversarial union-management rela
tionship, indirect costs associated with relative power options may have
been given little if any consideration. Still, these are costs, which later
may become apparent in higher grievance rates, absenteeism and tar
diness, and in reduced productivity or product quality. Finally, any net
gains or losses from any option differ across employers and unions, and
are determined in part by certain controlling or intervening variables
(e.g., market conditions).

Mixing Conflict and Cooperation
A Summary

Joint labor-management programs designed to improve company
performance and the labor-management relationship have recently be
come widespread in manufacturing because the companies, unions, and
employees involved have come to perceive (at least for the moment) that
the net gains from cooperative efforts to each party outweigh the net
gains from exclusive reliance on traditional uses of relative and total
power. The theory presented in this chapter, as well as American history,
suggests that when the relative power of a party increases sufficiently at
any point in time, that party will exercise its added relative power to
increase its own absolute utility and at the perceived expense of the other
party. It follows, therefore, that in many cases where the parties cooper
ate, one party (as a practical matter, almost always the employer) will
first pursue the kind of relative power options described above. After the
net benefits from these options have been reaped and expected net
benefits from further usage of relative power options have been signifi
cantly reduced, both parties may come to a similar conclusion: greater
net benefit can be derived from joint efforts than from the continued
exclusive exercise of relative power options. It is at that point where the
parties begin to design and implement joint programs.
In other cases, the reduction in total utility experienced as the pie
shrinks may not significantly alter the relative power of the parties. In
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these cases the loss of utility by both parties may trigger an examination
of the potential costs and benefits of cooperation, as it becomes apparent
that the net gain from attempting to use the relative power options is
zero, if not negative. Once both parties perceive that the potential net
benefits of cooperation outweigh the potential costs, then the parties
begin to design and implement joint programs.
None of the above suggests, however, that companies and unions have
not exercised their relative power in conjunction with joint program
activities. In those cases where they do, the parties must find a means of
satisfactory balance that allows for the coexistence of the two processes.
Shifts in relative power are bound to occur over time, and the gaining
party invariably will be inclined to exercise that added relative power.
Consequently, when the perceived net benefits of relative power options
begin to outweigh the perceived net benefit of cooperation, the parties
must be prepared for the potential exercise of relative power and its
implications for the continuance of joint program activities. Because the
relative power options heighten conflict, the use of these options
threaten, if not ultimately undermine, the cooperative process.

NOTES
1. Quote selected from presentation made by Mr. Douglas Fraser (former President of the UAW)
at the University of Michigan, February 1, 1987.
2. See the case of Milwaukee Spring Division of Dlinois Coil Spring Company v. UAW Local 547,
NLRB Decisions and Orders, 265 NLRB 28 (1982) and Second Court of Appeals decision, 765
F2d 175 (1985).
3. See James Treece, "Here Comes Saturn," Business Week, April 9, 1990, pp. 56-62.

Choosing to Cooperate
Company Strategies and Plant Programs
The central objectives of this chapter are to examine company wide
strategic choices to pursue union-management cooperation and to de
scribe joint activities at the plant level in companies that have chosen to
cooperate. To set the stage for these investigations, however, I first
briefly describe the economic context in which important shifts in
company wide strategies have occurred, and second I review the limited
literature about these company wide strategic choices. Because the em
pirical evidence used to examine company strategies and plant-level
joint activities are based on several survey data collections, these data
collections are then reviewed. Subsequently, I examine company wide
strategic choices with respect to factors influencing these choices and
the implementation of these strategies over the 1975 to 1986 period.
Finally, I describe in some detail plant-level joint activities.

Market Factors Inducing Change
During the latter half of the 1970s and throughout much of the 1980s,
the economic environment was marked by uncharacteristic short-term
volatility, coupled with the emergence of long-run global and domestic
nonunion competitive threats and other long-run trends demanding
change in traditional collective bargaining relationships.

Short-Run Forces
With respect to short-run forces, several factors are illustrative of
substantial market volatility or instability. First, annual nationwide
43
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unemployment rates bounced erratically from 5 percent in 1973 to a
postwar high of 9.4 percent in 1983. 1 In some regions of the U.S.,
unemployment rose to much higher levels. During the same period,
annual inflation rates likewise jumped and dropped as much as 12
percentage points, with both the Consumer Price Index and Producer
Price Index reaching nearly 14 percent in 1980. 2 Between 1977 and
1981, the annual average prime rate charged by banks for short-term
business loans rose from 7 percent to a post-War high of nearly 19
percent. 3 The annual inflation-adjusted U.S. exchange rate rose sharply
from a low of 84 points in 1978 to 130 points by 1985 (1973 indexed at
100 points). These real exchange rates then dropped nearly as sharply to
88 points in 1988. 4 Finally, crude oil (and to a lesser extent natural gas)
prices rose and fell rapidly over the 1973 through 1988 period. Indeed,
crude oil prices jumped nearly fivefold from $1.25 per million Btu in
1973 to nearly $6 per million Btu in 1981 (in constant 1982 dollars). 5
By 1988, unemployment, inflation, prime interest rates, real ex
change rates, and energy costs returned to their pre-1975 levels. One
might be inclined to conclude, therefore, that these market factors have
taken their short-run toll on American businesses and unions and that we
have returned to normalcy or stability in the market place. The volatility
of this recent period, however, vividly demonstrates that were the future
to hold similar periods of volatility, companies and unions that have not
become more flexible and adaptable in their relations will find them
selves at a competitive disadvantage. And that disadvantage could,
indeed, be substantial.
Long-Run Forces
In addition to short-run volatility, several long-run forces are at work.
First, the proportion of all employees represented by unions in the U.S.
has dropped steadily since the mid-1950s, from roughly 35 percent to
under 17 percent today. In the private sector, the proportion has dropped
to 13 percent. 6 Although the accuracy of any given union penetration
estimates can be questioned, the precipitous decline in union penetration
cannot. The threat of rising domestic nonunion competition has rather
obvious implications for unionized companies and for unionized facili
ties within multiplant companies partially unionized.
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In addition to steadily rising domestic nonunion competition, global
competition likewise clearly poses a long-run threat to much of Ameri
can industry. The import penetration ratio (value of imports over total
value of domestic shipments and imports) for all manufacturing rose
from 7 percent in 1974 to 13 percent in 1986. 7 For some industries, the
rise in import penetration has been far more dramatic. The value of
durable good imports alone rose dramatically from $150 billion in 1983
to $300 billion in 1989 (in constant 1982 dollars). Although U.S.
exports likewise rose dramatically after 1983, total goods and services
imports have continued to outrun exports; a difference that reached as
high as $130 billion in 1986 but narrowed to $56 billion in 1989. 8
Major investments in computer-aided technology may also be viewed
as a long-run force at work. North American investments in robotics
rose more than fourfold (in constant dollars) between 1981 and 1985 to
$525 million-tapering off, however, to $430 million in 1988. After
dropping sharply from roughly $2.4 to $1.6 billion between 1982 and
1983, capital expenditures in computer-aided machine tools rebounded
by 1985 and rose to $2.8 billion in 1988. 9
A fourth long-run force at work is the steadily rising cost of medical
care and associated benefits. Indexed to 1982 costs, the real cost of
medical care has risen threefold since 1975; and there is no indication
that these costs will soon be contained. 10
Although a number of other important long-run forces at work can be
identified (for example, effects of deregulation of the transportation
industry, divestiture of AT&T, the aging population, and rising female
labor force participation and divorce rates), the four long-run forces
described sufficiently document the need for restructuring labor-man
agement relationships. Although the form of any restructuring is debat
able, those unionized companies that cannot adapt to these long-run
forces are very likely to become uncompetitive.

Companyvvide Labor Relations Strategies: The Literature
The forces at work described above have inevitably required adjust
ment by unionized companies, either to maintain or regain competitive
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advantages or in some cases to minimize further erosion of competitive
advantages. Recent case studies undertaken by researchers associated
with the Sloan School of Management at M.I.T. identify three suffi
ciently distinct and emerging corporate labor-relations strategies: one in
which the purpose is to avoid if not reduce union representation (call it
Union-Avoidance), another in which the parties choose to cooperate
(call it Cooperation), and a third encompassing both union-avoidance
and cooperative activities (call it Mixed). 11
The Union-Avoidance strategy is basically a highly adversarial strat
egy that encompasses several kinds of activities designed to reduce the
proportion of plants unionized. Toward this end, Union-Avoiders ag
gressively campaign against the unionization of existing, newly opened,
or acquired nonunion facilities. Although it comes as no surprise that
employers generally prefer to operate in a nonunion environment,
recent evidence reported by Freedman (1979, 1985) indicates that top
management of large firms places a high priority on avoiding unioniza
tion of the firm©s nonunion facilities. According to the Freedman sur
veys, 31 percent of large, double-breasted firms (i.e., those firms with
union and nonunion establishments) in 1977 and 45 percent in 1983
reported that it was more important to them to keep as much of the
company nonunion than it was to achieve the most favorable bargain
possible.
In addition, Union-Avoiders make greater capital investments in
nonunion than in unionized plants, reduce employment in unionized
plants while increasing employment in nonunion plants, and, where
possible, seek decertification of unions. Tough positional negotiations
that demand concessionary bargains over wages, benefits, and work
rules are standard practice. Joint union-management activities at the
plant level are anomalies; they are sometimes used as temporary play
grounds for experimentation with employee involvement, with the
lessons learned to be transferred to nonunion plants. In many, if not most
cases, the Union-Avoidance strategy is an attack on the very legitimacy
of union representation.
The Cooperation strategy is an endorsement of joint decisionmaking
at the plant level. Generally, union participation is formalized through
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the establishment of committee-based and/or team-based programs.
The purpose of these joint programs is to improve company perfor
mance via increased efficiency and productivity, higher product quality,
and better supplier/customer services. In some settings, union leaders
participate in strategic business decisions. Although Cooperators do not
engage in aggressive union-avoidance or deunionization activities, they
do not relinquish relative power advantages.
Companies pursuing a Mixed strategy are double-breasted companies
that engage in many of the above union-avoidance activities in their
nonunion operations but engage in cooperative efforts in their unionized
operations. These companies, in short, are pursuing strategies that
embrace simultaneously what might appear to be two irreconcilable
approaches to union-management relations.
In addition to the case reports about the above strategies, in their
analysis of the 1983 Conference Board survey of large companies,
Kochan, McKersie, and Chalykoff (1986) briefly report on a model of
the determinants of the extent of "workplace innovations" across com
panies (see their table 2, page 493). Although not described in detail in
their report, the following factors are reported as statistically significant
in their regression estimation of factors influencing the extent of work
place innovations.
When corporate executives have emphasized a unionavoidance strategy, the extent of work place innovations in
unionized facilities is lower.
The more the union(s) participates in workplace innova
tions, the more extensive are these innovations.
The greater the influence of line executives vis-a-vis indus
trial relations executives, the more extensive are workplace
innovations in unionized establishments. (Presumably, line
executives are not as frozen in traditional labor relations
practices as are industrial relations executives.)
Larger companies engage in more extensive workplace
innovations.
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Perhaps just as interesting as the statistically significant estimates, are
two insignificant estimates. First, Kochan et al. do not find a statistically
significant relationship between "percentage of firm organized" and
extent of workplace innovations. Second, executive perceptions of
"competitive pressures on the firm (foreign and domestic)" are not
significantly related to extent of workplace innovations. Generally
speaking, these latter results are at odds with the Cooke and Meyer
(1990) results summarized below and as discussed by Kochan et al.
(page 494), apparently at odds with their own expectations.

Plant Manager, Local Union Officer,
and Executive Survey Data Collection
Three separate but complementary data collections were conducted
for this study. The first surveyed plant-level managers, the second sur
veyed their local union leader counterparts, and the third surveyed
executives of companies parent to the plants surveyed. These survey
data are supplemented by a variety of secondary data sources.
As discussed in chapter 1, one of the limitations of the literature is the
lack of comparability across single case study observations. An addition
to the current literature, therefore, is the collection of comparable data
across establishments. Short of having unlimited resources and un
limited access to organizations, however, we necessarily sacrifice details
obtained through intensive observation and data collection at a given
organization in exchange for greater comparability and generalization
of less detailed observations across a wide sample of organizations. In
order to obtain opinions and impressions across a wide sample of
companies, plants, and local unions, each organizational response is
based on a single response from plant managers, local union leaders,
and company executives, respectively.
The data collection began by randomly selecting 430 unionized
manufacturing companies listed in A Directory to Collective Bargaining
Agreements: Private Sector, 1982. The directory, published by Micro
filming Corporation of America in 1983, is based on collective bargain-
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ing agreements filed with the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1982 (or
agreements that were filed before but encompassed 1982). Approxi
mately 1,800 agreements across all manufacturing are listed. Although
agreements affect 900 or more employees, listed agreements are some
times master agreements covering more than one facility. Any given
facility, consequently, need not employ 900 or more bargaining unit
employees.
Company names were then matched with Dun©s Marketing Service©s
DMI unpublished files. These files provide names, addresses, phone
numbers, and employment figures at the establishment level. After an
extensive telephone search, only 350 of the 430 establishments could be
located. The establishments that could not be located apparently had
been sold or closed between 1980 and 1986. Given the extent of
company mergers, acquisitions, and plant closures during the early
through mid-1980s, this less than 20 percent turnover of unionized
plants would not be unexpected.
Labor relations managers or plant managers identified through the
initial telephone inquiries as the most knowledgeable with respect to
union-management activities and plant production were surveyed. After
three requests for a response, 55 percent (194) returned useable ques
tionnaires. The data base compiled through this survey will hereafter be
referred to as the "Plant Manager Survey." (See appendix A for a copy of
the questionnaire.)
Through the initial telephone inquiries to plant management, the
telephone number of the local union office was obtained. The local union
office was then contacted to explain the purpose and scope of the survey
and to identify the top local officer most familiar with the given plant.
These officers were then surveyed. After three requests for responses,
33 percent (114) returned useable questionnaires. Of the 114 responses,
74 were from unions representing employees in plants for which plant
manager responses were also obtained. The remaining 40 were not
matchable to any plant manager response. The data base compiled
through this survey will hereafter be referred to as the "Union Officer
Survey." (See appendix B for a copy of the questionnaire.)
In the survey of plant managers, respondents were asked to identify
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the top labor relations or human resource executive at the parent com
pany or division headquarters who would be most familiar with labor
relations at all the company©s plants. Initial telephone calls were made to
headquarter executives to explain the purpose and scope of the survey
and to check whether the executive identified from the Plant Manager
Survey was the most knowledgeable executive for the purpose of com
pleting the survey. After two follow-up requests for responses, 121
useable questionnaires were returned. Because some headquarters re
sponding were parent to more than one plant in the sample, headquarter
information is available for 135 (or 71 percent) of the 194 plants
represented in the Plant Manager Survey. The data base compiled
through this survey will hereafter be referred to as the "Headquarters
Executive Survey." (See appendix C for a copy of the questionnaire.)

Analysis of Headquarters Executive Survey Data
In the Headquarters Executive Survey, executives were queried re
garding company policy toward union representation of nonunion plants
and executive attitudes toward the establishment of joint programs in
their plants. With some adjustment explained below, responses to these
questions are used to classify companies as pursuing one of three grand
labor relations strategies.
Respondents were asked to complete the following two statements:
(1) "In general, it is company policy to
___ strongly oppose ___ oppose ___ remain neutral to
union representation of nonunion manufacturing plants."
(2) "In general, company executives are
___ not in favor of ___ in favor of ___ indifferent to
joint management-union programs or activities."

The responses to these two questions are cross tabulated below.
When respondents reported it was company policy to strongly oppose
or oppose union activities, the company is categorized as following a
Union-Avoidance strategy. Companies reportedly strongly opposed to
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Cross-Tabulation of Responses

Executive stance toward joint programs
Executive stance
toward unionization
Strongly Oppose
Oppose
Neutral To

Not in
favor

Indifferent
to

In
favor

17
5
0

10
8
4

27
32
16

union representation and at the same time in favor of joint activities are
categorized as following a Mixed strategy. Companies reportedly neu
tral to union representation of nonunion plants and in favor of joint
activities are categorized as following a Cooperation strategy.
There is some question as to whether the 32 companies opposed to
unionization (but not strongly opposed) and in favor of joint activities
are pursuing Cooperation or Mixed strategies. Here a comparison is
made using the percent of plants with formalized joint programs and the
percent of plants unionized in 1986. Of the 32 cases, 9 are distinctly
different from the remaining 23 cases. Among these 9 cases, 8 com
panies had established joint programs in fewer than 12 percent of their
unionized facilities; whereas the other 23 companies had, on average,
established joint programs in 72 percent of their unionized facilities. In
the 9th case, the percent of the company©s domestic plants unionized was
only 36 percent in comparison to an average 90 percent in the other 23
cases. Given these sharp distinctions, the 9 cases identified are included
in the Mixed strategy.
Only four companies were reportedly neutral to unionization and
indifferent to joint activities. These four companies are excluded from
the analyses because their responses do not readily fall into one of the
three identified strategies. Finally, two respondents failed to answer both
questions and thus are also excluded.
By partitioning headquarter responses as described, 35 percent of the
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Chart 3.1
Labor-Relations Strategy Choices
Among U.S. Manufacturing Corporations

34%

35%

31%

sample of headquarters have chosen to pursue Union-Avoidance strat
egies, 34 percent Cooperation strategies, and 31 percent Mixed strat
egies (See chart 3.1). Next, I summarize the results of an empirical study
of key factors influencing executive choices of these three grand strat
egies, conducted with David Meyer and published in the Industrial and
Labor Relations Review in January 1990 (Cooke and Meyer 1990).
General Propositions About Choice of Strategy
Guided by the general theoretical model developed in chapter 2,
executives choosing a grand strategy are expected to weigh the per
ceived costs and benefits of relying solely on their relative power (as
depicted by Union-Avoidance strategies) against the perceived costs and
benefits of juxtaposing relative power options and cooperative activities
(as depicted by Cooperation or Mixed strategies). Market and structural
factors (operational, financial, and extent of union representation) are
expected to influence these perceived costs and benefits, and in turn lead
corporate executives to choose one grand strategy over the others.
Assuming executives act to optimize net benefits to the corporation, it
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follows that by choosing either a Cooperation or Mixed strategy, execu
tives and union representatives have concluded that, more or less,
cooperation yields greater benefits than no cooperation. Among those
companies choosing a Union-Avoidance strategy, it follows that execu
tives perceive they will derive greater net gain from relying strictly on
their relative power than from juxtaposing relative power options and
cooperative activities. Union leaders representing employees in these
companies may agree or disagree with that corporate choice. Union
leaders, that is, may agree that traditional adversarial relationships are
preferred over cooperative relationships. They are unlikely to agree,
however, to corporate activities designed to destroy the union, activities
that are part and parcel of many aggressive Union-Avoidance strategies.
Among the three grand strategies identified, the Mixed strategy is
viewed as the least aggressive. In choosing a Mixed strategy, manage
ment needs to find some balance between union avoidance activities on
one hand, and cooperation activities on the other. In finding this balance,
companies will be less able to act aggressively in pursuing union
avoidance activities if simultaneously they are to aggressively pursue
cooperation. As aggressive union avoidance activities will be perceived
by union leaders as a challenge to the very legitimacy of union represen
tation (Oswald 1986), the contradictory message to union leaders under
lying a Mixed strategy becomes less manageable the more aggressive
the company©s union avoidance activities. One can also imagine that joint
activities are less extensive and intensive in plant settings where both
plant management and local union leaders perceive that upper manage
ment is less than fully committed to cooperation (Boylston 1986).
In comparison to the Mixed strategy, the more aggressive UnionAvoidance and Cooperation strategies are also more risky. Among
highly unionized corporations (as in the present sample), an aggressive
Union-Avoidance strategy pits the company against its union(s), and
unions are not without considerable power to inflict costs on companies
for aggressively pursuing Union-Avoidance strategies. Aggressive
efforts at cooperation are likewise risky. Until very recently, the parties
had very limited experience or expertise at formulating and implement
ing the significant organizational changes required to make cooperative
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efforts successful. History also demonstrates that unless the parties find
ways to minimize the problems that undermine cooperative efforts (see
chapters 5 and 6), these recent efforts will follow the course of Ameri
can history, a history of short-lived efforts.
Finally, in choosing a grand strategy, it seems reasonable to assume
that, in general, executives prefer to manage without unions. Hence,
after weighing the potential costs and benefits across the three strategic
choices (in light of market pressures and the company©s collective
bargaining, operational, and financial structures), all factors the same,
executives will choose a Union-Avoidance strategy. Indeed, some exec
utives may be willing to accept an unnecessary additional cost merely to
satisfy their antiunion ideologies. To the extent they are, the more likely
they will choose a Union-Avoidance strategy.

An Empirical Test of Factors Influencing
the Choice of Strategies
In order to test hypotheses about financial structure and to control for
changes in market conditions, data derived from the Headquarters
Executive Survey were merged with financial records of publicly held
corporations (provided by COMPUSTAT12) and industry data (pro
vided by the U.S. Department of Commerce 13). Only 90 headquarters
surveyed could be matched with corporations listed by COMPUSTAT.
Because of missing data on one or more variables in COMPUSTAT, the
final sample comprises 58 publicly held corporations.
The time frame selected for predicting the choice among strategies is
1981, a point in time at which unionized corporations were experiencing
substantial increases in domestic and global competition and other
market pressures demanding substantial adaptation. Although 1981 is
not necessarily the year in which all corporations in the sample shaped
and embarked upon their grand strategies, the very early 1980s appear
to closely approximate the timing of these choices.
In modeling and testing the hypothesized effects of market and
various structural factors on the choice of strategies, it is recognized that
the choices are not ordered. That is, some factors are expected to
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influence the choice between the less aggressive, less risky Mixed
strategy and one or the other more aggressive, more risky singleapproach strategies (Union-Avoidance or Cooperation). While some of
these factors, furthermore, are not expected to signal employers that a
Union-Avoidance strategy should be preferred over Cooperation (or
vice versa), other factors are expected to signal employers to choose
Union-Avoidance over Cooperation (or vice versa). An appropriate
statistical estimator for testing this kind of discrete unordered choice
model is multinomial logit (Amemiya 1981).
Effect of Market Factors on Choice of Strategy
All other factors held constant, it is found that the greater the increase
in import penetration (over the 1978 to 1981 period) in the corporation©s
primary product market, the more likely the corporation chooses a
Union-Avoidance strategy over either a Cooperation or Mixed strategy.
Given the greater need to be aggressive and risk taking, it can be
expected that corporations would choose a Union-Avoidance strategy
over a Mixed strategy. It remains unclear, however, why a UnionAvoidance strategy would also be much more preferred than a Coopera
tion strategy. Perhaps the difference is attributable to management©s
general preference for managing in nonunion settings.
Another market factor significantly related to choice of strategy is the
change in the corporation©s industry employment (measured over the
1978-1981 period). The more serious the decline in employment, the
more likely corporations chose either Cooperation or Union-Avoidance
strategies over Mixed strategies. Again, it is inferred that more serious
market threats require more aggressive, riskier strategies.

Extent of Union Representation on Choice of Strategy
The evidence strongly supports the expectation that the more highly
unionized the corporation, the less likely Union-Avoidance strategies
are pursued. Indeed, the larger the proportion of a corporation©s plants
unionized, the more likely Cooperation strategies are chosen over either
Union-Avoidance or Mixed strategies. These results are consistent with
the expectation that the potential disruptive costs associated with Union-
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Avoidance activities in highly unionized companies are substantially
higher than in companies with lesser union representation.
Effects of Operational and Financial Structures on Choice of Strategy
There is substantial evidence that the choice of strategies is also
significantly influenced by a variety of factors reflecting differences in
the operational structure and the financial structure or conditions of
corporations. First, the higher the average labor cost component of
production, the less likely corporations pursue either one of the more
aggressive, riskier strategies. This finding is consistent with the expec
tation that the more labor-intensive the operations, the riskier becomes a
Union-Avoidance or Cooperation strategy. Labor©s resistance to union
avoidance activities, that is, leads to greater disruption costs, the higher
the labor-intensiveness. Failure to successfully implement and maintain
joint activities across a company©s plants, likewise, would lead to greater
losses in reorientation and training investments in joint programs, the
greater the labor-intensiveness of production. Underlying this latter
argument is the presumption that the necessary reorientation and train
ing costs associated with joint programs are greater, since the labor cost
component of production is greater.
Second, in weighing the potential costs and benefits of the various
grand strategies in light of the labor cost component of production, the
overall size of the average investment in plant operations is also evalu
ated by executives. Here it is hypothesized that the larger the investment
in plant operations, the greater becomes the potential loss from failed
strategies, since more is put at risk. Hence, everything else the same,
larger average investments in plant operations reduces the likelihood
that either Union-Avoidance or Cooperation strategies are chosen (and
vice versa). Two variables were used to test this hypothesis: average
employment per plant and average sales volume per plant. The results of
estimation yield evidence that the larger the average sales volume per
plant, the more likely corporations choose a less aggressive, more risk
averse Mixed strategy over either a Union-Avoidance or Cooperation
strategy. Insignificant results are obtained with respect to the effect of
average plant size on strategy choice.
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It is also found, as would be expected,that the fewer the number of
plants companywide, the less likely corporations choose a Mixed strat
egy. The logic is that the fewer the number of facilities, the more difficult
it becomes to effectively manage the contradictory signals of embracing
cooperation on one hand while engaging in union avoidance activities on
the other.
Finally, strong statistical support is obtained, showing that the tighter
the average cost/price squeeze across facilities (measured as cost-ofgoods/sales), the more likely corporations choose Cooperation strat
egies over either Union-Avoidance or Mixed strategies. Joint activities at
the plant level are typically designed to identify and resolve productionrelated problems and to devise ways to improve productivity and quality
and to reduce operating costs. As the potential net benefit from cooper
ative activities rises, therefore (as depicted by higher cost of goods-tosales ratios), the likelihood of choosing a Cooperation strategy rises.
In summary, the limited statistical analysis reviewed herein strongly
suggests that corporations went about choosing among several grand
labor relations strategies in the early 1980s. The evidence is strongly
consistent with a decisionmaking model, wherein corporate executives
have chosen strategies that appear to fit within the competitive pressures
of their industries and within their collective bargaining, operational,
and financial structures in the early 1980s. In the following section I
report how companies went about implementing the three grand
strategies.

Implementation of Grand Strategies
Key changes in operational and collective bargaining relationships
over the 1975 to 1986 period are reported to highlight several distinct
outcomes associated with these strategies. The data presented are based
on the 115 headquarter executive responses, and companies are classi
fied by grand strategy by the method described above.
Setting the context for the description of key changes that follows, in
1975 Union-Avoiders on average had 26 plants, of which 68 percent
were represented by unions. Cooperators, on average, had 13 plants, of
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which 90 percent were unionized. Companies pursuing Mixed strat
egies had, on average, 17 plants in 1975, of which 68 percent were
unionized. Over the 1975-1986 period Union-Avoiders, on average,
increased the number of plants by roughly 29 percent, whereas com
panies pursuing Cooperation and Mixed strategies increased the
number of plants by roughly 18 percent.
As shown in chart 3.2, there are apparent differences across strategies
with respect to changes in the union status of manufacturing plants.
Over the 1975 to 1986 period, on average, Union-Avoiders increased the
proportion of total plants that are nonunion by 23 percent, whereas
Cooperators increased the proportion by only 6 percent and companies
pursuing Mixed strategies increased the proportion of plants that are
nonunion by 15 percent. Second, with respect to the closure of union
ized facilities (chart 3.3), on average, Union-Avoiders closed approxi-

Chart 3.2
Proportional Change in Nonunion
Plants (1975 to 1986) by Strategy
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Chart 3.3
Proportion of Unionized Plants Closed
(1975 to 1986) by Strategy
OU/o
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mately 12 percent of their unionized plants over the 1975-1986 period,
where in comparison companies pursuing Mixed strategies closed 20
percent and Cooperators closed 25 percent of their unionized plants.
Given the figures reported in chart 3.2, although Cooperators closed the
largest proportion of unionized plants, they also did not aggressively
resist the unionization of plants opened and/or acquired.
A third variable of interest is the extent to which corporations were
associated with decertification elections. As reported in chart 3.4,
Union-Avoiders were five times as likely to experience decertification
elections over the 1981 to 1986 period as were Cooperators (25 percent
and 5 percent, respectively). In comparison, companies pursuing
Mixed strategies were about three times as likely as Cooperators to
experience decertification elections.
Finally, on average, Cooperators had established formalized joint
programs (designed to improve company performance and/or quality of
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Chart 3.4
Proportion of Corporations Experiencing
Decertification Elections (1975 to 1986)
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Chart 3.5
Proportion of Unionized Plants With
Joint Programs (1986) by Strategy
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worklife) in 75 percent of their unionized plants (chart 3.5). Corpora
tions pursuing Mixed and Union-Avoidance strategies in contrast have
established joint programs in 50 percent and 15 percent, respectively, of
their unionized plants.
In conclusion, the kind of strategic thrusts described herein indicate
that three broadly defined labor relations strategies have evolved over
the last 10 to 15 years. Within these three grand strategies, however,
there is also some notable variation in activities. In particular, within the
Union-Avoidance category, approximately one-third of the companies
did not close any unionized facilities nor experience any decertification
elections. Union avoidance has been restricted apparently to the opening
and/or acquiring of nonunion plants. Within the Cooperation category,
approximately one-third of the companies closed a relatively large
proportion of unionized plants (on average, one-third) and simul
taneously opened or acquired a relatively large proportion of nonunion
plants (on average, increasing the proportion of nonunion plants by
about 20 percent). Except for extensive joint activities across their
unionized plants (on average, across 83 percent of their plants), the
strategic changes in these companies look similar to the those observed
for companies in the Mixed category.

Plant-Level Joint Programs
Objectives and Design
Based on the Headquarters Executive Survey, companies pursuing
Cooperation strategies have established joint programs in 75 percent of
their unionized facilities, those pursuing Mixed strategies have estab
lished joint programs in 50 percent of their unionized facilities, and even
15 percent of plants parented by Union-Avoiders have established joint
programs. My purpose in this section is to report on the objectives
underlying these joint efforts and on variations and commonalities in
their design.
In both the Plant Manager Survey and Union Officer Survey, re
spondents were first asked to identify any kind of formalized joint
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Table 3.1
Type and Extent of Joint Programs Across Manufacturing
Type of program

Percent of plants
with program*

Health and safety committees

48

Quality circles
Substance abuse committees

31
21

Quality of work life/
employee involvement

19

Work teams

18

Productivity committees

17

Labor-management committees
Training committees

15
15

Scanlon or other gainsharing
(with employee involvement)
Employee stock ownership
(with employee involvement)

6

Profit sharing
(with employee involvement)

6

Other than above

7

12

©Based on 194 company responses and 40 unique union responses, N=234

activity that had been established (see questionnaires in appendix).
Combining the 194 plant manager responses with 40 unique union
officer responses (unique in that no Plant Manager Survey responses
were obtained), 54 percent of the 234 facilities represented by these
survey responses have embarked on one or more joint programs. Ex
cluding joint health and safety programs (which 48 percent of the
sample reportedly have), table 3.1 shows that the most common form of
joint activity is the jointly administered quality circle. The least com
mon type of joint program, on the other hand, are programs that tie
financial incentives such as gainsharing, profit sharing, and stock
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Table 3.2
Most Important Joint Programs:
Type and Extent
Type of program

Percent reporting
program as
most important

Quality circles

31

Labor-management committees
Work teams

20
19

Quality of work life/
employee involvement

15

Productivity committees
Scanlon or other gainsharing
(with employee involvement)
Employee stock ownership
(with employee involvement)

2

Other than above

3

8
2

N = 129

ownership to employee involvement. Excluding health and safety, sub
stance abuse, and training committees, plants report having, on aver
age, 2.4 different joint programs: 38 percent having one program, 31
percent having two programs, and 31 percent having three or more
programs.
Of course, not all programs survive. Some never get beyond a
memorandum of agreement between the parties; some bloom and then
flounder; others get terminated de facto as a result of plant closure. In
the sample of 129 plants that established one or more joint programs, 30
plants (23 percent) reported having terminated one or more joint pro
grams. About 60 percent of these 30 plants, however, continued with or
established other joint programs despite the terminations. Of the 320
joint programs established by the 129 plants in the sample (again
excluding joint health and safety, substance abuse, and apprenticeship
programs), only 35 programs were terminated by 1986. Hence only 11
percent of all joint programs appear to have been terminated.
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Objectives and Structure of Joint Programs
In questionnaires sent to both plant-level management and local union
leaders, respondents were asked an identical set of questions about the
focus and structure of program activities. In the questionnaire to local
union leaders, respondents were asked an additional set of related
questions. This section first reviews the responses to the first set of
questions asked of both parties, and then reviews the responses to
questions asked only of local union leaders.
In response to the survey of plant-level management, 111 responses
describing joint programs were received. In addition, 18 responses were
received from local union leaders describing joint programs for which
no plant management response was obtained. These responses are
combined to describe programs in 129 different manufacturing plants.
As discussed above, 62 percent of those facilities that have engaged in
joint activities have established two or more joint programs. In asking
respondents to describe programs and evaluate program success, re
spondents were asked to answer questions as they would apply to their
most important program, where more than one had been established.
Table 3.2 reports the type and distribution of joint programs identified
by respondents as their most important joint effort.
In asking respondents to describe the focus and structure of their most
important joint program, it is found that, in general, team-based pro
grams are very similar in focus and structure in spite of the categoriza
tion reported in table 3.2. Labor-Management Committees (LMCs) and
Productivity Committees, on the other hand, appear to have a somewhat
different focus and structure than the team-based programs. To facilitate
the description of programs, therefore, the sample is divided into two
broad categories: (1) team-based programs (quality circles, work
teams, QWL/EI, gainsharing, and ESOPs) and (2) committee-based
programs (labor-management and productivity committees). As de
rived from table 3.2, this partitioning of the sample yields 90 teambased programs and 35 committee-based programs that are next de
scribed (four programs were not categorizable as either).
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Table 3.3
Team- Versus Committee-based Programs:
Key Problems That Led To and
Are Addressed by Joint Programs
Key problems

Team-based (N=90)
(percent)

Committee-based (N=35)
(percent)

Quality of product

49

20

Productivity

33

37

Cost-related

11

3

Labor-management
climate

9

29

Absenteeism

8

6

Communications

7

9

Quality of work life

6

3

Job security

6

6

Other

3

14

Primary Focus
Using an open-ended format, respondents were asked to describe the
key problems that led to and are addressed by their program. The key
problems identified were then categorized, and up to three problems
were coded for each respondent. Reported in table 3.3 are the coded
responses. Vague responses (e.g., "global competition," "new technolo
gy," "changing values of workers," etc.) were coded as "Other."
Among those facilities identifying team-based programs as their most
important programs, the most widely cited problems were associated
with quality of product (49 percent) and productivity (33 percent).
Eleven percent or fewer of the respondents with team-based programs
identified any other key problem.
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Among those facilities identifying committees as their most impor
tant joint efforts, the most widely cited problems addressed by these
programs are productivity (37 percent), the labor-management climate
(29 percent), and product quality (20 percent). Nine percent or fewer
identified any other key problem.
Program Initiation and Start-Up
The great majority of joint programs appear to have been initiated by
management (see table 3.4). Approximately 86 percent of key teambased programs and 85 percent of key committee-based programs were

Table 3.4
Initiation and Start-up of Joint Programs

Percent of teambased programs

Percent of committeebased programs

86

85

4

4

10

11

11

14

1980

7

3

1981

6

14

1982

16

11

1983

15

23

1984

16

20

1985

24

9

6

6

Program initiated by:
Company
Union
Company and Union
Year program began:
Before 1980

Early 1986
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Table 3.5
Assistance From Outside Organizations
Organization
Industrywide labormanagement committee
Areawide labormanagement committee
Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service
U.S. Dept. of Labor

Not at all
(percent)

Some
(percent)

Very much
(percent)

91

9

_

82

15

3

81
81

16
16

3
3

initiated by management. Only 4 percent of these key programs were
initially promoted by unions.
Also reported in table 3.4 are the years programs began. It is obvious
that joint efforts are relatively new, given that 89 percent of the teambased programs and 86 percent of the committee-based programs were
established in 1980 or later. Over 50 percent of all programs described
were begun between 1983 and 1985.
There are several nonprofit organizations and federal government
agencies involved in the promotion of labor-management cooperation.
In particular, these include areawide and industrywide Joint LaborManagement Committees (JLMCs), the Federal Mediation and Concil
iation Services (FMCS), and the U.S. Department of Labor (Bureau of
Labor-Management Relations and Cooperative Programs). Re
spondents were asked to indicate the extent to which their plant worked
with the above "organizations in designing and/or implementing cooper
ative programs." As reported in table 3.5, the parties have not relied to
any substantial degree on either kind of outside JLMC or on either the
FMCS or U.S. Department of Labor for assistance in getting started.
Only 9 percent of the plants were assisted by industrywide JLMCs, 18
percent by the FMCS, and 19 percent by the U.S. Department of Labor.
Overall, however, 33 percent of the plants with joint programs worked at
least "some" with one or more of these outside nonprofit agencies.
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Formal Structure
Team-Based Programs: Upon examining the formal structures of
joint programs, some clear commonalities among team-based programs
are found. On average, steering committees that oversee team-based
activities consist of five union representatives and five to six manage
ment representatives. The most common split is four union and four
management representatives. Some steering committees, however, are
considerably larger, with up to as many as 12 union and 12 management
representatives. In some committees, furthermore, union representa
tion accounted for as little as 5 percent of committee membership, in
others as high as 90 percent.
On average, steering committees meet every five weeks, but most
commonly every four weeks. Regularly scheduled meetings, however,
ranged anywhere from every week to every 16 weeks. The work groups
or teams themselves generally meet far more frequently, on average
every two weeks. The most common schedule is to meet once every
week. In one case, however, teams meet only once every three months.
Committee-Based Programs: The formalized structure of committeebased programs also has strong commonalities across facilities. On
average, committees are comprised of seven top union officials and
seven to eight company officials. The most common configuration is five
to six union and five to six management officials. The largest committee
is comprised of 15 union and 15 management officials, while the
smallest is comprised of one union official and four managers.
Roughly 50 percent of the committees meet every four weeks. The
remaining programs have scheduled meetings ranging from biweekly to
16-week intervals. In addition to the regular committee meetings, ap
proximately 40 percent report having some form of shop-floor team
meetings either as special task groups assigned by the committees or
as departmental labor-management or productivity committees. How
ever, in contrast to the team-based programs, for which teams generally
meet every week or two, these shop-floor committees meet on average
only every four weeks.
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Employees Covered in Team-Based Joint Programs
An attempt was made to estimate how widely diffused or extensive
joint activities are among bargaining unit employees. Regrettably, the
question was apparently stated in such a way that the responses have
ambiguous value. Respondents were asked to report "the proportion of
bargaining unit employees covered by the program." The responses
ranged from 1 percent to 100 percent, with 58 percent responding that
all bargaining unit employees were covered by the program described.
Respondents apparently interpreted "covered" to mean either (a) the
proportion of bargaining unit employees for which the joint program
was applicable but not necessarily the proportion of employees who
have been actively involved in joint program activities, or (b) the
proportion of employees who have been actively involved in joint
program activities.
Given the recency of the shift toward joint endeavors, it is highly
unlikely that many unionized plants have extended their team-based
joint programs to actively involve 100 percent of bargaining unit em
ployees. Assuming that respondents who reported 100 percent coverage
did, indeed, misinterpret the intent of the inquiry, some light can be shed
on how widely diffused these joint activities are within facilities.
Table 3.6 provides a breakdown of coverage into several categories,
both from the original responses and then excluding the 100 percent
category. As shown for the latter case, in 56 percent of the plants,
between 1 and 25 percent of bargaining unit employees are covered; in
28 percent of the plants, between 26 and 50 percent of employees are
covered; and in 16 percent of the plants, between 51 and 99 percent of
employees are covered. On average, roughly 21 percent of bargaining
unit employees are actively involved in joint program activities. Al
though the reader must exercise caution with these figures, they provide
some tentative evidence that three out of four team-based programs have
yet to actively involve a majority of bargaining unit employees.
Additional Union Officer Survey Responses
The survey mailed to union officials asked several questions about the
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structure and process of joint activities not asked in the survey to plantlevel managers. In this section we briefly review these union responses.
Outside Assistance: First, 41 percent of the respondents report that
national or regional union offices provided expertise or resources re
garding joint activities. The majority, therefore, did not receive any such
assistance from the union hierarchy. Second, 47 percent responded that
one or more neutral outside consultants were used to help facilitate joint
activities in their plants. Approximately 22 percent of the respondents
indicated that assistance from both the national or regional offices and
outside neutral consultants was used, whereas 33 percent indicate that
neither form of outside assistance was utilized.
Union Facilitators: Union officials were asked whether any union
representatives had been assigned or elected by the union to act as joint
program coordinators or facilitators. About 35 percent responded they
had. Of these, 68 percent had one or more full-time joint program
facilitators and 32 percent had one or more part-time joint program
facilitators. There was no overlap in these two categories; facilitators
were either all full time or all part time. The majority of those unions
with full-time coordinators or facilitators have one such person, but the

Table 3.6
Proportion of Bargaining Unit Employees Covered
by Team-based Programs
Percent in category
(all responses,
N=78)

Percent in category
(excluding response
of 100%, N=33)

1-25

23

56

26-50

12

28

51 -75

6

16
_

Percent covered

100

58
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Table 3.7
Joint Program Modification of Contract
Wages and benefits
(percent)

Work rules
(percent)

Not at all

89

63

Very little

6

16

Little

2

14

Much

3

8

Extent of change allowed

number ranges to as high as 18. Those local unions with part-time
coordinators or facilitators typically have one or two, but in several
cases the locals had eight to ten part-time facilitators.
Attendance Record: According to union respondents, both steering
committee meetings and shop-floor meetings are generally well at
tended. Only 9 percent of respondents indicated that steering committee
meetings were poorly attended. Only 2 percent indicated that shop-floor
team meetings were poorly attended.
Infringement on Labor Contracts: Finally, several questions were
asked addressing the potential overlap or infringement of joint activities
on the terms and conditions of the contract. First, respondents were
asked to what extent joint teams and committees were allowed to modify
either work rules or wages and benefits negotiated in the labor agree
ment. As reported in table 3.7, 89 percent of the respondents report that
joint teams and committees are NOT allowed to modify wages or
benefits. In only 3 percent of the programs are participants allowed
"much" leeway in altering negotiated wages or benefits. With regard to
work rule modification, the parties allow more opportunity to change
contractual agreements. \et even here, little change is generally al
lowed; 63 percent allow for no modifications and 30 percent allow for
very little or little change.
Respondents were further asked to describe the procedures to be
followed when proposals for contract modifications are allowed. The
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standard procedure has two steps: first, the top level steering or labormanagement committee of the program must agree to the proposed
changes. Second, a majority ratification vote of the bargaining unit must
be obtained.
A third question pertinent to the issue of overlap asked, "to what
extent do union representatives who serve on the contract negotiation
team or who are regular grievance committeemen also serve in key
positions in joint program committees?" Roughly 72 percent responded
that there was "much" or "very much" overlap; 23 percent reported "very
little" overlap. Only 5 percent reported no overlap.

Summary and Conclusion
Based on a survey of company headquarters, executives have very
recently fashioned three fairly distinct labor-relations strategies.
Among those companies pursuing Cooperation strategies, by 1986
about 75 percent of their unionized manufacturing plants had estab
lished formalized joint programs. Among companies pursuing Mixed
strategies, about 50 percent of their unionized plants had established
formalized joint programs by 1986. Only 15 percent of the unionized
plants in which parent companies are pursuing Union-Avoidance strat
egies have established joint programs. In choosing among these grand
strategies, the evidence presented herein implies that executives
weighed the perceived effects of market conditions and corporate struc
tural variables on the potential costs and benefits associated with the
three grand strategies. In turn, the strategy chosen reflects executives©
perceptions about which grand strategy optimizes net gains. Key factors
associated with these choices can be summarized as follows.
The more severe become market conditions (depicted by
rising import penetration and declining industry employ
ment), the more likely companies choose either the more
aggressive Union-Avoidance or Cooperation strategies over
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the Mixed strategy. On net, the choice is most likely to be a
Union-Avoidance strategy.
The greater the union strength (depicted by percent of
company facilities unionized), the more likely companies
choose a Cooperation strategy over both Union-Avoidance
and Mixed strategies.
The lower the labor intensity of production (measured by
labor cost/total value ratios and by the average value added
per employee) and the smaller the average plant investment
(proxied by plant sales), the more likely a Union-Avoidance
or Cooperation strategy is chosen over a Mixed strategy, and
the more likely a Union-Avoidance strategy is chosen over a
Cooperation strategy.
The greater the number of plants, the more likely com
panies choose a Mixed strategy, with a larger proportion
moving away from choosing a Cooperation strategy than
moving away from choosing a Union-Avoidance strategy.
The higher the cost-to-sales ratio, the more likely com
panies choose a Cooperation strategy. As the cost-to-sales
ratio rises, companies move away from choosing a Mixed
strategy but not away from choosing a Union-Avoidance
strategy.
I have also attempted to document the objectives and structure of joint
union-management programs in U.S. manufacturing. Based on a survey
of 350 plant managers and their local union leader counterparts,
roughly one-half of these manufacturing facilities have embarked on
joint programs established to improve plant-level performance and/or
labor-management relations. This figure excludes joint programs on
health and safety, substance abuse, and apprenticeship training. Nearly
all joint programs were begun in the last 10 years; over 50 percent of
programs were begun during the 1983-1985 period. The primary foci or
purposes of these joint programs are enhancing product quality, increas
ing productivity, and improving labor-management climates.
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Joint programs can be categorized reasonably well into two basic
types. The first are team-based efforts, in which bargaining unit employ
ees are involved in shop-floor problemsolving (quality circles, work
teams, quality of work life/employee involvement, and those employee
involvement programs with gainsharing or profit sharing incentives).
The second are committee-based efforts, in which plant management
and local union leaders are involved in plantwide problemsolving
(labor-management or productivity committees). It appears that within
plants, the diffusion of team-based activities has yet to involve a majority
of hourly employees. One must bear in mind, however, that most joint
efforts are relatively new and that expansion of employee involvement
activities takes considerable time. It is important to note that only 11
percent of all joint programs established in recent years have been
terminated, suggesting that these new cooperative efforts have some
durability.
Lest the reader gets the wrong impression, the statistical analysis of
the choice to cooperate should be viewed with caution. The analysis is
based on a small and unique data base, the information available is
limited (potentially leading to incomplete and overly simplified analy
ses), and the theory underlying any tests of hypotheses is in a formative,
incomplete stage and hence, any inferences about causality are
tentative.
One can readily surmise, however, that unless cooperative efforts
maximize net gains to all parties involved, the parties that have chosen to
engage in cooperative activities will ultimately choose to abandon these
efforts. Abandonment would be American history repeating itself,
except in today©s competitive markets the alternative is not yesterday©s
adversarial relationship of hard-nosed bargaining and contract adminis
tration. Today©s alternative is to pit unions against employers in an allout struggle over deunionization.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
In this appendix are tables pertinent to the analysis of factors affecting corpo
rate choics of labor relations strategies. These tables are reprinted from
William N. Cooke and David G. Meyer, "Structural and Market Predictors of
Corporate Labor Relations Strategies," published in the Industrial and Labor
Relations Review, Volume 43, Number 2 (January 1990), pp. 280-293.
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Table 3A.1
Variable Construction and Data Sources
Variable

Construction

AlMPORT

1981 import penetration ratio minus 1978 import penetration
ratio of company©s primary 2-digit SIC industry [Source:
Dept. of Commerce industry and import files]
((1981-78 total industry employment/1978 total industry
employment) * 100), using company©s primary 2-digit SIC
code [Commerce]

AEMPLOY

% UNION

Percentage of the company©s total domestic manufacturing
plants represented by unions in 1975 [author©s survey]

LCTV

((Total 1981 industry payroll/(total 1981 shipments) -I- (total
1981 inventory - 1980 inventory)) * 100), using company©s
2-digit SIC code [Commerce]

ADDVALUE ((1981 operating income + (1981 inventory - 1980
inventory))/1981 total company employment)
[COMPUSTAT]
PLNTSIZE

Total company employment in 1981/total manufacturing
plants in 1975 [COMPUTSTAT: survey]

vWGSALES

Total company sales in 1981/total manufacturing plants in
1975, in millions of dollars [COMPUTSTAT: survey]

NPLANTS

Total number of domestic manufacturing plants in 1975
[survey]

SQUEEZE

((1981 total sales - 1981 operating income)/1981 total sales)
[COMPUTSTAT]

Appendix to Chapter 3

Table 3A.2
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses)
of Exogenous Variables by Strategy

Strategy
Total
sample

Union
avoidance

Mixed

Coope
ration

IMPORT

11.27
(8.93)

8.76
(5.09)

12.12
(9.46)

11.72
(10.84)

AlMPORT

1.13
(3.01)

1.424
(2.317)

1.47
(1.88)

.54
(4.28)

Variable

AEMPLOY

-13.29
(16.10)

-16.10
(17.13)

-9.88
(12.51)

-14.49
(18.55)

% UNION

75.49
(26.82)

69.53
(28.31)

66.28
(28.34)

90.23
(16.83)

11.14
(3.91)

10.12
(4.02)

12.29
(4.33)

10.81
(3.18)

24.29
(10.45)

25.60
(9.12)

21.96
(7.93)

25.61
(13.48)

LCTV
ADDVALUE

(in $10,000)
PINTSIZE
AVGSALES
(in $millions)

2240
(3525)
407.4
(537.9)

1650
(2543)
224.1
(207.3)

2895
(4584)
474.2
(618.9)

2052
(2982)
493.1
(621.3)

NPLANTS

17.24
(22.40)

14.12
(16.00)

25.62
(31.36)

11.10
(11.36)

SQUEEZE

87.91
(4.67)

86.80
(4.09)

86.92
(4.29)

89.89
(5.06)

N

58

17

21

20
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Table 3A.3
Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Odds of
Choosing Corporate Strategies

Variable

In(Pua/Pm)

ln(Pc/Pm)

ln(Pc/Pua)

AlMPORT

+ 1.276***
(.439)
. 179***
(.059)

+ .445
(.289)
-.120**
(.055)
+ .065**
(.029)
-.545**
(.226)
+ .231**
(.099)

-.831**
(.362)

AEMPLOY
% UNION
LCTV
ADDVALUE
PLNTSIZE
AVGSALES
NPLANTS

-K017
(.025)
-.860***
(.256)
+ . 260***
(. 106)
-.00009
(.00015)
-.0045**
(.0021)
-.089**
(.041)

SQUEEZE

+ .331
(.210)

Intercept

-27.433
(19.273)

18

-.00015
(.00014)
-.0038**
(.0018)
-.102*
(.058)
+ .652***
(.227)
-60.099***
(20.745)

+ .058
(.045)
+.048**
(.025)
+ .315
(.196)
-.028
(.058)
-.00006
(.00016)
+ .0008
(.0013)
-.013
(.047)
+ .320**
(.151)
-32.667**
(13.844)

X2 = 58.842***,
d.f.; N = 58

Pua = the probability of selecting the union avoidance strategy; Pm — the probability of
selecting the mixed strategy; Pc = the probability of selecting the cooperation strategy.
*Significant at the .10 level; **significant at the .05 level; ***significant at the .01 level (twotailed tests.

Outcomes Associated With Cooperation
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, I report the perceptions
of plant-level managers and local union officers regarding changes in
company performance, labor relations climates, and outcomes specific
to unions and their members. These reported changes, however, apply to
perceived changes occurring after the introduction of joint programs
and not necessarily as the result of the introduction of joint programs. In
the second section, therefore, the theoretical linkage between joint
activities and these perceived plant-level outcomes is modeled and
findings from several empirical tests are summarized. At a more aggre
gated level, I then examine the effects of the various grand labor
relations strategies on corporate performance.

Perceived Outcomes Associated With
Joint Activities at the Plant Level
In both the Plant Manager Survey and Union Officer Survey re
spondents were asked: "Comparing the five year period prior to imple
mentation of the most important joint program identified above, please
indicate the degree to which the variables identified below have
changed." The response categories provided are: much higher, modestly
higher, about the same, modestly lower, and much lower. Presented
graphically in charts 4.1 through 4.11 are the responses from approxi
mately 110 plant managers and 65 local union leaders who reported
having established joint team-based or committee-based programs de
fined in chapter 3. Responses indicating that the selected outcome had
either worsened "modestly" or by "much" are collapsed into one cate
gory because very few responses indicated the selected outcomes had
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worsened by "much." For ease of presentation, the proportion of re
spondents reporting that the selected outcome was "about the same" are
omitted.
In charts 4.1 and 4.2 are the management and union leader reported
changes in worker productivity, product quality, and rate of scrappage or
waste. In general, it appears that the perceptions of managers and local
union leaders are largely consistent with respect to these changes in
company performance. At least one-half of the respondents perceived
that there have been modest improvements in productivity and quality. A
much smaller proportion of managers and union leaders (about 10-20
percent) perceived that there has been much improvement in productiv
ity, quality, and rate of scrappage. Very few respondents (but some)
reported that productivity and quality have worsened. One obvious
difference in opinion between managers and union leaders is observed in
reference to scrappage and waste; 18 percent of the union leaders
reported worsening performance, whereas only 4 percent of managers
reported worsening performance.
Charts 4.3 and 4.4 report responses to several outcomes related to
what might be thought of as labor relations climate variables. Again, the
responses across the management and union leader samples are largely
consistent. With respect to grievance rates, it appears that in roughly 20
percent of the plants with joint efforts, grievance rates have become
much lower, and in approximately 30 percent of the plants, grievance
rates have become modestly lower. It appears, however, that in many
settings (about one in five) grievance rates are at least modestly higher.
With respect to absenteeism and tardiness, about one-half of the
respondents perceive some improvement, most of that being modest.
With respect to changes in flexibility of work rules, only about 5 percent
report having obtained much greater flexibility after embarking on joint
activities, and only about 25 percent report having obtained modestly
greater flexibility.
Charts 4.5 through 4.8 summarize responses to several outcomes
pertinent to changes in labor-management relations. Direct com
parisons of responses between union leaders and plant managers cannot
be made here because some questions were worded differently in the
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Chart 4.1
Perceived Changes in Company Performance
(Plant Management Response)
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Chart 4.2
Perceived Changes in Company Performance
(Local Union Leader Response)
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Chart 4.3
Perceived Changes in Climate
(Plant Management Response)
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Chart 4.4
Perceived Changes in Climate
(Local Union Leader Response)
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survey instruments to each sample and other questions were asked only
of local union leaders. As reported in charts 4.5 and 4.6, it appears that
just over 25 percent of respondents perceive that the adversarial or
problemsolving relationship between plant managers and union leaders
has been much improved. Another 40 percent perceive modest improve
ment in these relations. Plant-level managers appear to perceive that
there has been much greater improvement in reducing adversarial super
visor-worker relationships than do local union leaders. (These reported
differences, however, could be attributed to differences in the wording of
questions.) It also appears that some parties have been able to capitalize
on improved cooperative relations developed through joint efforts when
subsequently engaging in contract negotiations. About 15 percent re
port much improvement in the cooperative spirit at negotiations and
another 30 percent report experiencing modest improvement. The diffi
culty of juxtaposing the more cooperative process of joint activity with
the inherently more adversarial process of contract negotiations is
highlighted, however, by noting that over 20 percent of the union leaders
and 15 percent of the plant managers report that the cooperative spirit of
negotiations has worsened since joint activities were begun.
As reported in charts 4.7 and 4.8, a majority of local union leaders
report that the parties to cooperative efforts have improved their under
standing of each other©s interests, objectives, and roles. One-fifth of
union leaders report that management©s understanding of the union
leader roles and interests has been much improved. Another one-third
perceive there has been modest improvement. Union leaders also report
some improvement in plant management©s understanding of worker
interests and objectives, with nearly 50 percent of union leaders report
ing modest improvement and just over 10 percent reporting much
improvement along these lines.
The opposite also appears to be true. That is, (see chart 4.8) in a
majority of settings union leaders and members have improved their
understanding of management©s business interests and objectives. This
appears especially to be the case for union leaders, whereby over 20
percent report having a much better understanding and over 50 percent
report having a modestly better understanding of management interests.
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Chart 4.5
Perceived Changes in Labor-Management Relations
(Plant Management Response)
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Chart 4.6
Perceived Changes in Labor-Management Relations
(Local Union Leader Response)
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Chart 4.7
Perceived Changes in Management
Understanding of Union and Worker Interests
(Local Union Leader Response)
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Chart 4.8
Perceived Changes in Union and Worker
Understanding of Management Interests
(Local Union Leader Response)
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Local union leaders were also asked a fairly wide range of questions
about potential gains to their members and the union as a whole. As
reported in chart 4.9, less than a majority of union leader respondents
perceive that member satisfaction with job tasks or work conditions have
improved. Most of the improvement, if any, has been modest. A large
majority of union leaders, on the other hand, perceived that manage
ment has shared more information since the establishment of joint
programs (See chart 4.10). Indeed, nearly 30 percent report that much
more information has been shared and another 40 percent report that
there has been modestly more information shared. In spite of this greater
sharing of information, however, it appears that the opportunities for
greater union input into business decisions have been relatively limited.
Only about 25 percent of the respondents report any greater input after
cooperation than before.
Any improvement in the ability of the union leadership to resolve
member problems is also a benefit to the leadership. About 10 percent of
the union respondents perceive their ability to resolve member problems
has become much better; another one out of three leaders report modest
improvements. In contrast, approximately 15 percent have found that
their ability to resolve member problems has actually lessened.
Finally, several potential gains to the union as an institution are
examined. As presented in chart 4.11, unions apparently have not
experienced any substantial gains in member commitment to the union.
Indeed, only one-third of the union leader respondents reported modest
improvement in commitment and nearly one out of five reported com
mitment has been reduced. On the other side of the coin, however, local
union leaders do not perceive companies have gained much higher
commitment. Although over 40 percent perceive a modest increase in
member commitment to the company, over 20 percent perceive a re
duced commitment to the company. Finally, according to local union
leader perceptions, the public image of their unions has improved
modestly, if at all.
In summary, it is important to emphasize that the reported perceptions
above are not attributable to joint activities, but rather merely reflect the
perceptions of plant managers and union officers with respect to ob-
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Chart 4.9
Perceived Changes in Quality of Work Life
(Local Union Leader Response)
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Chart 4.10
Perceived Gains to Union Leadership
(Local Union Leader Response)
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Chart 4.11
Perceived Gains to Union as an Institution
(Local Union Leader Response)
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served changes since embarking on joint activities. As the theoretical
framework presented in chapter 2 highlights, many other factors come
into play in cooperative settings that affect these outcomes. My purpose
in the next section is to examine the contexts in which cooperation is
more or less successful in improving plant performance and labor
relations.

Successful Cooperation
Factors That Make a Difference at the Plant Level
Previous Literature
There are a limited number of empirical investigations of cooperative
efforts that examine the effects of joint activities across establishments.
Schuster (1983) studied nine unionized manufacturing plants to exam-
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ine productivity and employment levels prior and subsequent to the
implementation of gainsharing and joint union-management commit
tees. Based on his interrupted time-series analysis, he finds that, in the
short run, in six of eight establishments productivity rose significantly
and in eight of nine establishments employment levels remained un
affected after joint activities began. Upon extending his analysis to
additional sites, Schuster (1984) found less favorable results. Based on
23 sites, productivity rose in about 50 percent of the sites in the
immediate period following the introduction of cooperative programs.
In the longer run (up to five years), however, productivity rose in only 17
percent of these sites. Based on a sample of 27 sites, employment
remained stable or rose in roughly 80 percent of the sites, in both the
immediate period following the introduction of programs and in the
longer run.
Voos (1987, 1989) analyzed 350 unionized firms in Wisconsin
(1983-1984) and reached the following conclusions:
All forms of joint programs at the establishment level have
positive effects on nearly all performance outcomes (quality,
productivity, labor costs, and profits).
Gainsharing, profit sharing, and employee involvement
programs have greater effects on performance outcomes than
committee-based programs.
All forms of joint programs have positive effects on changes
in flexibility, absenteeism, and turnover.
Only general plant committees have consistently positive
effects on union leader-management relations, grievance
rates, and the ability to resolve grievances informally.
Profit sharing and employee stock ownership plans have
negative effects on union leader-management relations.
Whereas Voos finds that formalized joint activities generally have
positive effects, Katz, Kochan, and their co-authors come to the op
posite conclusion. In three separate analyses of selected plants repre
sented by the UAW in one American auto company, Katz, Kochan, and
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others find that QWL and related activities have some very modest
effects at best on performance and costs. Katz, Kochan, and Gobeille
(1983) conclude that in their sample of 18 plants (1970-1979), more
extensive QWL efforts modestly improved quality but had no effect on
efficiency. Katz, Kochan, and Weber©s (1985) study of 25 plants
(1978-1980) leads the authors to conclude that greater QWL involve
ment had no effect on efficiency and a negative effect on quality. Greater
participation in suggestion programs, however, is reported to have
positive effects on quality, but still no effect on efficiency. In a more
elaborate examination of 53 plants (1979-1986), Katz, Kochan, and
Keefe (1987) examine the effects of joint activities on changes in the
ratio of supervisors to workers, labor hours in production, and quality.
The authors construct composite indices of worker-union participation
in group decisions and in technology decisions. The results of their
investigation lead the authors to conclude:
More extensive team-related activities increase labor hours
in production and have no effect on either the ratio of supervisors-to-workers or quality.
Greater worker-union participation in group decisions has
no effect on any of the given performance outcomes.
Greater worker-union participation in technology decisions
has generally positive effects on reducing hours of labor for
production but inconsistent effects on the ratio of supervisorsto-workers and quality.
In summary, the few studies conducted across plants lead to mixed
results with respect to the overall effects of joint programs at the plant
level. Although these analyses examine changes in outcome variables
within cooperative settings and have to some extent controlled for
additional variables expected to affect the outcomes of interest, the
authors generally fail to address how other factors in combination with
joint activities affect the outcomes of interest.
Next, I examine statistically the importance of a set of key variables
expected to influence performance and labor relations outcomes in
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cooperative settings. First, drawing on the theoretical framework devel
oped in chapter 2, a simplified empirical model of the determinants of
cooperative success is presented. Second, the model is operationalized
and tested separately with respect to three basic outcomes: perceived
changes in product quality, worker productivity, and supervisor em
ployee relations. These three outcomes are chosen for detailed study
because, as reported in chapter 3, they reflect the central foci of joint
programs.

Theoretical Model
Guided by the theoretical model presented in chapter 2, it is first
assumed that each party to cooperation seeks to find the mix of relative
and total power activities that optimizes its own utility. It can be as
sumed, in turn, that the intensity ofjoint activities reflects that perceived
optimal mix or balance. Central to the analyses that follow is the
proposition that the greater the intensity of joint activities at any point in
time, the greater the gains derived from those activities at subsequent
points in time.
The challenge in identifying important factors that affect the success
of joint efforts is the identification of factors that increase the perceived
costs or benefits to cooperative efforts. Factors increasing the perceived
costs to joint efforts are expected to diminish the intensity of effort and
hence degree of improvements. Factors that increase the perceived
benefits have the opposite effect on intensity and hence degrees of
success.
Based on the available literature and the general theoretical model
presented in chapter 2, the outcome model diagrammed in figure 4.1
guides the statistical analyses that follow. The model holds that once
joint programs have been established, changes in company performance
and labor-management relations in general depend, in large part, on the
intensity of joint efforts. Intensity of joint efforts not only has direct
effects on performance, but also has indirect effects on performance via
any improvements in labor relations. Changes in company performance
and labor relations (specifically supervisor-employee relations in the
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Figure 4.1
Model of the Effect of Cooperation on
Performance and Labor-Relations Outcomes

Change in
Labor-Management
Relations

Change in
Company Performance

tests that follow) are also directly affected by the relative power of the
union and company and by certain organizational constraints faced by
the parties. Changes in company performance are also affected directly
by the exercise of relative power options available to management.
Central to understanding the analysis herein is the intensity of effort.
Intensity refers to the amount of time, effort, commitment, and the
quality of input applied to joint activities. In part, the level of intensity is
structured. For instance, the larger the proportion of the bargaining unit
employees, the union leadership, and plant management engaged in
joint activities, the more intensive the effort. The literature indicates that
there is enormous variation in these structured levels of involvement.
The more frequently the parties schedule their problem identification
and resolution meetings and the better these meetings are organized or
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facilitated, the more intensive the structured joint activities. Intensity,
furthermore, is structured in part by the amount, type, and quality of
orientation and training undertaken toward developing important tech
nical, team building, and joint decisionmaking skills.
In addition to and within the formalized parameters of joint pro
grams, intensity is conditioned by the level of energy and involvement
applied to these efforts by all parties involved. For example, employees
may be more or less willing to participate in joint efforts, attend
scheduled meetings, or give serious attention to resolving problems or
pursuing improvements. As detailed in chapter 5, the greater the extent
of problems encountered (e.g., perceived violations of trust or commit
ment), the less intensive will be cooperative activities. The degree of
intensity is also often constrained by various organizational features
(e.g., age of workforce, size of facility, and level of resources).
In summary, the simplified model diagrammed in figure 4.1 holds that
certain key factors influence performance and labor-relations outcomes
in cooperative settings, either directly or indirectly by affecting the
intensity of effort. In testing the fundamental propositions underlying
the model described, however, it should be borne in mind that the tests
conducted do not estimate the separate independent direct and indirect
effects, but instead estimate the combined direct and indirect effects of
key variables on the selected outcomes. Given limitations of the data
collection, it is not possible, furthermore, to test the effect of changes in
supervisor-employee relations on changes in company performance.
Instead, separate tests are made of the effects of selected variables on the
changes in supervisor-employee relations and company performance. In
short, in the tests of the model of changes in performance, the effect of
changes in labor-management relations are unobserved.
Empirical Tests of Key Factors Influencing Outcomes
The data used for the analyses reported herein are drawn from the
Plant Manager Survey responses to the question about the perceived
extent of change in quality, productivity, and supervisor-employee rela
tions. Ordered probit estimators are used to estimate the independent
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effects of selected variables on the outcomes. The rationale underlying
the selected hypotheses tested and the results of the estimations are
discussed next. A summary of the results is subsequently presented in
figures 4.2 through 4.4. (For further details of the statistical analyses,
see Cooke 1989a and Cooke 1990.)
Cooperative Structure
With respect to the formalized structure of programs, it is first
hypothesized that since team-based programs involve a larger propor
tion of the workforce and supervision than do committee-based pro
grams, company performance and supervisor-employee relations will
improve more under team-based efforts. It is hypothesized, in addition,
that the more frequently the parties meet in team-based efforts, the
greater the improvements obtained. The results of the statistical tests
support the hypothesis (across all three outcomes) that more active
team-based programs yield substantially greater improvements than less
active team-based programs. Specifically it is found that the likelihood
of not obtaining improvements in performance is much greater in teambased programs in which teams are scheduled to meet less frequently
than every two weeks than those team-based programs in which teams
meet weekly or at least once every two weeks. The same general finding
applies to changes in supervisor-employee relations, except that teambased programs in which teams are scheduled to meet weekly are far
more likely to yield modest or much improvement in relations than
teams meeting less frequently than weekly. From these tests it appears
that unless team-based programs call for regular weekly or biweekly
meetings, there is very little or no payoff to team-based efforts.
The evidence indicates that committee-based programs are no more
effective in improving supervisor-employee relations than team-based
programs that schedule meetings less often than weekly. On the other
hand, it is found that, on average, committee-based programs have no
less effect on quality and productivity improvements than team-based
programs in which teams are scheduled to meet at least once every two
weeks.
Another factor related to program structure that has a substantial
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effect on all three outcomes is the extent of union leader participation on
top joint steering committees. Where more than six union represen
tatives sit on the top steering committee, the odds of improving quality,
productivity, and supervisor-employee relations are considerably
greater than when fewer representatives are members of these steering
committees. On average, it can be noted that steering committees are
comprised of five to six union representatives and five to six managers,
albeit the composition of steering committees is fairly wide-ranging.
The statistical estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that the more
input from union leaders on top steering committees, the greater the
intensity of the cooperative effort. That is, greater union leader par
ticipation is expected to demonstrate greater support for any team-based
or ad hoc subcommittee activities on the floor, to provide greater
interaction between plant managers and union officials, and in some
cases provide active policing of joint activities vis-a-vis traditional
contract administration.
Consistent with the literature, it is found that the gains from cooper
ative efforts appear to increase initially, rising at diminishing rates, then
eventually falling and leveling off. As reported in numerous cases, there
is typically a strong burst of enthusiasm for involvement and participa
tion. However, over time enthusiasm for joint activities wanes, as it does
with many new endeavors (Boyle 1986). Second, the identification and
resolution of many production and other workplace problems are fairly
easy to tackle, but over time become successively more difficult. As
gains are harder to accomplish, enthusiasm is harder to maintain, and
hence commitment to joint activities often dwindles. Third, over time
adversarial conflicts often re-emerge (Hoyer and Huszczo 1988). These
events increase distrust between the parties, which only undermines
cooperative efforts.
The results of the statistical estimations of this hypothesized rela
tionship between program duration and outcomes are statistically signif
icant with respect to perceived changes in quality and supervisoremployee relations, but not for changes in productivity. Based on the
estimates, improvements appear to peak, on average, at about the third
to fourth year of program activity.
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Union and Management Relative Power
The parties engaged in cooperative activities do not ipso facto relin
quish the exercise of relative power activities. Instead they must fashion
an acceptable balance of relative and cooperative power activities. In
choosing to exercise relative power options, the parties must contend
with the potential negative effects of that exercise on the labor-manage
ment relationship and, in turn, on the intensity of the cooperative effort.
In the statistical estimations, it is clear that, on average, subcontract
ing out bargaining unit work has a strong negative relationship with
changes in quality, productivity, and supervisor-employee relations. It is
inferred that this exercise of relative power by management has a serious
demoralizing effect on the workforce and union leadership, an effect
that reduces the union©s commitment to joint activities. Indeed, the
likelihood that there is "much" improvement in supervisor-employee
relations is reduced by more than 2.5-fold when management sub
contracts (every thing else the same). When translated into the effects on
performance, the likelihood that there is "much" improvement in quality
and productivity is reduced threefold and fivefold, respectively, when
management subcontracts.
Although subcontracting out bargaining unit work has very strong
negative effects on outcomes, concession bargaining appears to have no
effect, on average, on the selected outcomes studied. Nor does tech
nological displacement have a significant effect on changes in product
quality or supervisor-employee relations. Technological displacement,
however, is significantly associated with improvements in productivity.
Here, any negative demoralizing effects on the workforce appear to be
offset by the productivity gains associated with new capital investments.
As capital investments in plants may be a signal to the union leadership
and membership that management is committed to making the plant
competitive by allocating resources to capital advancements, one could
reasonably conjecture that management©s exercise of this relative power
option does not carry with it the demoralizing message sent by sub
contracting out work.
The economic forces at work that trigger the cooperation more often
than not shift the relative power advantage toward management. In the

Outcomes Associated With Cooperation

99

face of management©s exercise of the above kind of relative power
options in the context of serious competitive threats, unions are hard
pressed to exercise their traditional relative power options of striking
and slowing down production. As a practical matter, it is difficult to
readily identify and measure for statistical purposes the relative power
activities of unions in cooperative settings, except as may be inferred
(but only in part) by the absence of management©s exercise of relative
power options. In the present empirical analysis, the percent of produc
tion workers represented by unions is used as a rough proxy of a union©s
relative power (albeit, this is not a fully satisfactory measure of a union©s
relative power). In any case, it is found that the larger the proportion of
employees represented, the more likely there are perceived improve
ments in quality and productivity. No statistical support is found, how
ever, showing that a larger proportion of employees represented leads to
improvements in supervisor-employee relations.
Organizational Features and Constraints
The statistical investigation indicates that there are a number of
organizational features and constraints that have independent effects on
performance and labor-relations outcomes. First, the evidence indicates
that in plants where employment continues to decline, the likelihood
that there will be improvements in productivity is diminished. Only very
modest support is obtained, however, for continued employment decline
reducing the likelihood of obtaining improvements in quality. With
respect to changes in supervisor-employee relations, the evidence sug
gests that where the reduction in force is greater than 25 percent,
relations actually improve.
These results are fairly consistent with the hypothesis that continued
layoffs have a demoralizing effect on the parties, which diminishes the
intensity of the cooperative effort. In the opposite direction, stability or
growth in employment has an uplifting effect on the parties, which
reinforces the perceived value of cooperative efforts. In the extreme,
however, it appears that sharp reductions in employment may have a
"shock" effect on the parties, whereby when the very livelihood of the
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plant is at stake, the parties are shocked into improving relations on the
shop floor.
The size of the plant also appears to have an independent effect on
outcomes. It is hypothesized that the larger the organization, the less
likely improvements in performance and supervisor-employee relations
will be obtained. First, the larger the organization, the longer it takes to
diffuse cooperative activities across work groups and departments,
which, overall, makes cooperative efforts less intensive. Second, the
larger the organization, the greater the organizational complexity, mak
ing communication and control links more cumbersome to master; all of
this reduces intensity of effort. Furthermore, one can imagine that
general workforce alienation is greater, the larger the organization,
which in turn makes cooperative efforts more difficult to facilitate.
The results of the statistical estimation indicate that all else the same,
there is strong statistical support to conclude that it is far more difficult
to obtain improvements in productivity and supervisor-employee rela
tions in larger organizations. There is modest support for this conclu
sion with respect to changes in quality. It is also found, however, that in
relatively small plants (fewer than 500 employees), supervisor-em
ployee relations are less likely to improve than in larger plants. This
latter finding is consistent with expectation that supervisor-employee
relations are generally better to begin with in small vis-a-vis medium
and large-sized establishments.
Finally, it is often heard that the intensity of cooperative efforts is
reduced in establishments employing older, more senior workforces.
More senior workers may have more hardened distrustful perceptions
about management and, consequently, see less value in cooperating with
management. More senior employees, furthermore, enjoying greater
job security (via accumulated seniority rights) or facing retirement with
accumulated benefits, can be expected to be less enthusiastic about
volunteering or participating in joint team-based efforts. Except at the
extreme, however, there is reason to believe that greater seniority up to
some point increases the intensity of cooperative efforts. First, with
greater seniority comes a richer understanding of production problems,
and greater skill in devising solutions. Second, more senior employees
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can be expected to have greater attachment to the place of employment
than employees with few years of service. In light of threats of employ
ment loss, employees with greater seniority (but insufficient seniority to
protect them from sizable layoffs), can be expected to be more willing to
embrace and join in joint activities.
The statistical evidence suggests that indeed, greater average plant
seniority, up to 15 years, is associated with greater improvements in
supervisor-employee relations. Beyond 15 years, improvements in rela
tions become harder and harder to come by. No statistical support is
found, however, to indicate average years of seniority influence im
provements in quality or productivity, not even at the extremes.
Summary of Findings
No statistical analyses of human behavior and perceptions have ever
proved or disproved any cause-effect relationships. The analysis herein
is no exception. Statistical analyses, however, can provide us with more
sophisticated forms of evidence upon which to make judgments about
important cause-effect relationships. Bearing in mind the many pitfalls
and limitations of formulating theory, specifying models of that theory,
and empirically testing those models, the statistical analyses herein
provide relatively strong evidence that supports a number of commonsense notions about factors that influence the outcomes of cooperative
activities. Keeping these caveats in mind, findings of the present em
pirical investigation are summarized.
To ease the summary, the inferred effects of the variables examined
herein on the three major outcomes of interest are presented in figures
4.2 through 4.4. Those variables that on average are associated with
greater improvement in a given outcome are listed near the top of each
scale. Variables that generally are associated with no perceived im
provement or even worse outcomes are listed near the bottom of each
scale. Those variables that appear to have no average effect are listed
near the middle range of each scale. In reality these latter variables may
have positive or negative effects; but if they do, their effects are offset by
other unobserved variables not accounted for in the tests.
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Figure 4.2
Effect of Selected Variables on Perceived
Changes in Quality
Scale of improvement
Much
improvement
(17 percent)

• Teams meet frequently
• Committee-based
programs
• Program in 3rd or 4th
year

• Average seniority
(no effect)
• Plant size (no effect)

Modest
improvement
(49 percent)

• Technological
displacement
(no effect)
• Concession bargaining
(no effect)
• Program in 5th year
or later

• Continued
employment loss
• Subcontracting

About
the
same
(34 percent)

• Teams meet
infrequently
• Low union leader
participation

• High union leader
participation
• High percent union
representation

Review of the figures highlights a number of tentative conclusions.
Note that generally, unless teams in team-based programs meet suffi
ciently frequently (at least once every two weeks, if not more often)
there appear to be no gains. Additionally, note that where union leaders
appear to be more actively involved in joint activities and where union
representation is more secure or stronger, joint efforts realize greater
improvements. At the other end of the scale, it appears that more
positive outcomes are harder to come by when management sub
contracts out bargaining unit work, where employment levels continue
to decline, and in larger manufacturing facilities.
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Figure 4.3
Effect of Selected Variables on Perceived
Changes in Productivity
Scale of improvement
Much
improvement
(14 percent)

• Teams meet frequently
• Committee-based
programs
• Technological
displacement

Modest
improvement
(48 percent)

• Concession bargaining
(no effect)
• Program duration
(no effect)

• Continued
employment loss

About
the
same
(31 percent)

• Large plants
• Teams meet
infrequently
• Low union leader
participation

Subcontracting

Lower (7 percent)

• High union leader
participation

High percent union
representation
Small plants
Average seniority
(no effect)

It appears that on average concession bargaining (which typically
precedes or accompanies the establishment of joint programs) and
technological displacement do not, on net, have strong demoralizing
effects on the intensity of cooperative efforts. Last, it appears that
positive outcomes derived from joint activities typically peak at about
the third or fourth year.
Several general conclusions or lessons can be drawn from this data
analysis. First, cooperative efforts can in part be structured to increase
intensity of effort, for without sufficient intensity they have no discernable effects on performance or labor relations. Special attention could be
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Figure 4.4
Effect of Selected Variables on Perceived
Changes in Supervisor-Employee Relations
Scale of improvement
Much
improvement
(19 percent)

• Teams meet frequently
• High employment
growth
• High employment
decline

• Low average
seniority
• Percent union
representation
(no effect)

Modest
improvement
(43 percent)

• Technological
displacement
• Concession bargaining
(no effect)
• Program in 5th year
or later

• High average
seniority
• Subcontracting

About
the
same
(38 percent)

• Low union leader
participation
• Small plants
• Very large plants

• High union leader
participation
• Program in 3rd or
4th year

given to these efforts (typically) in the third or fourth year, in order to
infuse greater intensity into the effort. This attention may need to be
focused on any demoralizing factors (e.g., growing distrust or factors
negatively influencing perceived commitment), and/or on enhancing
the problem identification and resolution skills of the workforce.
Another general lesson is that the success of cooperative efforts are
dependent on union leader endorsement and participation. To secure or
enhance this union leader involvement, the union must be viewed as
relatively strong and secure.
Management practices that undermine this involvement, likewise,
undermine the potential success of cooperative efforts.

Outcomes Associated With Cooperation

105

The evidence suggests that the parties in general can juxtapose some
forms of relative power activities with cooperative activities (e.g.,
concession bargaining and technological displacement). Special atten
tion must be paid, however, to the demoralizing effect of subcontracting
bargaining unit work. Unless the union leadership and membership can
see its justification in light of serious competitive threats and a joint
process is established to justify any subcontracting, employers are
bound to undermine joint activities by engaging in subcontracting.
Finally, there appear to be factors that are not in the direct control of
the parties, but which, when confronted, require special attention.
These factors include the continued decline in employment and the
organizational constraints of managing in large establishments and
where the age or seniority of the workforce is relatively high.

Performance Outcomes Associated With Corporate Strategies
This section summarizes the results of an investigation of the effects
of corporate strategies on financial performance (see Meyer and Cooke
1990 for a detailed report). In particular, the independent effects of the
competitive restructuring activities reviewed in chapter 3 (the extent of
joint programs across plants, the acquisition and/or opening of non
union plants, the closure of unionized plants, and the decertification of
unions) on changes in return-on-sales and average added value per
employee are estimated. These estimates are made in light of differences
in industry market conditions and several other contextual factors across
the three grand strategies identified in chapter 3: Union-Avoidance,
Cooperation, and Mixed.

Empirical Investigation
As illustrated in figure 4.5, the objective of the investigation has been
to account for any changes in performance between 1974-1975 and
1984-1985 attributable to four key strategic labor-relations options
identified. In performing this analysis, the independent effect of each of
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Figure 4.5
Corporate Performance as a Function
of Strategic Choices
Options
Establish Joint
Program *

Open and/or Acquire
n on - U nlon Plants
Corporate

Corporate
Perform once
(1974-1975)

Close U nlon
Plants

Perform ance
(1984-1985)

U nlon
Decertification

Change In Industry
U arket Conditions

the strategic options on changes in performance is estimated. Addi
tionally, the cumulative effect of various mixes of options chosen on
changes in performance is estimated.
Because of limitations on the availability of financial data, the statis
tical tests are made against a subsample of 56 corporations from the
original sample of 115 headquarters. Ordinary least squares regression
was used to estimate the effects of the restructuring options on changes
in performance. The performance indices are percent change in returnon-sales (calculated as operating income divided by sales) and percent
change in added value per employee (calculated as operating income
plus inventory, divided by number of employees).
One cannot predict, a priori, which of the various restructuring
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activities or which combination of activities will yield the greatest
performance improvements. As discussed in chapter 3, the parties
appear to have chosen strategies expected to optimize performance
given their specific financial, operational, and collective bargaining
structures, as well as market constraints. There are many unknowns,
however, about the potential costs, benefits, and risks associated with
each strategy. In particular, the degree of union retaliation to various
union-avoidance and deunionization activities and the costs incurred
therefrom would be difficult to accurately predict. The same can be said
about the returns to joint efforts at the plant level. Hence, instead of
testing hypotheses about the effect of chosen strategies, Meyer and
Cooke attempt to simply estimate effects using a before-after analysis.
The results of the estimations can be summarized as follows:
• The greater the extent of nonunion plants opened and/or
acquired, the greater the increase in return-on-sales. Changes
in added value per employee appear unaffected.
• The greater the extent of unionized plants closed, the
greater the decrease in return-on-sales. Changes in added
value per employee appear unaffected.
• Decertification activity reduces return-on-sales and added
value per employee.
• Where joint programs have been established in a majority
of unionized plants, both return-on-sales and added value per
employee increase.
The results of estimation additionally indicate that market conditions
have a significant bearing on performance outcomes. The greater the
increase or less the decrease in value of domestic industry shipments
over the 1975-1985 period, the greater the improvement in return-onsales and added value per employee. The more severe the increase in
import penetration in a corporation's primary industry, the greater the
reduction in return-on-sales and added value per employee.
Although Meyer and Cooke do not provide estimates of the average
overall gain or loss associated with the three grand labor relations
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Table 4.1
Estimated Cumulative Effects of Strategic
Activities on Performance by Grand Strategy
(1974-1975 to 1984-1985)

Strategy
Union-Avoidance
Cooperation
Mixed

Percent change in
return-on-sales

Percent change in added
value per employee
(nominal $)

.52

-15.1

1.39

18.6

.57

1.7

Note: Estimates derived from data provided in Meyer and Cooke (1990).

strategies, here I estimate the cumulative or combined net effect of the
identified strategic activities (i.e., extent of joint programs across
plants, the acquisition and/or opening of nonunion plants, the closure of
unionized plants, and decertification of unions) on company perfor
mance. The average cumulative net effects of the various bundles of
activities on changes in return-on-sales and added value per employee
are reported in table 4.1.
These estimates indicate that Cooperators have gained, on average,
the most from their efforts. The change in return-on-sales rose 1.4
percent and the change in added value per employee (using nominal
dollars) rose approximately 19 percent over the 1974-75 to 1984-85
period. Union-Avoiders, on the other hand, gained the least from their
efforts, on average, increasing return-on-sales by .5 percent and reduc
ing added value per employee by 15 percent. In comparison, those
corporations pursuing Mixed strategies increased return-on-sales by .6
percent and added value per employee by 1.7 percent.
Implications and Conclusions
The statistical analysis performed on this small sample of highly
unionized manufacturing corporations implies that overall (and only on
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average), Cooperators have to date gained more from their strategy
choice than either the Union-Avoiders or those corporations pursuing
Mixed strategies. The estimated gains, however, must be put in a
broader perspective. First, the estimated changes in return-on-sales and
added value per employee attributable to any combination of the restruc
turing activities are very modest, indeed. Second, although the Cooper
ators appear to have gained the most with respect to improvements in
return-on-sales, as of 1984-1985 they still reported having the lowest
return-on-sales at about 10.75 percent, whereas return-on-sales was just
over 11 percent for Union-Avoiders and 13.5 percent for corporations
pursuing Mixed Strategies. On the other hand, Cooperators report
having the highest added value per employee in 1984-1985 at nearly $33
in comparison to roughly $25 for corporations pursuing either UnionAvoidance or Mixed strategies.
Third, along these lines it must be recognized that the analysis
examines only two indices of performance. Indices of financial perfor
mance are chosen because the kinds of restructuring activities examined
are designed largely to improve production efficiencies and product
quality and reduce labor costs. These factors of production have an
obvious bearing on the cost-price ratios of production and consequently
on profitability derived from sales. These performance measures, how
ever, provide only a partial picture of overall corporate performance.
Other measures of performance utilized by executives include marketto-book ratios, return on equity, and return on assets. In the only other
published report that begins to address the effects of cooperative strat
egies on company wide financial performance, the authors conclude that
in highly unionized companies, employee involvement programs actu
ally reduce return-on-assets (Delaney, Ichniowski, and Lewin 1988).
Finally, it is doubtful that the 10-year period examined reflects longrun equilibrium. The anticipated gains of the Union-Avoiders may
simply require a longer time period in which returns to their strategy are
realized. That is, one could argue that the average 20 percent reduction
in union coverage of plants among Union-Avoiders is still insufficient to
extract the expected gains from deunionization. On average, 50 percent
of the Union-Avoiders' plants are still represented by unions. How well
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will these corporations fare if, over the next 10-year period, union
representation is reduced another 20 percent or more?
Add to this that American history clearly highlights the short-lived
endurance of cooperative efforts, presumably because the costs out
weigh the benefits to at least one party or the other. The limited evidence
indicates that the gains from joint efforts peak at the third or fourth year
and then slide downward. Applied in the present context, the perfor
mance improvements observed by 1984-1985 may, on average, reflect
peak performance derived from cooperation. One can surmise that
unless these gains can at least be maintained (if not improved upon) over
the next 10 years, Cooperators could easily lose any short-term differen
tial they enjoy over Union-Avoiders.

Cooperative Outcomes in Perspective
One anonymous labor-relations executive of a company that touts its
new partnerships with unions recently commented to me that "there have
been a lot of first-base hits and very few home runs." That sobering
statement from an experienced advocate of cooperation is consistent
with the investigation presented herein. In general, joint activities have
had modest but important effects on labor-management relations and
performance. Many exceptions, of course, exist.
The few other empirical studies (those that go beyond specific case
analyses) yield mixed results that generally support this conclusion.
Unlike most of these other investigations, the analysis presented herein
has sought to examine the factors that influence the intensity of effort,
and in turn the effects of joint efforts on selected performance and labor
relations outcomes. The evidence indicates that there needs to be a
certain level of intensity to obtain substantial improvements. This inten
sity can in part be structured but in part is moderated by other contextual
factors and the exercise of relative power. Without sufficient effort to
reduce the influence of factors that reduce intensity, it is likely that the
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parties will continue to bat only first-base hits. Unless these first-base
hits translate into a lot of runs, the Cooperators' score card could prove
disappointing. It is in this sobering light that key problems undermining
the intensity of cooperative efforts are discussed in chapter 5 and
prescriptions for success are proposed in chapter 6.

Appendix to Chapter 4
Provided in this appendix are variable definitions, descriptive statistics, and the
results of the estimations of the models of perceived changes in productivity,
quality, and employee-supervisor relations. These results have been published
elsewhere as cited.
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Appendix 4A
Reprinted from: William N. Cooke, "Improving Productivity and
Quality Through Collaboration," Industrial Relations, Vol. 28, No. 2,
Spring, 1989: pp. 299-319.
Table 4A.1
Variable Definitions
Variable

Definition

Change in Productivity Perceived change in productivity per unit of
labor. Equals 0 if "modestly lower," 1 if "about
the same," 2 if "modestly higher," and 3 if "much
higher."
Change in Quality
Perceived change in product quality. Equals 0 if
"modestly lower" or "about the same," 1 if
"modestly higher," and 2 if "much higher."
Committee-Based
Equals 1 if key joint program is a laborProgram
management or productivity committee, 0
otherwise.
Less Active Teams
Equals 1 if key joint program is a team-based
program and teams regularly meet less often
than once every two weeks, 0 otherwise.
Benchmark category for both Committee-Based Program and Less
Active Teams includes team-based joint programs in which teams meet
once every one or two weeks.
Leaders on Steering
Committee
Steering Committee
Make-up Unknown
Multiple Programs
Program Duration

Equals 1 if more than 5 union
representatives sit on top steering committee, 0
otherwise.
Equals 1 if number of union representatives
sitting on top steering committee is not reported,
0 otherwise.
Equals 1 if more than one joint program exists, 0
otherwise.
1987-year program activities began.
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Program Duration2

Technological
Displacement

Subcontracting
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Equals log(Z) when X > Program Duration,
equals - (log(Z)) when X < Program Duration,
and equals 0 when X=Program Duration; where
Z=l + abs. ((X-Program Duration)/(X/
Program Duration)).
Equals 1 if respondent reports that since 1975
any "bargaining unit employees have lost their
jobs in the plant because of the introduction of
new technologies or automation," 0 otherwise.

Equals 1 if respondent reports that since 1975
the "proportion of bargaining unit jobs [that]
have been subcontracted out on a permanent
basis" has been either "modest" or "substantial,"
0 otherwise.
Concession Bargaining Number of negotiations since 1975 that
respondent characterizes as "concession
bargaining (i.e., wage or benefit freezes or
cutbacks, elimination of restrictive work rules,
etc.)."
Percent Union
Percent of production workers under the
identified union contract.
Layoffs
Equals 1 if average plant employment in 1983,
1985 is less than average plant employment in
1979, 1980, 1981; 0 otherwise.
Plant Size
Average size of plant during 1983, 1985.
Average Years
Average length of employment within bargaining
unit.
Average Years2
Equals log(Z) when X > Average Years, equals
— (log(Z)) when X < Average Years, and equals
0 when X=Average Years; where Z = l + abs.
((X—Average Years)/(X/Average Years)).
Percent Female
Percent of bargaining unit employees that are
female.
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Tfcble 4A.2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable

Mean or
Proportion

S.D.

Range

Change in Productivity
@ 0
@ 1
@ 2
@ 3
Change in Quality
@ 0
@ 1
@ 2

.07
.31
.48
.14

—
-

—
—
-

.34
.49
.17

-

-

Committee-Based Program

.28

.45

0-1

Less Active Teams

.37

.49

0-1

Leaders on Steering Committee

.28

.45

0-1

Multiple Programs

.73

.45

0-1
1-33

Program Duration

5.03

5.13

Program Duration2

.75

.92

Technological Displacement

.45

.50

-4.43-1.10
0-1

Subcontracting

.40

.49

0-1

1.17

.88

0-3

95.28

10.64

.52

.50

48-100
0-1

5.52

13-24000
3-32

Concession Bargaining
Percent Union
Layoffs
Plant Size
Average Years

2376
16.10

3323

Average Yearsz

1.88

.54

Percent Female

22.80

21.92

-1.46-2.11
0-85
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Table 4A.3
ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATES
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Exogenous
Variables
Committee-Based Program
Less Active Teams
Leaders on Steering Committee
Steering Committee Make-up Unknown
Multiple Programs
Program Duration2
Technological Displacement
Subcontracting
Concession Bargaining
Percent Union
Layoffs
Plant Size
Average Yearsz
Percent Female
Intercept
Mu(l)
Mu(2)
Mu(3)
Log-Likelihood
X2d4 d.f.)
N

Dependent Variables
Change in
Change in
Productivity
Quality
.057
(.362)
-.838**
(.348)
.899***
(.404)
.231
(.579)
.327
(.368)
.199
(.179)
1.079***
(.367)
-1.092***
(.381)
.299
(.229)
.025*
(.015)
-.954***
(.347)
-.0001***
(.00004)
-.087
(.337)
.018**
(.008)
-.466
(1.694)
0
1.713***
(.351)
3.899***
(.491)
-73.531
56.928***
87

.205
(.392)
-.831***
(.363)
1.030***
(.354)
-.732
(.642)
.777**
(.424)
.402**
(.172)
.147
(.333)
-.924**
(.418)
-.060
(.211)
.051***
(.018)
-.604**
(.354)
-.0001
(.00007)
-.694
(.656)
.008
(.007)
-3.047*
(1.876)
0
1.926***
(.364)
-66.056
43.527***
86

*** = significant < .01 level, ** = significant < .05 level, and * = significant at < .10 level;
using two-tailed tests for all variables except Less Active Teams, Leaders on Steering Committee,
Multiple Programs, and Layoffs where one-tailed tests are appropriate.

Appendix 4B
Reprinted from: William N. Cooke, "Factors Influencing the Effect of Joint
Union-Management Programs on Employee-Supervisor Relations," Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 43, No. 5, July, 1990, pp. 587-603.

Table 4B.1
Variable Definitions
Variable

Definitions

ARELATIONS

Perceived change in adversarial relationship
between supervisors and workforce. Equals 0 if
"modestly higher" or "about the same"; 1 if
"modestly lower," and 2 if "much lower."

ACTIVE TEAMS

Equals 1 if joint program is team-based and
teams regularly meet weekly, 0 otherwise.
Equals 1 if joint program is committee-based, 0
otherwise.

COMMITTEES

Benchmark category for both ACTIVE TEAMS
and COMMITTEES includes team-based
programs in which teams regularly meet less
often than weekly.
LEADERS-ONSTEERING
COMMITTEE
PROGRAM
DURATION

Equals 1 if more than 6 union representatives sit
on top steering committee, 0 otherwise.

PROGRAM
DURATION2

Equals log(z) when X > PROGRAM
DURATION; equals - (log(z)) when X <
PROGRAM DURATION; and equals 0 when X
= PROGRAM DURATION; where z = 1 +
abs((X - PROGRAM DURATION) / (X/
PROGRAM DURATION)).
Equals 1 if respondent reports that since 1975
any "bargaining unit employees have lost their
jobs in the plant because of the introduction of
new technologies or automation"; 0 otherwise.

TECH
DISPLACEMENT

1987-year program activities began.
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SUBCONTRACT

Equals 1 if respondent reports that since 1975
the "proportion of bargaining unit jobs [that]
have been subcontracted out on a permanent
basis" has been either "modest" or "substantial";
0 otherwise.

CONCESS1

Equals 1 if since 1975 respondent characterized
one round of negotiations as "concession
bargaining" (i.e., wage or benefit freezes or
cutbacks, elimination of restrictive work rules,
etc.)"; 0 otherwise.

CONCESS2

Equals 1 if since 1975 respondent characterized
two or more rounds of negotiations as
"concession bargaining"; 0 otherwise.

%UNION

Percent of production employees under the
identified union contract.

HIGH GROWTH

Equals 1 if average plant employment in 1983,
1985 is 25% higher than average plant
employment in 1979, 1980, 1981; 0 otherwise.

HIGH DECLINE

Equals 1 if average plant employment in 1983,
1985 is 25% lower than average plant
employment in 1979, 1980, 1981; 0 otherwise.

AVG SENIORITY

Average length of employment within bargaining
unit.

SMALL

Equals 1 when average size of plant during 1983,
1985 < 500; 0 otherwise.

LARGE

Equals 1 when average size of plant during 1983,
1985 > 3500; 0 otherwise.
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Table 4B.2
Ordered Probit Estimates of Perceived Changes
in Employee-Supervisor Relations
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Exogenous
Variables
ACTIVE TEAMS
COMMITTEES
LEADERS-ON-STEERING COMM
PROGRAM DURATIONz
TECH DISPLACEMENT
SUBCONTRACT
CONCESS1
CONCESS2
% UNION
HIGH GROWTH
HIGH DECLINE
AVG SENIORITY
AVG SENIORITY2
SMALL
LARGE
INTERCEPT
Mu(l)
Mu(2)
Log-likelihood
X2 (15 d.f.)
N

Coefficients and
Stnd. Errors
.664**
(.355)
-.116
(.401)
.884**
(.432)
.314**
(.158)
-.097
(.324)
-.653**
(.344)
.077
(.385)
.676
(.456)
.003
(.016)
1.499**
(.591)
.827**
(.375)
.224***
(.087)
-.008***
(.003)
-.851**
(.383)
-1.447*
(.668)
-1.839
(1.586)
0
1.695***
(.267)
-72.706
46.283***
92

Mean or
Proportion
.34
.26
.18
.98
.45
.40
.42
.32
95.29
.12
.31
15.90
287.30
.23
.14

Dependent variable is ARELATIONS, with the following ordered categories and proportion of
outcome represented by each category: 0 = about the same or modestly higher (38%); 1 =
modestly lower (43%); 2 = much lower (18%).
*** = significant < .01 level, ** = significant < .05 level; * = significant < .10 level; using twotailed tests for all variables except ACTIVE TEAMS, SUBCONTRACT and LEADERS-ONSTEERING COMM, where one-tailed tests are appropriate.

Key Problems Encountered
As synthesized in chapter 1, the literature and testimony identify
several fundamental problems encountered in the process of establish
ing and maintaining good relationships necessary for cooperation.
These problems are:
• Distrust
• Lack of Commitment
• Demoralization from Gains Not Gotten
• Juxtaposing Cooperation and Traditional Collective Bargaining

Distrust
Distrust between the parties inhibits the establishment of joint pro
grams. Because distrust between employers and unions often has deep
roots, however, the establishment of joint programs typically only
signals that the parties are willing to experiment with joint programs.
Existing literature and testimony make it clear that joint efforts reflect
fairly uneasy partnerships in joint problemsolving. The widely shared
conclusion of the literature and testimony is that sufficient trust must be
developed over time, else joint efforts will wane and ultimately be
undermined by distrust.
Trust is a "firm belief or confidence in the honesty, integrity, reliabil
ity, justice, etc. of another person or thing." To trust another party,
moreover, means allowing them "to do something without fear of the
outcome" (Webster's New World Dictionary 1968). In the context of
union-management cooperation, the parties typically ask on a day-to121
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day basis the following kind of questions in making their assessments of
the level of trust that exists between them.
• Do you consult with me?
• Do you share pertinent information, avoiding surprises?
• Are you straightforward and honest with me, relinquishing
hidden agendas?
• Do you listen to my opinions?
• Do you follow through with joint decisions and any
promises?
• Are you consistent and reliable in your actions?
• Do you forego using double standards for managers and
employees?
• Do you forego using threats?
• Do you forego "cutting deals" on the side that are inconsis
tent with cooperation?
• Do you forego intentionally undermining my role and
responsibilities?
• Do you accept unintended failures?
• Do you live up to your role and responsibilities?
When answers to the above questions are answered in the negative, trust
is diminished. The more negative the response, the more trust is dimin
ished. As trust is diminished, the parties are unable to develop rela
tionships that maximize the potential benefits of cooperation. Instead,
distrust merely increases the potential costs of cooperation, and the
intensity of effort applied to cooperative activities is diminished. Serious
violations of trust, furthermore, are apt to cause cooperative efforts to
be put on hold, if not destroy them altogether.
To examine the perceived magnitude of distrust as a problem, charts
5.1 and 5.2 report the responses of both plant managers and local union
leaders to several questions pertinent to the issue of trust. Respondents
to the Plant Manager Survey and Union Officer Survey were asked: "To
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Chart 5.1
Lack of
Sufficient Trust Between Parties
Management Response

Union Leader Response

75%

52%
46%
37%

36%

17%
12%

Not a
Problem

Somewhat
a Problem

Very Much
a Problem

what extent have the following problems affected the successful imple
mentation and maintenance of your most important joint program...?"
Respondents were given a choice of four answers: not a problem,
somewhat a problem, very much a problem, or important factor in
termination of program. For the sake of simplicity, those few responses
that the given problem was an "important factor in termination of
program" are included in the charts under "very much" a problem. The
responses reported throughout this chapter are drawn from approxi
mately 110 plant manager questionnaires and 60 union officer question
naires.
Chart 5.1 reports the responses with respect to the extent to which
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Chart 5.2
Trust: Violations, manipulation, Cooptation
(Union Response)
Trust Violated

Manipulation

Cooptation

75%
67%

44%

40%

35%
29%

26%

26%

25%

7%
0%

Not a
Problem

Somewhat
a Problem

Very Much
a Problem

"lack of sufficient trust between parties" is a problem. There appears to
be close agreement as to the extent of the trust problem between
managers and local union leaders. Only about 15 percent do not find
trust to be a problem, whereas about 50 percent find it to be somewhat a
problem and roughly 35 percent find it to be very much of a problem.
Chart 5.2 reports the proportion of union leader responses to several
trust-related questions. (These problems were not raised in the survey to
managers.) The first question asked the extent to which "violation of
trust by either party" is a problem. About 45 percent find it to be
somewhat of a problem and another 25 percent find it to be very much a
problem. The second question asked the extent to which "perceived
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manipulation of program (or bonus formula) by management" was a
problem. Here, about 35 percent find perceived manipulation to be
somewhat of a problem and 25 percent find it to be very much a
problem.
The literature indicates that union leaders often fear that cooperation
with management will be perceived by union members as a form of
cooptation. Union leaders, of course, want their members to trust that
the leadership has in mind the best interests of the membership upon
embarking on joint endeavors. To address this dimension of trust, union
leaders were asked the extent to which "perceptions by workers that the
union leadership has been coopted by management" was a problem.
Over 65 percent report that perceptions of cooptation are somewhat of a
problem, but only 7 percent find it to be very much a problem.
One aspect of trust focuses on how much trust the union has in
management's capabilities to manage the company well. Since skep
ticism of management's abilities to manage is also likely to be a problem
for some organizations, union leaders were asked the extent to which the
"local union leadership trust management's capabilities to manage this
company." Approximately 21 percent reported "very little," 47 percent
reported "little," 22 percent reported "much," and only 10 percent
reported "very much."
In summary, the responses to several questions pertinent to trust
clearly support the conclusion that the lack of trust is a widespread
problem. For a large majority of the parties involved in team-based and
committee-based joint programs, distrust is at least somewhat a
problem.

Commitment
To "commit" to something means to obligate or bind to some course of
action. In the case of union-management cooperation, commitment
means to obligate to joint decisionmaking. This commitment, however,
is not necessarily to a given program or set of decisionmaking param
eters (e.g., to a quality control circle program, where team members
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meet every week and report to a joint steering committee comprised of
five union and five management representatives), but rather to the
general process of joint problem identification and resolution. Bear in
mind, on the other hand, that in practice the parties may characterize or
address commitment in the form of a given joint program structure or set
of activities.
There appear to be a number of questions asked by the parties on a
day-to-day basis, answers to which help formulate their perceptions
about the level of commitment to joint decisionmaking.
• Are you willing to commit time and resources to
cooperation?
• Are you willing to work hard at this new process?
• Are you interested in obtaining gains for the other party as
well as selfish gains?
• Do you see this process as a long-run effort?
• Are you willing to take political risks in supporting and
soliciting support for cooperation?
• Are you willing to assist the other party with his/her organi
zational and personal political constraints?
• Are you willing to reward subordinates who actively sup
port and engage in joint activities?
• Are you willing to share authority?
• Are you willing to share responsibility for failures and
recognition for successes?
When answers to the above kind of questions are answered in the
negative, perceptions of lack of commitment arise. The more negative
the responses, the more negative the perceptions of commitment. These
perceptions may be formulated about the representatives of the other
party, or about representatives of one's own organization. The result, in
either case, is (again) diminished effort at effective cooperation.
In the survey to local managers and union leaders, respondents were
asked a number of questions about the extent to which various dimen-
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Chart 5.3
Upper Management Commitment to Joint Programs
Management Response

Union Leader Response

75%

41%
36%

39%
34%

30%
21%

0%

Not a
Problem

Somewhat
a Problem

Very Much
a Problem

sions of the lack of commitment was a problem. Charts 5.3 and 5.4
report these responses about the extent that "lack of commitment by
upper management" and "lack of broad commitment among plant man
agers," respectively, were problems affecting the success of joint pro
grams. Chart 5.5 reports responses about the extent that "lack of broad
commitment by union leaders" was a problem.
As shown in chart 5.3, a majority of both plant managers and local
union leaders find that the lack of upper management commitment to
joint programs is a problem. Indeed, just under one-third of managers
and just over one-third of union leaders perceive the lack of upper
management commitment to be very much a problem. With regard to
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plant-level management commitment (chart 5.4), there is substantial
disparity between management perceptions and union leader percep
tions. In particular, note that only 17 percent of managers perceive that
the lack of broad commitment among plant managers is very much a
problem. In sharp contrast, 37 percent of union leaders perceive plant
management commitment to be very problematic.
These perceptions of commitment are reversed when the parties are
asked about the lack of broad union leader commitment. As reported in
chart 5.5, nearly 80 percent of managers report union leader commit
ment to joint programs as a problem, whereas only 50 percent of union
leaders report union leader commitment as a problem. Although, over-

Chart 5.4
Plant Management Commitment to Joint Programs
Union Leader Response

Management Response
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45%

39%

38%

37%

25%
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Chart 5.5
Union Leader Commitment to Joint Programs
Management Response

Union Leader Response

75%
51%
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22%

51%

36%
27%
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14%
t.'.yy '••<•"•-'.:

0%

Not a
Problem

Somewhat
a Problem

Very Much
a Problem

all, local union leader commitment seems to be a less serious problem
than broad plant management commitment, 27 percent of managers find
union leader commitment to be very much of problem, whereas 14
percent of local union leaders report union commitment to be very much
a problem.
In the Union Officer Survey, leaders were asked the extent to which
"skepticism or lack of interest of workers" is a problem. This question
was asked to get indirectly at the question of union member commitment
as a potential problem affecting the success of joint efforts. Eighty-five
percent perceive it to be a problem, with nearly one-third reporting it to
be very much a problem.
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Chart 5.6
Support for Joint Programs:
Perceptions of Local Union Leaders
Generally Opposed

Generally in Favor

80%
74%

69%
61%
49%

49%

31%
22%'
18%
4%
0%
National
Union Leaders

Local Union
Leaders

Local Union
Members

Plant
Managers

In an earlier part of the questionnaire to local union leaders, leaders
were also asked the following question: "To what extent do the following
parties support the establishment of joint labor-management pro
grams?" Chart 5.6 shows the given "parties" and two response catego
ries: generally opposed or generally in favor of joint programs. Not
reported in chart 5.6 is the remaining proportion of responses in which a
given party is perceived as generally indifferent to joint programs. Note
that the responses apply only to those local unions engaged in joint
programs.
According to those responses, the party least opposed to joint ac
tivities are national union leaders. Here, only 4 percent are perceived to
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be generally opposed. At the other extreme, 31 percent of the re
spondents perceive that plant managers are generally opposed to joint
programs. In the opposite direction, it is perceived that 69 percent of
national union leaders, 74 percent of local union leaders, and 61 percent
of company executives are generally in favor of joint programs. How
ever, just under 50 percent of local union members and plant managers
are perceived to generally favor joint programs. Overall, based on local
union leader perceptions, the least enthusiastic parties to cooperation
are local union members and plant-level managers.
Finally, in regard to commitment, in the Headquarters Executive
Survey, the top labor relations or human resource executive was asked
two questions that indirectly address company headquarters' commit
ment to cooperative efforts in manufacturing plants. The first was, "In
general, company executives are: not in favor of, in favor of, indifferent
to joint management-union programs or activities." Restricting the
subsample of responses to those headquarters in which at least one plant
reported having joint activities, the following responses were obtained:
78 percent generally in favor, 14 percent generally indifferent, and 8
percent generally not in favor of joint activities.
The second related question asked was, "Specifically, the company
has: (a) instructed plant management to actively pursue joint manage
ment-union activities, (b) instructed management NOT to engage in
joint management-union activities, (c) left the decision to engage in joint
management-union activities to plant-level managers." The following
responses were obtained: 46 percent instructed plant management to
pursue cooperation, 50 percent left decisions to plant management, and
4 percent instructed plant management not to pursue joint activities.
As with the problem of perceived distrust, the perceived lack of
commitment is a problem that affects the success of a majority of joint
programs. As with distrust, lack of commitment (at least its perception)
is a serious problem, in one form or another, for one-quarter to one-third
of the parties involved in cooperative activities.
Finally, there is bound to be a high association between the problems
of trust and commitment. That is, commitment is hard to attain when
trust is questioned and a high level of trust is hard to accomplish when
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commitment from any of the parties is perceived to be problematic. This
association is demonstrated, for example, by the high correlations
between responses to the Plant Manager Survey on the survey questions
pertinent to trust and commitment as problems. The zero order correla
tions between responses to the question about (a) the extent of sufficient
trust between the parties as a problem and responses to the questions
about (b) the extent of upper management commitment, plant manage
ment commitment, and union leader commitment are all very high and
statistically significant (ranging from .33 to .50).

Demoralization From Gains Not Gotten
Over time, the enthusiasm for innovative joint activities is known to
wane and under severe market conditions, the intensity of effort appears
to decline. In the Union Officer Survey, leaders were asked several
questions about the extent to which demoralizing outcomes were prob
lematic for the successful maintenance of joint activities. In the first
question, union leaders were asked the extent to which "expected gains
from programs not gotten" were a problem. As reported in chart 5.7,
approximately 80 percent respond that not attaining expected gains was
a problem. Nearly 30 percent report this factor to be very much a
problem. Nearly 80 percent of the respondents also find that "insuffi
cient job security" is problematic. Indeed 40 percent report the issue of
employment security to be very much a problem.lt has also been
reported that turnover of key management and union leaders, who have
played instrumental roles in spearheading or managing joint activities,
has a demoralizing or at least a detrimental effect on program success.
In asking union leaders about the extent to which the "turnover of key
managers" or "key union leaders" has proven to be problematic, the
response indicates that union leaders find turnover of key managers
much more problematic than turnover of key union leaders. Just over 60
percent find management turnover as problematic, but less than 30
percent find union leader turnover as problematic. At the extremes, 20
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Chart 5.7
Demoralization As a Problem
(Union Leader Response)

75%-

50%
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Somewhat
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Very Much
a Problem

Insufficient Job Security

percent find management turnover as very much a problem, whereas
only 7 percent find union leader turnover as very much a problem.

Juxtaposing Cooperation and Traditional Collective Bargaining
A fundamental thesis underlying our analysis of cooperation is that
the successful implementation, maintenance, and expansion of joint
activities require that the parties find ways to juxtapose cooperation and
more traditional collective bargaining. In addition to what has been
presented in earlier chapters, the parties were directly asked how prob
lematic it is to juxtapose these two dimensions of the relationship.
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Chart 5.8
Juxtaposing Cooperation and Contract Negotiations
Union Leader Response

Management Response
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Reported in chart 5.8 and 5.9 are responses to two questions which
asked the parties the extent to which they have had difficulty "juxtapos
ing cooperation" or "balancing joint activities" with contract negotia
tions and contract administration. As shown in the charts, the majority
of managers and union leaders find that juxtaposing joint activities with
contract negotiations and administration presents problems. About 20
percent of all respondents report juxtaposing cooperation and contract
negotiations as very much a problem. Likewise, about 20 percent of
managers find juxtaposing cooperation and day-to-day contract admin
istration very much of a problem, but only 12 percent of union leaders
report this to be very much of a problem.
In many respects, the issue of juxtaposing relative power and cooper-
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Chart 5.9
Juxtaposing Cooperation and Contract Administration
Union Leader Response

Management Response
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ative power envelops the problematic issues of distrust, perceived lack
of commitment, and demoralization from gains not gotten. The exercise
or threat of using relative power depicts a process in which distrust is
magnified as traditional conflicts are rekindled and old wounds are
opened. Commitment to cooperation is likewise challenged when either
party uses relative power advantages to maximize its overall gains.
Often enough, cooperative activities are held "hostage," i.e., put on
hold until adversarial conflicts are satisfactorily resolved. Demoraliza
tion with cooperation is also often heightened. In this latter regard,
resolution of conflicts of interest via relative power raises the important
concern over fair and equitable distribution of overall gains (or losses).
The difficult process of identifying and distributing gains derived di
rectly or indirectly from cooperative activities is visited or revisited.
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All this does not imply that hard bargaining and legalistic contract
administration necessarily undermine cooperation. Indeed, what is
learned from cooperation with respect to joint problemsolving often
improves the negotiation and contract administration process. The po
tential for diminishing the cooperative process, however, must be recog
nized and dealt with effectively if cooperation is not to be diminished or
destroyed. This is not to suggest, however, that the parties should resort
to short-sighted compromising in the spirit of demonstrating commit
ment to cooperative relations. Several prescriptions designed to help
labor and management avoid serious problems and minimize unwanted
and unnecessary consequences are proposed in chapter 6.

Implications and Prescriptions for
Making Partnerships Work
In this final chapter, I first briefly discuss several fundamental im
plications derived from the analyses presented in the first five chapters.
Second, I propose several fairly general prescriptions that may hold
some promise of enhancing labor-management partnerships—for those
parties, of course, choosing to cooperate. In this chapter I take the
liberty of releasing myself from the burden of providing empirical
documentation or support for either the implications drawn or prescrip
tions proposed. My intention here is to open a debate and discussion, not
test the soundness of any propositions.

Implications
One overriding implication of the present inquiry is that neither labor
nor management can avoid making some hard choices fundamental to
their relationships. It appears that for most American unions and com
panies, the choices faced are either all-out conflict or all-out coopera
tion. The traditional ways simply don't work well in highly competitive
and volatile markets. Indeed, there is no option of maintaining or
returning to the "good old days" of traditional collective bargaining.
In thinking about alternative labor-relations strategies, it seems rea
sonable to assume that some companies have selected and designed
strategies to deunionize; and they have done so without any or with very
little consideration of choosing cooperation. In these companies, unions
face no choice. They are forced to challenge the company. Weaker
unions will simply lose, but strong unions have some opportunity to
force a shift in management strategies. Failing to seek or failing to force
137
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a shift to cooperation, strong unions will slowly destroy the companies
and themselves in battle. Needless to say, this scenario will prove to be a
hollow victory for all parties concerned. But for recalcitrant employers
unwilling to cooperate, strong unions cannot sit back and watch their
own institutions destroyed while these employers are allowed to have
their aggressive way unopposed.
Alternatively, some companies seek to cooperate initially but their
union leader counterparts cannot find their way to cooperate. Denied by
their unions the choice of cooperation, these companies are forced (and
perhaps easily so) to embark on union avoidance strategies—com
panywide or in given plants where local unions refuse to cooperate.
Again, weak unions will lose and unnecessarily so. Strong unions will
lose in the longer run, unless they recognize that traditional adversarial
relations won't work and they too eventually embrace cooperation. One
can imagine, however, that the longer unions deny management the
choice of cooperation, the less likely management will be interested in
shifting course, especially where management has reduced union
strength over time via union avoidance and deunionization strategies.
The general implication, therefore, is that, except in that handful of
unionized settings not seriously threatened by domestic or global com
petitors, unions have little choice but to cooperate. A second implica
tion, on the other hand, is that unions have many choices regarding what
cooperation looks like. In making these choices, the focus is on the
means of cooperation not the fundamental goals of unions or manage
ment. The union still seeks to gain as much as possible for its mem
bership in compensation and in the terms and conditions of employ
ment. Management still seeks to optimize profits. In general terms,
therefore, cooperation does not require (indeed, it cannot require) the
parties to shift their fundamental priority goals, or the fundamental
values and ideologies underlying these goals. Instead, cooperation
requires that the parties shift their values and ideologies about the means
of pursuing priority goals. The prescriptions proposed in the next
section address some of the more important shifts along this line.
A third implication is that relative power plays an important checkand-balance role in cooperative efforts. Choosing to cooperate does not
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change the inherent conflict of interests between management and
union. The wealth generated from the employment context will always
require dividing and relative power will always underlie any mechanism
for dividing it. Consequently, as in any traditional collective bargaining
relationship, attention to the relative power of one's own organization is
essential. This implication, given changes in the market, is perhaps
most important to unions. Diminished relative power not only under
mines a union's ability to maximize gain via the process of dividing
wealth, but also undermines the cooperative effort to increase the wealth
to be divided. This implication is consistent with the empirical analyses
of performance and labor relations outcomes presented in chapter 4 and
the problems examined in chapter 5.
A fourth implication is that in highly competitive markets, "every
thing else the same," employers cannot endure incurring higher costs
per unit of labor input. Unions, however, must obtain some combination
of higher levels of compensation and better workplace environments
than is obtained by employees of nonunion competitors, else employees
have insufficient reason to retain or select union representation. It is
imperative to union survival, therefore, that not "everything else be the
same." Unions must offer some added value to production that offsets
any differential in compensation and workplace environment costs.
Cooperation offers that potential added value, given that union lead
ers provide an effective voice mechanism that leads to improved quality,
greater efficiencies, productivity, or other cost reductions. Such a per
spective assumes that the workforce and union leadership are well
equipped to devise ways of organizing work and work relationships
effectively. One might argue, however, that the same gains can be
accomplished in nonunion settings and, hence, unions cannot provide
sufficient added value relative to their nonunion competitors. That
alternative argument holds if management in nonunion settings provides
equivalent mechanisms for employee input and effectively utilizes that
input. My limited observation indicates that a large majority of Ameri
can managers do not willingly or purposely share their decisionmaking
authority and status with their workforces. Without constraints im
posed, managers who are less open to seeking the input of employees
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and sharing authority with them act in ways that do not maximize
efficiencies and productivity.
Here, union leaders with the support of their members can constrain
reluctant managers, insisting upon the sharing of decisionmaking and
responsibility. By being worthy advocates of effective employee input,
union leaders have before them a mechanism upon which to obtain
higher compensation and better workplace environments for their mem
berships and at the same time provide the added value to the enterprise to
offset these added labor costs. Effective advocacy, however, demands
that union leaders be far better equipped or skilled in the business
functions of finance, operations, marketing, and human resource man
agement. This does not imply that they become businessmen and busi
nesswomen. It implies that they understand the market and organiza
tional constraints of running a competitive enterprise, that they become
the experts of human resource management, and that they, in turn, act
vigorously as the advocates of the workforce. As advocates of the
workforce (which notably requires no change in union philosophy),
union leaders view the workforce as the key set of stakeholders in the
enterprise. As such, their role is to construct and pursue avenues that
effectively elevate the importance of legitimate workforce interests as
stakeholders of the enterprise. In doing so, union leaders must be able to
demonstrate that satisfying important interests of the workforce leads to
added value, at least equivalent to the added costs of satisfying the
interests of the workforce. As discussed subsequently, the interests of
employees as stakeholders will need to be balanced with the interests of
other stakeholders of the enterprise.
Finally, a central implication of the present analysis is that it is im
perative the parties find ways to sufficiently mitigate the salient prob
lems that undermine successful cooperation. Unless these problems can
be dealt with effectively, the long-run prospects that cooperative efforts
will have handsome payoffs are greatly limited.
Prescriptions for Long-Term Successful Cooperation
In this section, several prescriptions are proposed that are designed to
avoid, mitigate, or resolve problems that undermine successful coopera-
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tion. They are proposed in a spirit that recognizes that in each labormanagement setting, the relationship is unique, unique in history, with
unique personalities, and with unique organizational and market con
straints. The given parties, therefore, are best equipped to establish
detailed mechanisms or processes around each prescription that
follows.

Establish Triggers and Procedures for Resolving
Serious Problems and Crises
The evidence indicates that a majority of efforts wane after a short
period of time, and history shows that some efforts collapse (without
much forewarning) under the weight of market pressures or flagrant
violations of trust and commitment. It is proposed herein that the parties
establish some trigger mechanism and a process to resolve disputes over
problems or events that seriously threaten the livelihood of cooperative
efforts.
Such a trigger mechanism and process, of course, have already been
developed for resolving disputes over rights embodied in contracts.
Because the parties cannot foresee all the problems and disputes that
undoubtedly will arise during the term of negotiated contracts, griev
ance procedures (usually with outside arbitration as a final step) have
been implemented. The parties are allowed to grieve when problems
arise, and grievance procedures provide an acceptable due process
mechanism for resolution of disputes. In turn, grievance procedures
provide a means for accomplishing labor-management stability; they are
essentially a quid pro quo for eliminating strike threats, strikes, and
other workplace disruptions during the life of agreements.
The strategic shift to joint activities is also wrought with unknown
events and reactions that can undermine cooperative efforts—much like
problems that test the rights and responsibilities negotiated in contracts.
It is proposed, therefore, that a parallel structure or mechanism de
signed to resolve disputes associated with cooperative activities be
created. Here I would highly recommend that when a majority of the
joint steering or policy committee believe the cooperative effort is
seriously threatened, that a trusted (and preselected) mediator or neutral
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consultant be called in to help resolve disputes. Such a trigger (i.e., the
vote of the committee) allows the parties to begin constructively tackling
the problem at hand, instead of allowing it to have unintended and
unnecessary negative snowballing effects.
This proposed mechanism would allow both management and the
union leadership to explain to all parties that a serious problem (or
problems) has been recognized and that the issue is being dealt with
constructively and jointly through the mediation process, which was
jointly decided beforehand. Once a resolution has been reached jointly,
the resolution would be jointly presented to all the parties. This kind of
procedure not only allows the parties to more effectively construct a
resolution, it also is intended to help insure that cooperative activities
remain intensive instead of dwindling, being held hostage, or at the
extreme destroyed (a la Eastern Airlines).
Negotiate TVust and Commitment
One theme that is heard over and over (albeit not in every setting) is
that "you can't trust em" and "they're really not committed" to this effort.
Cooperation is a highly demanding exercise and it is clear that behaviors
that increase distrust between parties and/or imply that either party is
not sufficiently committed to the cooperative effort undermine it. It is
important to recognize that assessments of trust and commitment are
based on perceptions, some accurate and some not. In order to reduce
the occurrence and magnitude of the effects of perceived violations of
trust and commitment, the second proposal prescribes that the parties
negotiate definitions and expectations of trust and commitment. By
"negotiate" I do not mean to imply contractually binding rights. The
overall objective is to delineate the kind of behaviors that lead each party
to infer that the other party has violated or diminished the level of trust
or commitment and to reach a compromise that both parties agree to
live by.
By negotiating trust and commitment, each party has an opportunity
to explain its view of what is expected from the other party. For instance,
consider the following true but anonymous case. Division headquarters
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informed plant management that they intended to subcontract out a
small proportion of plant production, which would displace 10 to 12
hourly employees. Affected employees were informed of their antici
pated displacement. After consultation with the local union chairman,
an alternative proposal was devised at the plant and, in turn, accepted by
division-level management. The affected employees were then notified
by both the plant superintendent and local chairman that a solution had
been found and they would not be displaced. A few days later, however,
the plant superintendent was notified that division management had
reversed its decision. The superintendent (without further consultation
with the local chairman) informed the employees that the subcontracting
decision had been reversed. In the eyes of the union membership, its
leadership in this case appeared to have no control over or input into
such key decisions; worse yet, the leadership appeared to have been
coopted by management. Having lost faith in the cooperative process
and support from its membership, the local union leadership sent out the
word to the rank-and-file that management was not to be trusted and that
the leadership now had serious reservations about ongoing joint
activities.
By discussing the kind of behaviors that diminish or violate trust and
the kind of responses that can be expected from such violations, the
parties can then negotiate behaviors that enhance cooperation, not
undermine it. In the above example, one condition of trust that could
have been negotiated is that any announcement or notification concern
ing displacement from subcontracting must first be presented to the
union leadership or, going further, announced jointly. In addition, the
parties could have agreed that the union leadership is not to withdraw its
support for joint activities until a given perceived violation of trust is
fully investigated and discussed within the appropriate joint steering or
policy committee.
Negotiation over an acceptable definition and acceptable behaviors
with respect to expected commitment to cooperative efforts is likewise
proposed. For example, take the case where a supervisor has decided to
have employees regularly work overtime instead of recalling laid-off
union members. To the local union leader, this may be perceived as a
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violation of commitment to cooperation if, indeed, the union leader
wants laid-off members recalled. As a form of political retaliation, the
union leader encourages members not to volunteer for team-based
activities the supervisor wants.
Upon discussion and negotiation, a solution to the above incident may
become clear. In the present actual case, the supervisor assumed he was
doing the right thing for the union; he had polled his employees, who
overwhelmingly voted to work overtime instead of recalling laid-off
members. However, the supervisor never queried the union leader for
his preferences. Angered, the union leader failed to discuss in any detail
with the supervisor, the dispute between them. Had the parties defined
and negotiated acceptable behaviors as they pertain to expectations
about commitment, the problematic circumstances that effectively led to
withdrawal of support for cooperation by the union leader could have
been avoided. Here, one could imagine that agreement could have been
reached in advance that supervision and the union leadership were
obligated to jointly decide the issue of overtime vs. recall anytime the
extent of overtime exceeded an agreed upon level. More broadly, the
parties could agree that supervision is not to make assumptions about
union leader preferences. It could also have been agreed that the union
leadership is obligated to consult with supervision when normal super
visory discretion is perceived as being inconsistent with expectations of
commitment.
As part of negotiating trust and commitment, the parties will need to
establish a means or procedure by which to settle disputes and repair
relations over violations of agreed upon behaviors. Those behaviors that
lead to serious disruption perhaps can be best resolved using the pro
cedures developed under the first proposal above. Less serious infrac
tions can be addressed and resolved by members of an appropriate joint
steering or policy committee. As a first step, the manager or union
representative who perceives that a representative of the union or man
agement has violated trust and/or commitment (as it has been negoti
ated) is obligated to bring it immediately to the attention of that indi
vidual. If after private conversation about the perceived violation, the
individuals to the dispute cannot resolve it in a mutually satisfactory
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way, then other members (if not all members) of the joint steering
committee are invited to discuss the dispute and help formulate a
resolution. The key here is that a procedure requiring immediate atten
tion to problems of trust and commitment be established, that the parties
know well in advance that certain actions or behaviors will be immedi
ately challenged, and that both labor and management are part of an
agreeable resolution.
Finally, perceptions are often inaccurate. In sensitive labor-manage
ment interactions, misperceptions are often the case, especially as the
parties move from strictly adversarial relations to cooperative arrange
ments. In the example above of perceived violation of commitment, the
supervisor was genuinely surprised at the union officer's reaction to the
use of overtime. By negotiating expectations of sufficient trust and
commitment and by immediately bringing any perceptions of violations
of trust and commitment to the attention of presumed offenders, many
misperceptions would be cleared up and truly unnecessary withdrawal
avoided.

Establish Labor©s Claim to Stake in Business Decisions and
Performance Gains
As first presented in the theoretical discussion in chapter 2, coopera
tion requires a different perspective and approach to labor's input into
management decisions and the division of gains than is required by
traditional collective bargaining. In traditional collective bargaining,
the division of gains is primarily determined by the relative power of the
parties. The introduction of cooperation, however, carries with it an
expectation that gains are shared fairly, according to each party's contri
bution to that gain. The clash inherent upon introducing cooperation to a
traditional adversarial relationship clearly demands that the parties
• identify where and how much union input into company
decisions is expected;
• agree to how union input contributes to cooperative gains
(directly and indirectly); and
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• agree to the union's share of income and security rewards
derivable from cooperation.
Where and How Much Input
In order to distribute fairly the gains derived from cooperation, it is
essential that the parties first agree as to where cooperative input is
expected. The organizational arrangements for union leader and mem
ber input is wide-ranging. These arrangements include employee
ownership and control (e.g. Weirton Steel and the Independent Steelworkers Union), consensus decisionmaking from top-to-bottom (LWW
and GM, Saturn Corporation), membership on company boards of
directors (e.g., currently, Chrysler and the UAW, and at one time
Eastern Airlines and the Machinists), and more traditional structures
with extensive cooperative activities but with ultimate executive author
ity (e.g., Xerox and the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
Union, and Ford and the UAW).
It is clear in any case that the choices for organizational arrangements
for union leader and member input are wide-ranging. One would search
in vain to find a satisfactory theoretical or empirical justification for
considering any one form as optimal across all settings. But, pragmat
ically, the parties can only benefit in the long run if they can fashion an
agreeable organizational arrangement regarding the points of union
input and the extent of that input. Problems enveloping trust and com
mitment arise from the lack of clarity or agreement as to the appropriate
degree of input and the points at which union input is expected. For
instance, it is heard frequently enough that plant-level joint decisions are
unilaterally overridden or "put on the back burner" by managers or
executives at the division or corporate level. These experiences can only
seriously frustrate the efforts at the plant level by undermining expecta
tions of company commitment to cooperation, unless, of course, it has
been agreed upon by both labor and management that joint decisionmaking occurs only at the plant level. If both parties or the union at the
plant level conclude that it is essential to the success of plant-level
cooperation to have division- or corporate-level joint decisionmaking,
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then arrangements need to be made to provide for upper-level union
input into upper-level management decisions.
The form and degree of union input or participation within the
hierarchy of the company must also be determined. For some union
leaders and/or their management counterparts, the acceptable choice is
that the top union leadership be consulted prior to company decisions.
For others, the choice may be some degree of union membership on
boards of directors, or regular consultation with executive committees,
or some form of majority or consensus decisionmaking by upper-level
joint policy committees. For others, the agreeable choice may be that
union input and participation be restricted to within the scope of tradi
tional plant-level decisions.
Although some observers of cooperative activities may argue that
union input at all levels of the company structure is essential to the
overall success of cooperative efforts, the real key is that the parties have
identified and sufficiently clarified the various points and degree of
union input and have agreed that these arrangements satisfy each party's
interests. The primary objective here is to eliminate misperceptions by
either labor or management as to where and how much input the union is
to have into traditional management decisions. Misperceptions of this
kind lead to serious problems of trust and commitment and, further
more, they make it very difficult to ascertain labor's claim to cooperative
gains.
Determine How Union Input Contributes to Performance Gains
Having established and clarified where and how much union input is
expected, the parties must next identify how union input contributes to
overall company performance. Centrally important to an equitable
distribution or sharing of gains from cooperation is the clarification of
that portion of any recognizable gain that is attributable to cooperative
activities. By way of example, if the company makes sizable capital
investments that lead to productivity gains, are these considered gains
obtained outside the cooperative effort? If efficiency gains are obtained
through elimination of restrictive work practices via concession bar-
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gaining, are these gains treated as coming from outside cooperative
efforts? If overall company performance improves (or worsens) due to
the performance of nonproduction business units or nonbargaining units
(e.g., from financial arms of the company), are these gains or losses
considered outside cooperative efforts?
Acceptable answers to these questions obviously must be decided by
the parties themselves. In some settings, the input of the union at the
corporate level may have led management to make capital investments
they otherwise would have foregone. Or capital investment decisions
may have been borne directly from proposals generated by joint teambased efforts at a given facility. Or in other instances, employers may
have based their investment decisions in part on the fact that joint
activities at the plant would maximize the returns to such investments.
As in the above examples where capital investment decisions are shaped
directly or indirectly by union involvement, unions typically will have
expectations that gains so derived are to be shared equitably. In other
settings or instances, management decisions on capital investments may
have been made independently of any union input or weight given to
more cooperative relations or joint programs at the plant level. Per
ceived as such, managers will expect any gains tied to capital investment
as theirs, except to the extent that labor via its relative power can demand
some of the gain.
With respect to gains obtained from concession bargaining, one could
imagine that in some cases unions agreed to the elimination of restrictive
practices as a quid pro quo for greater union input and participation in
traditional management decisions. As a quid pro quo, the union lead
ership and its members may very well expect to share the gains from
concessions, since they would not otherwise have agreed to them. In
other cases, efficiencies derived from concessions could not have oc
curred without a much more trustful relationship having been developed
through earlier cooperative efforts. As such, union leaders and mem
bers may perceive they are entitled to share these indirect cooperative
gains. In the third example above, management may hold that any
profitability derived from production or nonproduction business units in
which no cooperative efforts are ongoing is not subject to sharing,
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except as bargained for. Unions may hold otherwise, believing that these
other units indirectly profit from business units in which cooperation
does take place. By way of example, if a company's financial arm that
provides credit to customers is profitable, the union may perceive that its
profitability is tied to the price and quality of products sold. Because
price and quality have been made more attractive by cooperative efforts
in producing that product, the union can argue that the business unit
providing attractive financing has benefited in part and indirectly from
cooperation. Hence some of the profitability derived from the company's
financial credit arm is expected to be shared, without resort to adver
sarial negotiations.
The level of aggregation to which cooperative gains are tied is also a
key issue to be decided. Is the profitability to be shared tied only to a
given plant's performance, or to its division or operating company's
performance, or to overall corporate performance? When either party
believes any cooperative gains to be shared are based on a different level
of profit aggregation than the other party so perceives, then the parties
will remain in dispute over how the pie is to be shared— simply because
the potential size of the pie has not been agreed upon. Again, expecta
tions of receiving equitable sharing of cooperative gains are thwarted
and problems of perceived distrust and lack of commitment go
unresolved.
Agree On Equitable Sharing of Cooperative Gains
Finally, having agreed upon where in the organization there is to be
cooperative input, the extent of that input, and how that input contrib
utes directly and indirectly to cooperative gains, the parties need to
resolve differences of opinion regarding equitable sharing. As dis
cussed, although each party always prefers more over less, each party
ultimately wants nothing less than their perceived contribution to any
gain generated by cooperative activities. As one can readily imagine,
determining an equitable share becomes exceedingly complex. First, it
is difficult enough to accurately measure overall improvements, be they
productivity, quality, or efficiency gains. Except in the simplest con
texts, accurately measuring any gains due in full or in part to coopera-
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tion is probably impossible. For example, how does one measure labor's
contribution to cooperative gains derived from upper-level management
consultation with upper-level union leadership? How does one measure
labor's contribution to gains derived from capital investments, either
with respect to labor's input into those decisions or labor's utilization of
capital investments?
Second, not all performance gains or losses are due to cooperative
efforts. Yet the parties must reach some agreement as to what portion of
performance gains, if any, are to be divided based on equitable sharing,
the remaining portion to be divided by traditional bargaining. In spite of
the difficulty, if not impossibility, of accurately measuring the portion of
any overall gain attributable to cooperation and then measuring each
party's contribution to those cooperative gains, the parties still must
reach an explicit agreement of sharing the fruits of cooperation.
From the union's viewpoint, sharing the fruits of cooperation has as
much to do with job security as it does with compensation. The demor
alization that arises from continued employment losses cannot be under
estimated. Hence, agreements on sharing performance gains must be
fashioned around compensation and employment security.
With respect to compensation, some negotiated formula for perfor
mance gain sharing—be it gainsharing, profit sharing, and/or stock
ownership—should be negotiated. The formulas are used to make ex
plicit labor and management's equitable shares of performance improve
ments. As best the parties can, these performance sharing plans should
be tied to the various levels or points of cooperative input throughout the
organization.
At the plant level in multiplant companies, gainsharing based on
productivity or performance benchmarks may be most appropriate in
sharing gains (if any) from cooperative input at that level of organiza
tions. The formulas established necessarily should reflect the agreed
upon intensity or degree of input from labor. That is, formulas used
should satisfactorily reflect the perceptions of the amount of input for
each kind of input (i.e., the points of input) by labor and management.
For instance, if capital investments are made, the parties must agree how
much, if any, performance improvements derived from capital invest-
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ments go to labor. Where management decides and acts unilaterally to
make capital investments, but those decisions are predicated on the
union's cooperative spirit, then the negotiated formula should reflect
some measure of sharing any gains with labor as derived from such
investments. One can imagine that the union's proportionate share
would be smaller (say 10 percent of gains) than where capital investment
decisions were first proposed by joint teams or joint committees. Here,
the parties may agree that 25 or 50 percent of gains are to be shared with
labor. Similarly, the parties must address the proportion of gains to be
shared as derived from all other forms of union input and participation at
the plant. The key, of course, is tying the proportion of gains to the
degree of union input that leads to performance improvements.
As we move up the organization hierarchy to the division, group,
or operating company level and then on to corporate headquarters, mea
suring cooperative input and gains from cooperation becomes even
more complex (and in many cases, perhaps hopelessly so). Some
performance-sharing formula, however, must still be devised. Again,
the parties must decide the form of sharing and base that sharing on the
points of cooperative input. Given the added complexity and the more
steps removed from the cooperative input, it would be advisable that the
parties fashion some sort of profit sharing and/or stock ownership plan.
Although more removed from the actual cooperative input, the ambigu
ity inherent in tracing cooperative input to cooperative output demands a
more ambiguous performance-sharing formula. It remains essential
though that both labor and management come to agree that the method
and formula used reflect the parties'joint effort to tie performance gains,
at least roughly so, to cooperative gains (gotten both directly and
indirectly).
In summary, by constructing acceptable performance gain formulas,
the parties make explicit their perceptions and expectations of equitable
sharing from cooperative efforts and they distinguish between gains (or
losses) derived from traditional collective bargaining and those derived
from cooperation. In so doing, the parties eliminate (or greatly mini
mize) misperceptions about labor's claim to the company's wealth.
Performance sharing arrangements also carry with them other advan-
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tages. First they provide a mechanism by which the parties can better
assess and monitor their performance. As discussed in chapter 4, it
appears that performance gains from cooperation peak after a few years
and then decline. By better monitoring of successes and failures, if and
when performance begins to decline, the parties can more quickly and
vigorously tackle the factors or problems leading to waning perfor
mance. Second, advocates of performance-sharing arrangements
largely premise their advocation on the grounds that such plans provide
financial incentive for employees to become more committed to attain
ing performance improvements. As such, employees are more inclined
to actively participate in joint activities and more aggressively seek
solutions to problems and barriers impeding performance. Finally, it is
generally argued that performance-sharing arrangements not only allow
employees to share in the responsibility and gains of improving com
pany performance but also to share the risks associated with running a
business. By sharing the rewards and risks, employees are expected to
become more in tune with good business practices and managers are
expected to become more in tune with good employee and labormanagement relations practices. In turn, both parties learn to engage in
more optimal employment-related behaviors.
As recognized above, compensation is only part of the performancesharing equation; employment security is another. Underlying coopera
tion is the important notion that each party learns to better appreciate the
special interests of the other party. Underlying the trust and commitment
surrounding cooperation is the important notion that each party (having
recognized and having a better understanding of the legitimate interests
of the other) becomes more committed to seeing those legitimate inter
ests obtained. The issue at hand and one central to the long-run success
of cooperative efforts is employment security. Along these lines, em
ployees and union representatives expect that operational decisions give
considerable weight to potential employment displacement. Several
examples may best illustrate this point.
Strategic operational decisions about the opening and location of new
facilities, the assignment of new product lines, the closing or idling of
facilities, subcontracting bargaining unit work, and capital investments
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have been (short of contractual and NLRB-imposed restrictions) the
exclusive domain of management decisionmaking. In cooperative set
tings, however, the potential for substantial displacement carries with it
an expectation by labor that (1) management will seek alternative
business plans that minimize displacement while satisfying other legiti
mate business concerns, and (2) those local parties who have worked the
hardest at cooperation will be the least adversely affected. These legiti
mate expectations by unions require that strategic operational decisions
be influenced by employment security concerns. They obligate manage
ment, furthermore, to reward local parties who have demonstrated their
commitment to making joint activities successful. It is proposed herein
that labor and management negotiate or management make explicit up
front (a) the factors that are weighed in making various strategic opera
tional decisions, (b) the weight or ranking among factors of the impor
tance given to displacement of employees, and (c) the weight or ranking
among factors given to the success of local joint efforts in improving
productivity, quality, and operational efficiencies.
This proposal is not to imply that employment security or the reward
ing of local cooperative efforts are factors to be given the top priority
among all other factors (albeit that may be the optimal solution in some
cases). Instead, the above proposal requires the parties to agree over the
weighting or ranking among other factors of employment security and
rewarding local parties for their cooperative efforts. Having reached an
acceptable agreement, the parties are agreeing (at least for the present
and until renegotiated) that they can live by the agreement, without
misperceptions that lead to rising mistrust and diminishing commitment
to cooperation.

Summary and Conclusions
New Partnerships or Going in Circles?
Because of enormous and unrelenting market forces at work, labormanagement relations have had to change. The volatility of the market
during the late 1970s and throughout most of the 1980s, coupled with
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long-run market pressures, have required that unionized organizations
become far more adaptable and flexible and that they continually im
prove performance. At the corporate level of highly unionized manufac
turing, three grand labor relations strategies are currently being pur
sued: Union-Avoidance, Cooperation, and a Mixed strategy
encompassing elements of both union-avoidance and cooperation. In the
short run, Cooperators appear to have gained the edge with respect to
improving corporate performance. The longer-run outcome regarding
which strategy may prevail, however, is still in the making.
Primarily influenced by the strategic choices of their parent head
quarters, roughly half of the unionized manufacturing plants in the U.S.
have embarked on formalized cooperative activities. These activities
include joint team-based and committee-based programs. Only the
more intensive joint programs in these plants appear to be having
positive effects on plant performance and on labor-management rela
tionships. Where there are secure unions and high degrees of union
leader participation, gains are all the more sizable. Where employment
continues to decline and employers engage in subcontracting out bar
gaining unit work, gains from cooperation are difficult to achieve. The
evidence also indicates that the positive returns to joint efforts typically
wane after a few years.
Several general types of problems are typically encountered in coop
erative settings, problems that can seriously undermine the cooperative
spirit. These problems include violations of or insufficient trust and
commitment, demoralization from employment insecurity and antici
pated gains not achieved, and the inherent difficulties of juxtaposing or
interweaving traditional collective bargaining and cooperation.
Based on empirical analyses reported herein, several general implica
tions for unions can be derived. First, in the great majority of cases,
unions have little choice but to cooperate, because even traditional
adversarial relations of the past are no longer available to them. Second,
however, unions have many choices to make about what cooperation
entails. Third, union leaders, as advocates for the general welfare and
benefit of employees, must become tomorrow's human resource man
agement experts and must understand far better the running of a profit-
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able business. As advocates and experts, union leaders have the oppor
tunity to improve the lives of their members and simultaneously show
management the full potential for deriving necessary added value via the
improved management and utilization of its human resources.
American history shows that cooperation has been a short-lived
experience for nearly all unionized organizations. The widespread "ex
perimentation" of the present era, however, is unusual and signals that
conditions have greatly changed, giving some indication that coopera
tion in U.S. industry may ultimately become a workable alternative.
Nevertheless, the parties must find ways to avoid the pitfalls that have
destroyed earlier cooperative efforts. It is in this spirit that several
prescriptions for long-term success are proposed: namely, establish
triggers and procedures to resolve serious problems and crises, negoti
ate trust and commitment, and establish and clarify labor's stake in
business decisionmaking and labor's claim to sharing performance
gains.
Competitive threats to unionized enterprises have spurred coopera
tion, but those competitive threats can also destroy cooperative efforts
by pitting proponents and opponents of cooperation (within both man
agement and union ranks) against one another, as organizations faced by
shrinking markets struggle to find a way out. In that struggle, many
parties may lose by simply going in circles, with the potential fruits of
cooperation only an illusion. Those who can form workable part
nerships, on the other hand, with their eyes focused on continuous
improvement in their relations, are very likely to be tomorrow's
winners.

Appendix A

PLANT MANAGER SURVEY
Survey of Plants:
Management-Union Cooperation
Research Project
Management-union cooperative programs as defined for present pur
poses refer to activities devised and/or undertaken jointly with unions.
The focus of such programs may be on company performance (for
example, productivity committees or quality control circles), and/or
worker satisfaction and well being (for example, quality of work life,
employee involvement, and safety and health). Activities may also
entail some form of incentive arrangement to increase company prof
itability and employee compensation (for example, Scanlon or Rucker
gainsharing plans and profit sharing or ESOPs that include activities
designed to increase employee involvement).
If you have never established any such joint programs, please com
plete sections I, II, III and VII. If you have established any such
program, even if it has not been fully implemented or has been termi
nated, please complete all sections of this questionnaire.

Section I. Program Identification
Below is a table that identifies several kinds of programs. Under the
various stages of the process identified at the top of the table, please
provide the approximate month and year for each of the applicable
stages.
Even if you have not established any kind of joint program, please
indicate under column 1 if the establishment of any kind of joint
programs was given serious initial consideration, and if so, when.
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Program/ Activity

Month
L

Quality of Work Life

2.

Productivity Committee

3.

Quality Control Circles

4.

Work Teams

5.

Training Committee

6.

Industrial Relations Com.
(general problem solving)

7.

Scanlon Plan

8.

Rucker Plan

9.

Other Gainsharing Plan

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Health and Safety Comm.
Substance Abuse Comm.
ESOP (with employee
involvement activities)
Profit Sharing (with
employee involvement activities)
Other (describe)

Oversight
or Steering
Committee
Established

Considered
but Decided
Against
Year

Month

Year

Month

in

Program
Activity
Became
Widespread

Program
Activities
Began
Year

Month

NOT a
Joint
Program

Program
Terminated
\ear

Month

Year

oo

1
1
X

>
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Even if you have established or terminated any of the programs
identified below and they are not jointly coordinated efforts with the
union, please check this in the last column.

Section II. General Information About Plant
1.

What proportion of production workers are under the union con
tract identified in the cover letter? ____%

2.

How many unions represent employees in your plant? ____
What proportion of non-exempt office employees are under a
union contract? ____%

3.
4.

What is the average length of employment within the bargaining
unit? ____ years

5.

What proportion of the bargaining unit employees are
female? ____%

6.

Since 1975, what has been the extent of capital expenditures on
new technologies or automation within the plant?
Substantial ____ Modest ____ None ____ $____

7.

Since 1975, what proportion of the bargaining unit employees
have lost their jobs in the plant because of the introduction of new
technologies or automation? ____ %

8.

Since 1975, what proportion of bargaining unit jobs have been
subcontracted out on a permanent basis?
Substantial ____ Modest ____ None ____ ____%

9.

Since 1975, would you characterize any round of negotiations as
"concession" bargaining (i.e., wage or benefit freezes or cut
backs, elimination of restrictive work rules, etc)?
No ____ Yes ____
If yes, in what year or years were such concessions negoti
ated? ____ ____ ____

10.

Is there an Area-Wide Joint Labor-Management Committee in the
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locality of your plant?
Yes ____ No ____ Don't know
11.

Is there an Industry-Wide Joint Labor Management Committee in
your industry?
Yes ____ No ____ Don't know ____

Section III. Comparison of 1976-1980 Period to 1981-1985 Period
Comparing the 1976-1980 period to the 1981-1985 period, please
indicate the extent to which the variables identified below have changed
since the 1976-1980 period.
Extent of Change
Variable

Much
Higher

1.

Total level of production

____

2.

Plant capacity utilization

3.

Productivity per unit of labor

Modestly About Modestly
Higher the Same Lower
____

____

____

____

____

____

Much
Lower

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

4.

Product quality

____

____

____

____

____

5.

Rate of scrappage or waste

____

____

____

____

____

6.

Restrictiveness of work rules

____

____

____

____

____

7.

Rate of grievances

____

____

_____

____

____

8.

Rate of absenteeism/tardiness

____

____

____

____

____

9.

Adversarial relationship with
union

10.

Adversarial relationship be
tween supervisors and work
force
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Section IV. Structure and Focus of Program Activities
A.

B.

Including any j oint program that may have been terminated, please
briefly describe the focus and structure of the joint effort that you
consider to be the most important to management objectives,
excluding health and safety activities. (If you have some documen
tation describing the focus and structure of this program, feel free
to submit that in place of your description under 2 below.)
1.

Key problem(s) that led to and is addressed by program: (e. g.,
productivity, quality, absenteeism)

2.

Structure of kind of activities: (e. g., work team arrangements,
ad hoc tasks groups, regular meetings for employee input,
etc.)

In reference to the program identified above, please indicate:
1.
2.

the proportion of bargaining unit employees covered by the
program: ____ %
the frequency of scheduled meetings for
the highest level steering committee: every ____
weeks
(b) the lowest level work groups or teams, (if applicable):
every ____ weeks
the number and proportion of union representatives on the
% ____
highest level steering committee: # ____
(a)

3.
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4.

who initially promoted the development of the program:
parent company ____

C.

D.

plant management __

union __
division headquarters____
please iden
terminated,
If the program identified above has been
tify what you believe to be the key factors leading to its termination.

To what extent has your plant worked with the following organiza
tions in designing and/or implementing cooperative programs?

Organization
Area-Wide Joint Labor-Management
Committee

Not at all

Some

Very Much

___

___

___

Industry-Wide Joint LaborManagement Committee
Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service (FMCS)
U.S. Department of Labor

Section V: Comparison of Conditions Before and After Joint
Program Implementation
Comparing the five year period prior to implementation of the most
important joint program identified above, please indicate the degree to
which the variables identified below have changed.
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Extent of Change

1.

Variable

Much
Higher

Total level of production

____

Modestly About Modestly
Higher the Same Lower
____

____

____

Much
Lower
____

2.

Plant capacity utilization

____

____

____

____

____

3.

Productivity per unit of labor

____

____

____

____

____

4.

Product quality

____

____

____

____

____

5.

Rate of scrappage or waste

____

____

____

____

____

6.

Restrict!veness of work rules

____

____

____

____

____

7.

Rate of grievances

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

8.

Rate of absenteeism/tardiness

9.

Adversarial relationship with
union

10.

Adversarial relationship be
tween supervisors and work
force
Cooperative spirit in contract
negotiations

11.
12.

Other conditions that have
changed (describe)

Section VI. Difficulties in Implementing and Maintaining Joint
Program Activities
Problems obviously arise as joint program activities are imple
mented. To what extent have the following problems affected the suc
cessful implementation and maintenance of your most important joint
program, identified above?
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Extent of Problem

Potential
Problems

Not a
Problem

Somewhat
a Problem

Important
Factor in
Very much Termination
a Problem of Program

1.

Lack of experience or expertise in
devising and implementing joint
programs.
_____

_____

_____

_____

2.

Lack of sufficient trust between
parties.
_____

_____

_____

_____

3.

Lack of adequate preparation of plant
management for change.
_____

_____

_____

_____

4.

Lack of adequate orientation and
training for bargaining unit employ-

5.

Perceived lack of commitment by up
per management.

6.

Lack of broad commitment among
plant managers.

7.

Lack of broad commitment by union
leaders.

8.

Difficulty juxtaposing cooperation
and contract negotiations.

9.

Difficulty juxtaposing cooperation
and contract administration.

Other that the potential problems identified above, please briefly
describe other problems that you have encountered and/or elaborate, if
you wish, on any of potential problems identified above.

Section VII.
Please identify the top labor relations executive at the parent company
or division headquarters who would be most familiar with labor rela-
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tions at all the company's plants. If your company is a single plant
company, simply check here:
single plant company ____
Top labor relations executive:

parent headquarters
division headquarters

Name:
_______________________
Title
_______________________
Address: _______________________

Phone:
Finally: please enclose a copy of your current labor agreement.
Name of Respondent: __________________
Company of Respondent: ________________
Thank you again for responding to this questionnaire. As
soon as the results have been compiled and analyzed, I will
send you a copy of the key findings.

Appendix B

UNION LEADER SURVEY
Survey of Local Unions:
Joint Labor-Management Relations
Project
Union-management cooperative programs as defined for present pur
poses refer to activities undertaken jointly between companies and
unions. The focus of such programs may be on company performance
(for example, productivity committees or quality control circles), and/
or worker satisfaction and well being (for example, quality of work life,
employee involvement, and safety and health). Activities may also
entail some form of incentive arrangement to increase company prof
itability and employee compensation (for example, Scanlon or Rucker
gainsharing plans and profit sharing that include activities designed to
increase employee involvement).
If you have never established any such joint programs, please com
plete sections I, II, and VI. If you have established any such program,
even if it has not been fully implemented or has been terminated, please
complete all sections of this questionnaire.
Lastly, questions that refer to this company or this plant pertain to
the bargaining unit employees represented by your local union at the
plant of the company identified in the cover letter.

SECTION I. Program Identification
Below is a table that identifies several kinds of programs. Under the
various stages of the process identified at the top of the table, please
provide the approximate months and year for each of the applicable
stages.
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Joint
Program/Activity

Considered
but Decided
Against
Month

2.

Quality of Work Life
Productivity Committee

3.

Quality Control Circles

1.

Year

Oversight
or Steering
Committee
Established
Month

Year

Program
Activities
Began
Month

Year

Program
Activity
Became
Widespread
Month

Year

<§ s- E?
O

Program
Terminated
Month

Year
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4.

Work Teams

5.

Training Committee

6.

Industrial Relations Com.
(general problem solving)

7.

Scanlon Plan

8.

Rucker Plan

9.

Other Gainsharing Plan

I&E
p B a

10.

Health and Safety Comm.

lie

11.

Substance Abuse Comm.

12.

ESOP (with employee involvement activities)

13.

Profit Sharing (with
employee involvement activities)

14.

Other?
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g. & 2
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S «

8
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SECTION II. General Information about Union and Plant
1.

What proportion of production workers are represented by your
union in this plant? ____ %

2.

Which of the following best describes the bargaining structure
between your union and this company?
Master agreement with more than one plant of this com
pany, plus supplemental local agreements at each
plant. ____
b. Single-plant agreement between your local and this
plant. ____

a.

3.

c.

Multi-employer agreement between your union and more
than one company ____

d.

Multi-union agreement between one or more additional
unions and this company. _____

Do you have a union-shop security clause in your agreement
with this company?
____ Yes ____ No

4.

Do representatives from the national or regional union offices
actively participate in your contract negotiations?
____ Yes ____ No

5.

Does the national union require national union approval of
contracts negotiated by your local?
____ Yes ____ No

6.

Does your local union represent employees at other companies
in your area?
____ Yes ____ No
If yes, how many other companies? ____
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7.
8.

In what year did your union negotiate its first agreement with
this company at your plant? ____
Is the top local officer elected by the local membership or is he
or she an appointed business agent?
____ elected by local membership
J

9.

f

____ appointed
business agent
IT IT

How long has the current top local officer been in his/her
position?
____ Years

10.

What is the average length of employment within the bargaining
unit?
____ Years

11.
12.

What proportion of the bargaining unit employees are
female? ____ %
Since 1975, would you characterize any round of negotiations
with this company as "concession" bargaining (where, for ex
ample, wages or benefits were frozen or cut or protective work
rules were modified)?
____ Yes ____ No
If yes, in what year or years were such concessions negotiated?

13.

14.

To what extent does the local union leadership trust manage
ment's capabilities to manage this company?
____ Very little

____ Much

____ Little

____ Very much

To what extent does this company treat the union as having a
legitimate right to represent workers?
____ Very little right ____ Little right
____ Full right
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Which of the following best describes the overall relationship
between the bargaining unit and local management?
____ Very good

____ Poor

____ Satisfactory

____ Very poor

Is there an Area-Wide Joint Labor-Management Committee in
your locality?
____ Yes ____ No ____ Don't know

17.

Is there an Industry-Wide Joint Labor-Management Committee
in your industry?
____ No ____ Don't know

18.

To what extend do the following parties support the establish
ment of joint labor-management programs?
Generally
Opposed

Neutral

Generally
in Favor

Local Union Leaders
National Union Leaders

____

____

_____

____

____

____

Local Union Members
Plant Management

____

____

_____

____

_____

____

Company Executives

____

____

____

Party

SECTION HI. Structure and Focus of Program Activities
A.

Including any joint program that may have been terminated,
please briefly describe the focus and structure of the joint effort
that you consider to be the most important to union objectives
(excluding health and safety activities).
1.

Key problem(s) that led to and is addressed by program
(for example, quality of work life, job security, low produc
tivity, etc.):
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2.

B.

Kind of joint activities (for example, work team arrange
ments, ad hoc tasks groups, regular meetings for employee
input, etc.):

In reference to the program identified above, please answer the
following questions.
1 . What proportion of bargaining unit employees are covered
by the program?
2.

3.

How frequent are meetings held by:
(a) the highest level steering committee?
every ____ weeks
(b) the shop floor work groups or teams (if applicable)?
every ____ weeks
Are these meetings well attended by committee or team
members? (please check)

Appendix B

Very Well
Attended

Well
Attended
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Poorly
Attended

(a) Steering
Committee
Meetings
(b) Shop Floor
Committee
Meetings

4.

How many union and company representatives sit on the
highest level steering committee?
____ # union rep.

5.

____ # company rep.

Who first promoted the development of the joint program?
____ union ____ company ____ both union
and company

C.

Have any union representatives been assigned or elected by the
union to act as joint program coordinators or facilitators?
____ Yes ____ No
If yes, how many union representatives are full-time or part-time
coordinators or facilitators?

____ # full-time ____ # part-time
D. To what extent are joint labor-management activities allowed to
modify either work rules or wages and benefits negotiated in the
labor agreement? (please check)

Work rules
Wages and
benefits

Not at all

Very little

Little

Much

___

___

___

___

___

___

___

___
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If work rules and/or wages and benefits can be modified through
joint activities, what procedure or rules are followed in making
modifications? (please briefly describe)

E.

To what extent do union representatives who serve on the con
tract negotiation team or who are regular grievance committeemen also serve in key positions in joint labor-management
committees?

____ Not at all
____ Much overlap
____ Very little overlap
____ Very much overlap
E Has the national or regional union office provided expertise or
resources to your local for joint labor-management activities?
____ Yes ____ No
G. Has any neutral outside consultant(s) been used to help facilitate
your joint efforts?
____ Yes ____ No
H. To what extent have tradeoffs been made between promotion of
the union's social concerns or objectives (for example, concerns
for older workers, minorities, females, safety and health, etc.)
and joint labor-management program objectives?
Considerable tradeoff ____ Some tradeoff ____
Little or no tradeoff ____
I. To what extent has your plant worked with the following organi
zations in designing and/or implementing cooperative programs?
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Organization

Not at all

Some
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Very Much

Area-Wide Joint LaborManagement Committee
Industry-Wide Joint
Labor-Management
Committee
Federal Mediation &
Conciliation Service
(FMCS)
U.S. Department of
Labor

SECTION IV. Comparison of Conditions Before and After Joint
Program Implementation
Comparing the five year period prior to implementation of the most
important joint program identified above, please indicate the degree to
which the variables identified below have changed.
Extent of Change
Variable
1.

Union member satisfaction
with job tasks.

2.

Level of job security.

3.

Work conditions and quality
of work life.

4.

Sharing of information by
management.

5.

Management understanding
of worker interests and
problems.

6.

Management understanding
of union role, interests, and
objectives.

Much
Higher

Modestly About Modestly
Higher the Same Lower

Much
Lower
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7.

Union leaders' understanding
of management's business in
terests and problems.

8.

Union members' understand
ing of management's business
interests and problems.

9.

Joint problem solving rela
tionship between union lead
ers and managers.

10.

Union input into business
decisions.

11.

Cooperative spirit in contract
negotiations.

12.

Problem solving relationship
between supervisors and
union members.

13.

Union's ability to resolve
member grievances or prob
lems satisfactorily.

14.

Union member commitment
to union

15.

Union member commitment
to company.

16.

Public image of union.

17.

Worker productivity.

18.

Product quality.

19.

Level of scrappage or waste.

20.

Rate of grievances.

21.

Rate of absenteeism/tardi
ness.

22.

Flexibility of work rules.

23.

Other variables?

SECTION V. Problems in Implementing and Maintaining Joint
Program Activities
Problems obviously arise as joint program activities are imple
mented. To what extent have the following problems affected the sue-
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cessful implementation and maintenance of your most important joint
program, identified above?
Extent of Problem

Potential
Problems

Not a
Problem

Important
Factor in
Somewhat Very much Termination
a Problem a Problem of Program

1.

Lack of experience or expertise in
devising and implementing joint
programs.
_____

2.

Lack of sufficient trust between
parties.
_____

_____

_____

_____

3.

Violation of trust by either party.

_____

_____

_____

_____

4.

Lack of adequate preparation of
plant management for change.
_____

_____

_____

_____

5.

Lack of adequate orientation and
training for bargaining unit em
ployees for change.
_____

_____

_____

_____

6.

Lack of commitment by upper
management.
_____

_____

_____

_____

7.

Lack of broad commitment among
plant managers.
_____

_____

_____

_____

8.

TUrnover of key managers.

_____

_____

_____

9.

Lack of broad commitment by
union leaders.

10.

TUrnover of key union leaders.

11.

Skepticism or lack of interest by
workers.

12.

Balancing joint activities and con
tract negotiations

13.

Balancing joint activities and con
tract administration (e.g. griev
ance handling).

14.

Perceived manipulation of pro
gram (or bonus formula) by
management.

15.

Perception by workers that union
leadership has been coopted by
management.

16.

Insufficient job security.

_____

_____

_____

_____
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17.

Continued reduction in work
force.

18.

Expected gains from program not
gotten.

Other than the potential problems identified above, please briefly
describe other problems that you have encountered and/or elaborate, if
you wish on any of potential problems identified above.

SECTION VI. Thank you again for responding to this questionnaire.
As soon as the results have been compiled and analyzed, I will send you
a summary of the key findings.
Name of Respondent:
Name of Union:
Phone number:
Lastly, as part of the analysis, it would be very helpful to have a copy
of your current labor agreement. Therefore, we ask that you please
enclose a copy of your agreement.

Appendix C

HEADQUARTERS EXECUTIVE
SURVEY
Management-Union Cooperation
Research Project
A.

Company Structure
1.

2.

3.

At what operating level are key strategic decisions made
regarding manufacturing operations (i.e., major capital
investments, acquisitions, plant closure, etc.)?
____ parent
headquarters

____ subsidiary
headquarters

____ operating
f
&
headquarters

____ division
headquarters

At what operating level are key strategic policies made regard
ing labor-management relations (i.e., key negotiation issues,
union avoidance, joint management-union activities, etc.)?
____ parent
headquarters

____ subsidiary
headquarters

____ operating
headquarters

____ division
headquarters

If you represent a subsidiary, operating company, or division
of a parent company, please complete a, b, c, and d below.
(a)

(b)

Name of Parent Co.: __________________
Address: __________________

Top labor relations executive at parent headquarters.
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Name:
Phone:
(c)

Name of subsidiary, operating company, or division
headquarters that you represent:
Name of Organization: _______________

____ subsidiary ____operating co.
____ division
(d) By drawing arrows between the organizational units
below, indicate the linkages between your subsidary,
operating company or divison and the parent
company:

Parent Co.

Operating Co.

Subsidiary
Division

Please answer the questions below as they apply to your level
within the organization structure (parent company, subsidiary,
etc.).
These data are for statistical purposes only. All answers will
remain confidential.
B. Manufacturing Facilities
1.

How many domestic manufacturing plants are there within
the company?
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____ # of unionized facilities ____ # of non-union
facilities
2.

Since 1975, how many domestic manufacturing plants have
been opened or acquired and are still in operation?
____ # of unionized plants ____ # of non-union
plants

3.

Since 1975, how many domestic manufacturing plants have
been permanently shut down?
____ # of unionized plants ____ # of non-union
plants

4.

How many unionized domestic manufacturing plants have
some formalized joint management-union activities de
signed to improve company performance and/or quality of
work life? ____

5.

How many manufacturing plants are located outside of
North America? ____

6.

Approximately what proportion of total manufacturing pro
duction is produced outside North America? ____ %
total production.

7.

Approximately what proportion of total manufacturing
products (components and finished goods) are sold outside
North America? ____ % total worldwide sales.

8.

Since 1975, have there been any major changes in company
structure due to merger with other companies, major ac
quisitions, or joint ventures? Yes ____ No ____
If yes, please briefly identify these mergers, acquisitions, or
joint ventures.
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Company Policy In Unionized Facilities
1. In general, company executives are
____ not in favor of ____ in favor of
____ indifferent to joint management-union programs
or activities.
2.

Specifically, the company has:

(check one)

instructed plant management to actively pur
sue joint management-union activities.
____ b. instructed management NOT to engage in
joint management-union activities.
____ c. left the decision to engage in joint manage
ment-union activities to plant level managers.
To what extent are top union officers involved in strategic
management decisions affecting your manufacturing
operations?

____ a.

3.

___ very much involved ___ somewhat involved
___ much involved

___ not involved

Please briefly describe any such involvement.

______

In general, it is company policy to:
____ strongly oppose ____ oppose
____ remain neutral to union representation of non
union manufacturing plants.
How many union organizing drives have occurred in the last
5 years at your manufacturing plants?
____ # of successful union organizing drives
____ # of unsuccessful union organizing drives
Have there been any union decertification efforts in the last
5 years at your manufacturing plant?

Appendix C

Yes ____ No ____
If yes, how many?
____ # of decertification drives unions have lost
_____ # of decertification drives unions have won
Thank you again for your assistance.
D.

Respondent
Name:

_________________

Title:

_________________

Company:

_________________

Address:

________________

Phone:
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